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ABSTRACT
In the first chapter of this dissertation, I hypothesize that several non-tax-driven benefits of debt
induce REITs managers to issue debt despite no apparent tax-driven benefit. Several
methodologies and tests applied in capital structure literature are introduced to the literature of
REITs capital structure. First, I investigate how the market prices leverage in absence of taxdeductibility benefit. Then, I diagnose the relative importance of several non-tax-driven benefits
of leverage in deriving the capital structure decisions of REITs. Third, I conduct a thought
investment experiment with debt-restricted vs. non-restricted REITs portfolios. I find weak
evidence that leverage, by itself, creates value. Nevertheless, I find strong evidence that during
financial crisis debt-restricted REITs perform better than non-restricted ones. Also I find
evidence that lends support to the pecking order story of leverage. I conclude that REITs
managers issue debt mainly to avoid issuing equity and to maximize wealth of existing
shareholders.
The second chapter addresses corporate diversification discount. I present and test a hypothesis
that diversifiers exchange immediate diversification discount with future value gain attributed to
unanticipated financial and strategic advantages of diversification. Two implications of this
hypothesis are tested in this dissertation. First, the initial diversification discount found in static
methodologies should be attenuated in a dynamic analysis. Second, diversifier’s value evolution
patterns are driven by the materialization of certain financial and strategic efficiencies. The
overall results indicate that there is value recovery over time. Diversifiers’ performance and
value evolution is dynamically linked to synchronous improvements in market power, internal
capital market activities, and cost efficiencies. Further, consistent with current evidence in

ix

diversification literature, related diversifiers outperform unrelated diversifiers. Moreover,
related diversifiers witness faster value recovery relative to unrelated diversifiers.

Key words: REITs, Capital Structure, Diversification Discount, Mergers and Acquisition.
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Chapter 1: Essay on the Capital Structure Properties of Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITs)
I.

Introduction

It is puzzling that the managers of REITs issue substantial amounts of debt despite no
apparent benefits (Ott, Riddiough, and Yi, 2005). Classic capital structure theories
(Modigilani and Miller, 1958 & 1963 and Miller 1977) suggest that leverage-increasing
policies add value in the form of tax deductibility. Trade-off theory posits that an optimal
level of leverage exists where the marginal benefit of debt (tax-deductibility) equals
marginal costs of debt (costs of bankruptcy, agency costs of debt, and debt overhang).
Due to their unique regulatory environment, REITs do not pay corporate income tax and
thus do not enjoy the classical tax-deductibility benefit of leverage1. Therefore, the static
trade-off theory of capital structure suggests that REITs use of debt should be minimal
because tax saving does not exist (Howe and Shilling, 1988). However, anecdotal
observation and the findings of previous studies (such as Howe and Shilling, 1988;
Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans, 2001; and Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans, 2007) suggest the
opposite. An influential paper by Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans (2007) investigated the
puzzling borrowing behavior of REITs and shows that REITs carry more than 50% of
debt at IPO, and the debt ratio gradually increases to 65% in 10 years. They attribute this
phenomenon to the special regulatory environment of REITs. Nonetheless, in their
conclusion they concur with Ott, Riddiough, and Yi (2005) that there is no apparent
benefit to debt and, thus, debt issuance by REITs is puzzling.

1

REITs are tax-exempted if they pay 90% of earnings as dividend; this provision eliminates the taxdeductibility advantage of debt (Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans, 2007)

Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans (2007) suggest that one potential motivation for debt issuance
in REITs is the monitoring benefit of debt. This claim fits well with the agency cost
theory of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) which implies that mandatory interest payment
restricts managers access to cash flow (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Ramman, 2005) as
well as managers empire-building behavior (Hart and Moor, 1995). Further, Feng, Ghosh
and Sirmans (2007) highlight that monitoring is a special concern in real estate sector
because the market for corporate control is weak. In this dissertation, I respond to this
particular research invitation but I also take a more comprehensive approach to explain
REITs borrowing behavior. In particular, I investigate REITs leverage in three different
approaches.
First, I investigate whether leverage-increasing policies in REITs create value. This has
been tested, and almost confirmed, in non-REIT capital structure literature. Numerous
studies report value gain associated with leverage-increasing policies in general samples2
(such as Masulis (1980), Masulis (1983), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Mikkelson and
Partch (1986), Pinegar and Lease (1986) Howe and Shilling (1988), and Ghosh, Nag, and
Sirmans (2001)). In REITs literature, this implication has also been tested by few authors
(such as Howe and Shilling, 1988; and Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans, 2001) and supporting
evidences where found. However, methodologies used in the REIT capital structure
literature are limited to short-run event study. In contrast, the regression approach used in
this dissertation captures the sustained leverage-induced value change (Fama and French,
1998). I use quarterly REITs data in OLS regression. The dependent variable is the

2

Howe and Shilling (1988) and Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans (2007) note that little work has been done on
non-tax-paying entities and capital structure literature has conventionally excluded REITs and, therefore,
capital structure of REITs is largely unexplored

2

spread of market value over book value. The independent variables are proxies for
investment, growth, dividend policy and leverage. I use models and specifications found
in Fama and French (1998), the coefficient on change in capital structure variable
measures the leverage-induced value gain. I expect to obtain significant positive
coefficient that indicates existence of value gain of leverage in absence of apparent taxdriven benefits. However, unlike other REIT capital structure studies, the coefficients in
this study capture only the non-tax-driven value gain of leverage.
Second, I ask which theory of capital structure seems to explain REITs’ capital structure
behavior. While classic capital structure theories focus on the tax consequences of
leverage, non-tax-based theories of capital structure suggest that business entities issue
debt for several plausible reasons including: 1) lowering the adverse selection cost of
equity, 2) monitoring, and 3) signaling. I focus mainly on pecking order theory, agency
cost theory, and signaling hypothesis. Lowering the adverse selection cost of equity is
suggested by the pecking order theory of capital structure proposed by Myers and Majluf,
1984 who argue that market participants discount firm’s new issues of securities because
they suspect that managers are likely to issue equity only when stocks are overvalued.
Consequently, managers refrain from issuing equity, in general, and choose to issue debt
to reduce this adverse selection cost of equity. Debt issuance also mitigates agency
problems such as the perquisite spending and empire building behavior (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976) and free cash flow problem (Jensen, 1986) because debt payouts are
mandatory (unlike equity payouts). Further, debt financing offers the benefit of
monitoring undertaken by savvy lenders. In a sense, debt serves as a substitute to
alternative monitoring mechanism (Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans, 2007) that reduces agency
3

cost. Finally, under the signaling hypothesis (Ross 1977, Myers and Majluf, 1984, and
Miller and Rock, 1985), managers are informationally advantaged relative to
shareholders and other market participants. Managers do not explicitly disclose their
information. Rather, they send signals to the market. Because debt payouts are mandatory
while equity payouts are not, issuance of debt implies capability of bearing the mandatory
burden of servicing the debt. Thus, debt issuance signals prosperous future and/or
financial stability.
In order to address the second question, I investigate the determinants of REITs capital
structure policy as predicted by extant theories of capital structure. Fama and French
(2002) present a comprehensive model that accounts for different capital structure
theories. If pecking order theory implications derive REITs capital structure, we should
find that REITs with higher (lower) existing investment must, after controlling for
profitability, be more (less) leveraged. Similarly, REITs with higher (lower) profitability
must, after controlling for investment, issue less (more) debt. Further, REITs with higher
(lower) expected investment opportunities must, controlling for existing investment and
profitability, be less (more) leveraged. Under the agency costs theory the major benefits
of debt is monitoring. Thus, REITs with more (less) investments must, controlling for
profitability, need less (more) monitoring and issue less (more) debt. Similarly, REITs
with higher (lower) profitability, controlling for investments, issue more (less) debt to
restrict managers’ spending. Finally, signaling theories implies that managers issue debt
to signal a prosperous future or a financially stable firm. Therefore, REITs with higher
(lower) existing and expected investments and profitability carry more (less) debt. In
summary, we can use the predicted impact of profitability and investment opportunities
4

on capital structure to judge which theory prevails and, consequently, what derives
leverage issuance decisions. This approach is found in Fama and French (2002).
Specifically, I regress changes on capital structure in REITs on several proxies of
profitability and investment opportunities. I expect to be able to identify how the benefits
of leverage (lowering adverse selection of equity, monitoring, mitigation of free cash
flow problem, and signaling prosperous future) derive to the REITs capital structure.
Third, I conduct a thought experiment on debt-restricted REITs. I construct a debtrestricted portfolios and a non-restricted portfolios and track their performance over
1990-2010. I collect quarterly data on 163 active REIT’s (CIS code 6798) from
COMPUSTAT databases over the period 1990Q1-2009Q4 (there are 80 quarters). I
create two debt-restricted REIT portfolio based on equal-weighting and value-weighting
schemes. The filtering threshold is a maximum of 33% debt ratio. For the purpose of
comparison, I form two non-restricted portfolios (one equally-weighted and one valueweighted) composed of all the REITs that do not pass the filtering criterion.
The contribution of my dissertation is three-folded. First, I am attempting the resolve the
existing puzzle of observed REITs capital structure behavior (Ott, Riddiough, and Yi,
2005 and Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans, 2007). Second, Howe and Shilling (1988) note that
little empirical work has been done on non-tax-paying entities. In addition, Feng, Ghosh
and Sirmans (2007) note that capital structure literature has conventionally excluded
REITs from studied samples due to their unique regulatory environment. As such, capital
structure of REITs is largely unexplored and thus my work contributes to our knowledge
in this area. Third, my work contributes to the broader corporate capital structure
literature. In fact, after almost half a century from the seminal work of M&M (1958,
5

1963) we still cannot say for sure whether tax-driven advantages of leverage are of firstorder importance in capital structure policy. Further, according to Fama and French
(1988), there is little convincing evidence on how taxes affect the pricing of dividends
and debt. A good deal of the ambiguity, in my opinion, is attributed to the mixed nature
of leverage consequences. My work exploits the unique regulatory environment of REITs
where the focus is on the magnitude and determinants of non-tax-driven value gain of
leverage.
I found evidence that, in contrast with Fama and French (1998) findings with broader
sample, REITs do not gain or loss value by altering their capital structure. The average of
period slopes (the approach of Fama and MacBeth (1973) used by Fama and French,
1998) on current, past and future leverage are statistically insignificant. In fact, I found
that only dividend policy (but not investment or leverage policy) contributes to value in
REITs. Nevertheless, to overcome a potential smaller sample caveat 3 , I re-run the
regressions with all data points (REIT-quarter) in the sample to obtain “global slopes.” I
found that current and future (expected) increases in leverage policy add value but past
increases do not. However, controlling for investment and profitability eliminates this
value gain of current leverage policy. I conclude that current leverage, by itself, does not
explain variation on value in REITs. I found, however, that past changes in leverage,
controlling for investment and dividend and profitability, add value in REIT but the
economical impact is very small. Future changes in leverage policy, controlling for
investment and dividend and profitability, has negative impact on value.

3

My sample includes REITs only and it is much smaller that Fama and French 2002 sample of all
companies in Compustat excluding utilities and financials and regulated entities (such as REITs).

6

I also find evidence that lends support to pecking order theory in particular. This is
consistent with previous findings in broader non-REIT samples (Long and Malitz (1985),
Rajan and Zingales (1995) and

Fama and French (2002). I conclude that REITs

managers attempt to maximize wealth of existing shareholders by refraining from issuing
equity (unless stocks are overvalued) and rely heavily on debt to finance investments.
In the thought investment experiment, I find that restricted portfolio performs better in
value-weighted (but not in equal-weighted) portfolios in both average return and
volatility. The BHR analysis reveals similar results where restricted equally-weighted
portfolio always underperformed the non-restricted one while restricted value-weighted
portfolio always outperformed the non-restricted one. During the recent crisis period,
however, restricted portfolio outperformed the non-restricted one in both equallyweighting and value-weighting schemes. Using Jensen’s alpha approach, I find that in
equally-weighting portfolios non-constrained REITs outperform the constrained ones and
there is no difference between restricted and non-restricted REITs in value weighted
portfolios. Finally, I use Fama and French (1993 and 1996) three-factor model and
Carhart (1997) four-factor market equilibrium model. I find that when other risk factors
are controlled for, there is no convincing evidence that restricted portfolio’s performance
differ from the non-restricted one and that market-wide risk-return characteristics are
more important than leverage (restricted vs. non-restricted) characteristics.
The rest of this dissertation unfolds as follows. Section II summarizes important capital
structure theories and focuses on particular implications used in this dissertation. In
particular, I focus on the distinction between tax-driven and non-tax-driven advantages of
debt and the implications of each. Section III develops the hypotheses tested and explains
7

the sample used. Section IV investigates the value-adding property of leverage. Section V
investigate the determinants of leverage benefits. Section VI explains the thought
investment experiment and its findings. Section VII summarizes my work and highlights
major conclusions.

8

II.

A Premier on Major Theories of Capital Structure (Literature
Review)

In this section I summarize major theories of capital structure and highlight their
implications that are relevant to this dissertation. I also document some empirical
evidence. I start with classical Modigliani and Miller propositions then I move to tradeoff theory. Next, I supply a brief discussion of recent not tax-based capital structure
theories.
A. Tax-based Theories of Capital Structure – Modigliani and Miller (1958, 1963)
and Miller (1977) Propositions
Academicians date capital structure debate to Modigliani and Miller (1958) proposition
that in frictionless markets4 firm’s value, in equilibrium, is unaffected by their capital
structure. Therefore, value of a leveraged firm equals the value of identical unleveraged
one:
(E 1)
Where:
:
:
:

Value of leveraged firm
Value of identical but un-leveraged firm
Present value function

The main prediction of this model is that firm value is invariant with capital structure.
Figure 1 below illustrates this notion.
4

In particular, no corporate or personal taxes and no cost of bankruptcy or financial distress. In addition to
other assumptions such as no information asymmetry and no transaction costs. In effect, investors have the
same access to financial markets as firms, which allows for homemade leverage. Homemade leverage
means that investors can alter firm-made capital structure decisions to fit their own preferences, thus firmmade capital structure is irrelevant.

9

Figure 1 – Illustration of the implications of Modigliani and Miller’s
(1958) Proposition

Modigliani and Miller (1963) introduced corporate tax (but not personal taxes and no
financial distress and other costs of debt) into the capital structure model and show that
the value of a leveraged firm equals the value of an identical unleveraged firm plus the
value of debt’s side effect: interest tax-deductibility.5 They show that interests outlays
lower total tax liability so that each

paid in interest results in tax savings of

.

Hence:

(E 2)6

5

Under current corporate taxation system, debt payouts (interests) are paid out of before-tax income and
equity payouts (dividends) are paid out of after-tax income. Hence, debt payouts reduce tax liability while
equity payouts do not.
6
If future benefits of tax savings
are as risky as the debt that generates them (Modigliani and
Miller, 1963), the proper discount rate is the cost of debt which is . Hence:

Miles and Ezzell (1985) present an argument that
might be too low to be used as a
discounting rate and suggest using required return on equity instead. Grinblatt and Titman (2002)
present a counter argument that
might be too high. Both arguments affect the magnitude but
not the sign of the tax advantage of debt. In this dissertation, I do not consider these arguments.
As long as the sign of the tax-driven advantage of debt is not altered, my discussions and
analyses are still valid.

10

Where:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Value of leveraged firm
Value of identical but un-leveraged firm
Corporate statutory marginal tax rate
Value of debt
Interest rate (coupon rate)
Tax advantage of debt
Present value function

Ignoring offsetting costs of debt (cost of financial distress, agency cost of debt and
underinvestment costs), Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) model shown above has two key
implications. First, firms have the incentive to use debt not equity. More precisely, since
is conventionally positive, firm’s value is an increasing linear function of . Second,
the optimal capital structure policy is 100% debt. Figure 2 below illustrate these findings.

11

Figure 2 – Illustration of the implications of Modigliani and Miller’s
(1963) proposition

Miller (1977) expands the model by incorporating the effect of discriminating tax
treatment of personal income from equity proceeds (dividend and capital gain) and from
debt proceeds (interests). If

is tax rate on personal income from equity proceeds and

is tax rate on personal income from debt proceeds, the model becomes:
(E 3)7
OR

(E 4)

Where:
:
:

Value of leveraged firm
Value of identical but un-leveraged firm

7

Miller and Scholes (1978) suggested a tax-avoidance scheme where investors avoid personal tax by
borrowing via some tax-free vehicles. To narrow the discussion, personal tax affects and investors’ taxavoidance schemes are not considered in this dissertation.
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:
:
:
:
:
:

Tax rate on personal income tax from bond return (interest)
Corporate statutory marginal tax rate
Tax rate on personal income tax from equity return
(dividends and capital gain)
Value of debt
Present value function
Tax-driven Value Gain of Leverage

This modification renders the model more realistic but it does not fundamentally change
the fundamental two implications of Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) argument. Personal
taxes reduce, but do not completely eliminate, the advantage of debt financing so that
firm’s value still increases with debt and optimal capital structure is still 100% debt8. It is
worthy to note, however, that all value gain of leverage introduced so far is attributed to
tax-deductibility only. This model does not account for non-tax-driven advantages of
debt. Therefore, the different between the value of leveraged firm and identical nonleveraged firm, within the confinement of this model, is only tax-driven value gain of
leverage (

). This component is linear and increasing in debt level. Figure 3 below

illustrates the implications of MM (1958, 1963) and Miller (1977) propositions:

8

Nevertheless, Miller’s (1977) model introduces a third implication: if tax rate on personal income from
interest is relatively high compared to tax rate on personal income from dividend and capital gain, the firm
will have less incentive to issue debt. Mathematically:

Obviously, the bracketed term in equation (3) becomes smaller and the value of tax advantage of debt
becomes smaller. In some extreme cases, the tax advantages of debt might be completely wiped out or even
turns negative. This possibility is unrealistic and is not considered in this dissertation. For tax advantage of
debt to turn negative, personal and corporate tax rates must satisfy:

This possibility is unlikely because
by definition. Tax rates that satisfy this
inequality must satisfy:
which implies that either
unlikely.

is too high relative to

and/or
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is too small. Both possibilities are very

Figure 3 – Illustration of the implications of Modigliani and Miller’s
(1958, 1963) and Miller’s (1977) propositions

Despite its theoretical appeal, Modigliani and Miller’s (1963) and Miller’s (1977)
suggestion of 100% debt policy is readily rejected by anecdotal evidence. Logically, there
must be some offsetting costs of excessive debt that explains why firms refrain from
adopting aggressive debt policies. This puzzle is solved by the “Trade-off Theories” of
capital structure summarized next.
B. Trade-off Theory of Capital Structure
In trade-off theory, firms set up a “target ratio” of leverage which is not 100% as
suggested by MM (1963) and Miller (1977). This target ratio occurs at an optimal level of
debt (

) where marginal benefits of debt (tax-deductibility) is equal to marginal costs of

debt. Mayer (1984) calls this The Trade-off Theory of capital structure which deviates
from Modigliani and Miller’s model by incorporating the costs of financial distress 9

9

The use of “financial distress” as a generic term describing the three components was first made by
Bradley, Jarrell and Kim (1984) who supply the standard presentation of the trade-off theory.
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including: 1) costs of bankruptcy, 2) agency costs of debt, and 3) debt overhang costs. A
brief explanation of each cost is presented below.

i.

Costs of Bankruptcy

Kraus and Litzenberger (1973) show that leverage increases the costs of bankruptcy and
firms should “trade-off” these costs with tax-driven advantages proposed by MM (1963)
and Miller (1977). Haugen and Senbet (1978) criticized this view by pointing out that
these bankruptcy costs cannot exceed the cost of negotiating them. If they do, debtholders
would prefer to avoid them by recapitalizing the firm outside bankruptcy. Titman (1984)
responded to Haugen and Senbet’s (1978) critique by suggesting additional indirect costs
of bankruptcy. In result, we have a set of direct and indirect bankruptcy costs. Direct
costs include legal and accounting expenses, liquidation costs10 and physical deterioration
of assets11. Indirect costs include management attempts to boost cash flow in the shortrun in a manner that dilutes value in the long-run 12 , plus adverse actions taken by
managers and employees, suppliers and customer 13 . Several empirical studies support
existence of direct and indirect costs of debt. Direct costs are estimated at 3% of firm
value and total bankruptcy costs (direct and indirect) are estimated at 20% of firm value
(see White (1983), Altman (1984), Weiss (1990) and Andrade and Kaplan (1988)).
ii.

Agency Cost of Debt

10

Assets are usually sold at low prices in case of bankruptcy and/or re-organization.
Assets are sold after long settlement time which further decreases their value because of rusting and
vandalism.
12
Such as lowering due maintenance activities and making cutbacks in R&D and training expenses (see
Barclay and Smith (2005)).
13
When a company is financially distressed, it is likely that managers and employees seek job at other
companies (lower their productivity), suppliers tighten credit terms and consumers lessen loyalty.
11
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Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that, in absence of any restriction, managers typically
take actions that maximize shareholders wealth at the expense of debtholders. One
classical example presented in this context is the asset substitution scheme where
managers exchange low-risk projects for high-risk projects. This causes risk to be
concentrated on debtholders because their return is fixed while shareholders’ return is
not. In an efficient well-functioning market, lenders would charge higher interest rate to
compensate for additional risk. In addition, lenders would use “protective covenants” that
incur additional costs of monitoring and restrictions-induced inefficiencies14.
iii.

Debt Overhang

Myers (1977) suggests that high levels of debt trigger a debt overhang problem. A debt
overhang problem exists when a company forgoes a positive-NPV investment project due
to an existing excessive debt position. Excessive debt causes earnings generated by new
investment projects to be partially appropriated by existing debt holders. Debtholders
would be reluctant to finance the firm because the face value of the existing debt is bigger
than the expected payoff to debtholders. Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) claim that bondholders
do not know ex-atne the quality of investment and, therefore, infer adverse selection, and
ask for higher premium. Similarly, equityholders would also be reluctant to buy new
stocks unless greater return is anticipated (larger price discount). Thus, the firm rejects
positive-NPV projects that otherwise would be accepted.
C. Non-tax-based Theories of Capital Structure (non-tax-driven benefits of debt)

14

Restriction on management protects lender rights but also lowers efficiency and/or hampers operations.
In addition, preventing managers from doing the wrong things might as well prevent them from doing the
right things.
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The overwhelming evidence in capital structure literature supports the overall intuition of
the trade-off model and advocates leverage’s value-increasing property [Masulis (1980),
Masulis (1983), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Pinegar and
Lease (1986)]. Further, the market seems to respond positively to leverage-increasing
moves (Howe and Shilling, 1988, Howton et al., 2000 and Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans,
2001)15. However, little work is done on whether this value gain is attributed solely to
tax-driven advantage of debt OR to a mix of tax-driven and non-tax-driven advantages.
Empirical evidence as well as some theories supports the latter view i.e. leverage-induced
value gain is NOT solely of tax-driven nature.
Equations E1 through E4 above suggest that leverage benefits are of tax-driven nature
only. If this is true, non-tax paying entities (such as REITs) should have virtually no
value gain attributed to leverage. In fact, if leverage has only tax-driven advantages,
REITs managers should not use debt at all (Howe and Shilling, 1988). However, Feng,
Ghosh and Sirmans (2007) find that REITs managers issue debt aggressively despite no
apparent benefit. Specifically, they find that an average REIT carries 50% of debt in IPO
and debt ratio reaches 65% after 10 years. Howe and Shilling (1988) document a positive
stock price reaction to debt offerings in REITs. These evidences suggest that not all
advantages of leverage are tax-driven and REITs managers may be issuing debt for some
other non-tax-driven benefits. Fortunately, there is a strong theoretical ground of this
claim. We have several outstanding capital structure theories that propose additional non-

15

Nevertheless, some empirical work documents a weak relation between firm value and leverage (Shah
(1994) and Cornett and Travlos (1989) and Fama and French (1998) I discuss those also in details in the
next section.
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tax-driven advantages of leverage. In the following, I am supplying a brief discussion of
these theories and explain leverage advantages under each one.
Pecking Order Theory:
Myers and Majluf, 1984 and Myers 1984 observed that firms prefer to finance investment
with internal sources of funds (retained earnings) and raise equity as a last resort. Cost of
issuing new equity includes transaction costs as well as potential adverse reaction of
investors. According to Myers and Majluf (1984), managers have superior information
relative to investors and are inclined to act in best interest of existing (rather than future)
shareholders. Thus, managers are likely to issue equity only as a last resort and more
likely when stocks are overvalued. Market participants are aware of that and they
discount firm’s new issues of securities. This is known in literature as adverse selection
costs of equity. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that because adverse selection costs are
always larger for equity issues than for debt issues, issuing equity is never optimal. As a
result, firms issue debt in order to reduce the adverse selection cost of equity suggested
by the pecking order theory.
Arguing that costs of issuing new equity overwhelm costs of issuing debt, they developed
the well-known Pecking Order Theory of capital structure. It states that companies
prioritize their sources of financing in such a way that they first finance investment with
internally-generated retained earnings, then, if outside funding is still needed, they prefer
to issue safe debt, risky debt, and finally equity; in that order. Accordingly, crosssectional and historical variation in capital structures is explained by needs for external
finance not by companies’ attempt to adjust their capital structure toward an optimum
18

level. Obviously, this is a great departure from trade-off theory explanations of capital
structure.
The pecking order theory implies that leverage is determined by the availability of
internally-generated cash (profitability) and the need for cash (investment opportunities).
According to Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) and Fama and French (2002), firms with
higher (lower) existing investment must, after controlling for profitability, be more (less)
leveraged. Similarly, firms with higher (lower) profitability must, controlling for
investment, issue less (more) more debt. Further, firms with higher (lower) expected
investment opportunities must, controlling for existing investment and profitability, be
less (more) leveraged (as they are preserving their debt capacity to the expected
investment)16.
iv.

Agency Costs Models:
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Evidence: Consistent with Myers and Majluf’s (1984) argument, Masulis (1980) finds that the market
responds positively to exchanges of debt for equity and negatively to exchanges of equity for debt. Further,
Vermaelen (1981) show that equity repurchases produces positive return and Masulis and Korwar (1986)
show that new equity issues produced negative return. Asquith and Mullins (1986) find that announcement
of equity offerings reduces stock prices significantly. They look at 531 offerings (both primary and
secondary offerings) from 1963-1981 and document negative reactions. More than 80% of the issues
caused decreases in value of stock and overall two-day reaction was -2.7% (-3% for primary issues, -2% for
secondary issues). They also find that the decline in stock price is proportional to the size of the equity
offering. Mikkelson and Partch (1986) performed a longitudinal study on 360 firms and found positive
stock returns around announcements of bank loans and negative return around announcements of equity
and convertible bonds issuance. Pinegar and Lease (1986) analyze preferred-for-common exchange offers
(leverage-increasing transactions) which include no corporate tax consequences and documents positive
stock reaction. Eckbo (1986) document an even stronger evidence that supports Myers and Majluf’s (1984)
argument. In their sample, incidents of debt issuance not associated with reductions in equity produce
weak stock price responses. Myers and Shyam-Sunder (1999) find evidence supporting pecking order
theory. They show that large firms’ rely on debt financing. Fama and French (2002) find that more
profitable firms are less levered, firms with more investments have less market leverage, and short-term
variation in investment and earnings is mostly absorbed by debt. Above-mentioned evidences are consistent
with pecking order theory. Nevertheless, some authors report evidence against the predictions of the
pecking order theory. For instance, Goyal and Frank (2003), show that small firms, where growth
opportunity is high and information asymmetry problem is presumably large, issue less debt and, hence,
pecking order theory fails.
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Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) theory of agency cost posits that firms incurs two distinct
types of cost when shareholders (principals) hire expert managers (agents). On one hand,
managers may use organizational resources to pursue their personal goals (perquisite
spending and empire-building behavior) rather than shareholders’ (share value
maximization). On the other hand, in order to align managers’ interest with shareholders’,
firms incur other costs attributed to monitoring techniques (e.g. production of financial
statements and other reports) and executives’ incentives (stock options). Jensen (1986)
shows that the agency problems exacerbates with availability of abundant free cash flow.
Specifically, free cash flows allow managers to finance spend on perquisites and select
low-return projects. Examining the U.S. ten largest oil companies, which had earned
substantial free cash flows in the 1970s and the early 1980s, he found that managers
decided not to pay out the available excess cash to shareholders. Instead, they continued
to spend heavily on exploration and development projects and acquisitions even though
average returns were below the cost of capital.
Debt issuance mitigates agency costs in two ways. On one hand, Datta, Iskandar-Datta,
and Raman (2005) show that short-term debt limits management’s over-consumption or
perquisites. Hart and Moore (1995) show that long-term debt limits management’s
empire-building behavior. In fact, mandatory debt payouts restrict manager’s freedom in
the use of available cash flow (while discretionary equity payouts impose less of such
restriction). Therefore, leverage mitigates the free cash flow form of agency cost. On the
other hands, lenders usually impose ex-ante and ongoing monitoring on managers. In the
case of REITs monitoring is a very likely motivation of debt issuance because it is a real
concern in real estate sector (Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans, 2007).
20

Agency cost theory implies that the use of debt is derived by the need for controlling
managers’ access to free cash flow not by desire to maintain optimal leverage ratio (as in
the trade-off theory). Agency cost theory, just as the pecking order theory, links leverage
use to the availability of cash (profitability) and need for cash (investment). However,
agency cost theory’s prediction on profitability effect is just the opposite of the pecking
order theory prediction. According to Fama and French (2002), under the agency costs
theory, firms with higher (lower) profitability, are in more need to control their managers
and must, controlling for investments, issue more (less) debt. Yet, agency cost theory’s
prediction of investments effect is the same as the pecking order theory’s prediction.
Firms with more (less) investments are in less need to control their managers (cash flow
is directed to investments and not left in managers’ hands) and must, controlling for
profitability, issue less (more) debt.
v.

Signaling Theories of Capital Structure:

Under information asymmetry hypothesis, debt issuance conveys positive information to
the market. Managers always have better information about the future of the company.
For several practical and legal reasons, they do not expose this information. Instead, they
send signals to the market (Ross, 1977). Since debt payouts are mandatory and equity
payouts are not, a firm that issues debt sends a positive signal of financially stable firm
and stock prices respond positively to this news17. Thus, leverage is driven by availability
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Evidence: Shah (1994) shows that leverage-increasing exchange offers convey positive information of
reduced risk; hence the stock price increase. He also shows that leverage-decreasing exchange offers
convey negative information of reduced future cash flows; hence the negative stock price reaction. In a
sense, these findings indicate that future cash- and risk-related information, not capitalization of future tax
savings, causes stock price reactions to leverage-increasing events. Cornett and Travlos (1989) regress
event stock returns on the change in debt and two information control variables: the ex-post change in
insider ownership and ex-post abnormal earnings. They find that change in debt coefficient is insignificant
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of expected investment not by optimum-seeking behavior (trade-off theory), not by cash
availability and need concerns (pecking order theory), and not be desire to control
managers access to free cash flow (agency cost theory). The signaling theory predicts that
firms with higher (lower) existing and expected investments carry more (less) debt.

while the other two information control variables coefficients are positive and significant. They conclude
that positive stock price reaction to debt-increasing actions is related to positive information conveyed by
the exchange not to change in leverage itself.
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III.

Hypothesis Development and Sample Description

Hypothesis
The main contribution of this dissertation is the attempt to explain observed behavior of
REITs in terms of their capital structure. REITs, by virtue of their regulations, are nontax-paying entities. Thus, the significant level of debt financing (50% to 65% as shown in
Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans (2007)) used by REITs is puzzling because under classic taxdriven theories of capital structure REITs debt financing should be minimal, if any.
What entices managers of REITs to issue debt just as regularly as any non-regulated
entity when REITs do not enjoy the tax deductibility benefit of leverage? Feng, Ghosh
and Sirmans (2007) suggested that monitoring benefit of leverage could be the answer. I
hypothesis that, beside monitoring, a set of non-tax-driven benefits of debt motivate
managers of REITs to issue debt. In the previous section, I showed how those benefits
stem from extant theories of capital structure. Non-tax-driven theories of capital
structure, therefore, offer some potential explanations that could solve the puzzle. Two
implications of this hypothesis are tested in this dissertation. First, the market looks
favorably at leverage-increasing policies in REITs. Second, variation in capital structure
is explained by non-tax-driven benefits of leverage. Both implications are discussed in
more details below.
D. Sample Description
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I use Compustat database to obtain quarterly accounting data on REITs’ (SIC Code 6798)
over the period 1990Q1 to 2009Q218. Accordingly,

is a period identifier

that identifies a certain quarter. The final sample includes 8922 REIT-quarter data points
from 216 REITs over the said period. The following table shows descriptive statistics of
the sample. Panel A lists level variables used in this dissertation. REITs used in the
sample have an average market value of about $1,048 million with a minimum of about
$0.0142 million and a maximum of $24,851 million. In terms of total assets, REITs have
an average asset of $2,260 million with a minimum of $1.343 million and maximum of
$68,267 million. In terms of profitability, REITs in this sample have an average of about
$31.724 million in earnings before interest and taxes, an average of about $29.685
million in earnings before interest and extraordinary items and after depreciation, and an
average of about $0.42 million in depreciation. Finally, REITs in the sample have
distributed an average of about $15.746 million in dividend.

18

In fact, the original sample covers the period 1989Q3-2009Q3. The first two quarters (1989Q3 and
1989Q4) as well as the last quarters (2009Q3) are used only to construct difference variables necessary for
this dissertation. See the methodology section for more details.
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Table 1 – Sample Descriptive Statistics
Panel A – Level Variables

V
E
A
I
D
ET
DP

Mean
Std Dev
Minimum Maximum Median
1st Qrt
3rd Qrt
IQ Range
1048.460
1950.617
0.0142 24851.805
432.756
120.379
1137.972
1017.593
29.685
63.457 -1787.177
780.700
13.435
3.445
33.240
29.795
2260.394
4285.231
1.343 68267.258
898.781
268.069
2415.875
2147.805
19.755
42.571
0.000
709.007
7.293
1.713
20.551
18.838
15.746
27.837
0.000
796.996
7.345
1.258
18.558
17.300
31.724
80.250 -2814.188
933.820
13.433
3.520
36.316
32.796
0.420
3.611
0.000
88.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
Panel B – Variables Scaled by Total Assets

(V-A)/A
E/A
I/A
D/A
L/A
V/A
ET/A
DP/A

Mean
Std Dev
Minimum Maximum Median
1st Qrt
3rd Qrt
IQ Range
-0.387
0.722
-1.00
32.471
-0.471
-0.690
-0.208
0.482
0.0145
0.0213
-0.358
0.996
0.0156
0.0105
0.0198
0.00930
0.00873
0.0104
0.000
0.466
0.00824
0.00627
0.0105
0.00425
0.0118
0.150
0.000
13.937
0.00880
0.00445
0.0129
0.00849
0.456
0.232
0.000
2.279
0.484
0.339
0.599
0.260
0.613
0.722
0.000
33.471
0.529
0.310
0.792
0.482
0.0149
0.0456
-3.154
0.912
0.0160
0.0112
0.0207
0.00958
0.000
0.00214
0.000
0.0803
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.000
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IV.

Non-tax-driven Value Gain (Market Response) of Leverage

One underlying assumption of the hypothesis presented in this dissertation is that debtincreasing changes in capital structure of REITs are value-creating. In particular, I
investigate whether there is long-term sustainable increase in value associated with
leverage increase. Previous studies have already documented existence of value gain of
leverage. In non-regulated entities, similar findings are found in Masulis (1980), Masulis
(1983), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Mikkelson and Partch (1986), Pinegar and Lease
(1986) and Howton et al. (2000). However, in all of these studies it is not clear how the
value gain is derived from tax-driven and non-tax-driven advantages of debt mainly due
to the mixed nature of the two. Further, these studies conventionally exclude regulated
entities such as utility and financial firms. REITs, being a regulated entity, are also
conventionally excluded from samples of capital structure studies. Yet, we do have some
literature on capital structure of REITs. Howe and Shilling (1988), and Ghosh, Nag, and
Sirman (2001) report value gain associated with leverage-increasing policies in REITs in
absence of apparent tax-driven benefits. Howe and Shilling (1988) investigate the shortterm market reaction to debt offering in REITs. They find that two-day excess return is
positive 1.72% in response to REIT debt offerings and negative 1.9% in response to
equity offering. Ghosh, Nag, and Sirman (2001) uses sample from 1991-1997 REITs and
event study methodology. They also document a positive market reaction to debtincreasing announcements in REITs. However, these are event studies that measure
short-term market reaction to announcement of change of debt but do not capture the
long-term cumulative value consequences of leverage changes.
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My work is methodologically different from above-mentioned studies on REIT leverage.
I start with re-testing the value-creation assumption using an approach that is commonly
used in capital structure literate but never been used in REITs (as far as I am concerned).
Specifically, I use OLS technique to regress REITs’ value on quarterly levels and
changes in capital structure. In this model, the coefficient on changes in leverage
represents value gain of leverage.
The general approach of regressing holding period returns on changes in leverage is
common in capital structure literature that generally exclude regulated entities, like
REITs, from studied samples. Masulis (1983) uses a linear model to estimate the firm
valuation effect from capital structure changes using OLS. Specifically, he regresses
stock returns on changes in debt and finds that the slope coefficient on debt change is
significantly positive. He concludes that firm’s value is positively related to leverage.
Further, he finds that the magnitude of the coefficient is close to statutory corporate tax
rate at the time (about 0.4). This result strongly supports MM propositions that leverage
increase firm’s value through tax-savings19. Fama and French (1998) regress leveraged
firm value (market value minus book value) on debt interest, dividends, and several
proxies for identical unleveraged firm. In a sample of all Compustat companies over the
period 1965 to 1992, they found that value, after good control of profitability, is
negatively related to leverage and change in leverage and conclude that there is no
indication that debt has net tax benefits. They conclude that negative debt slopes support
19

Masulis (1980) also finds similar results with different approach. He utilizes a sample of exchange offers
during 1960’s and 1970’s. Since exchange offers are pure leverage-changing transactions, they provide an
excellent sample for studying the wealth effects that result strictly from a change in a firm's capital
structure i.e. any market response can be attributed only to the change in the firm's leverage. He uses Mean
Adjusted Abnormal Return (MAAR) methodology and finds that leverage-increasing exchange offers
increase equity value by 7.6% and leverage-decreasing exchange offers decrease value by 5.4%. He also
finds that larger leverage-increasing transactions are associated with larger gains in stock value.
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Miller’s (1997) hypothesis of no tax benefit of debt because personal tax cost of debt just
offset corporate tax benefit. However, they still think that because they cannot fully
control for the profitability information of debt, the negative debt slopes may also support
the hypothesis that increasing debt is negatively received in the market (Myers, 1984,
Myers and Majluf 1984, and Miller and Rock, 1985) and triggers an agency problem
effect (Fama and Miller, 1972, Jensen and Meckling, 1976, and Myers 1977).
I use a model very similar to that of Fama and French (1998). I regress market value
minus book value on quarterly changes in capital structure as well as other control
variables. As the literature above indicates, the coefficient on change in capital structure
variable measures the leverage-induced value gain. In REITs, this would be safely called
the non-tax-driven leverage-induced value gain. In a sense, this work has also a byproduct of contributing to the broader capital structure literature because tax-driven and
non-tax-driven benefits of debt are commonly not disentangled.
I use OLS regression model derived from the model used by Fama and French (1998) to
assess the value-adding property of debt in REITs. Fama and French (1998) argue that
their cross-sectional regressions approach has advantages over event studies. Specifically,
while event studies measure only the effects of unexpected changes in leverage,
regression techniques measure the fully anticipated longer-term (two years in their study)
effect of a firm's observed leverage changes on value. Thus, the value effects observed in
regressions are larger and more reliable than those of event studies. Controlling for
profitability and investment, they use cross-sectional regressions to study how a firm's
value is related to debt (and dividends). Specifically, they regress firm value on earnings,
investment, and financing variables to measure tax effects in the pricing of debt (and
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dividends). The coefficient on debt variable captures information about value not
captured by earnings, investment, and dividends variables.
When Fama and French’s (1998) model is applied to a sample of REITs, it captures the
non-tax-driven value gain of leverage, if any. The model used in this dissertation is very
similar in terms of specifications to the model of Fama and French, 1998 with modest
modifications. I regress spread of market value over book value of existing assets on
current, past, and future changes in earnings, investment, leverage, and dividends. The
model is,

(E 5)

Where:
:

:
:

Market Value in quarter
Calculated as21:
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Shares outstanding (Item CSHOQ in
Compustat)
Share price (Item PRCCQ in Compustat)
Book value of assets in quarter (Item ATQ in Compustat)
Earnings before interest and extraordinary items but after
depreciation and taxes in quarter
Calculated as:

20

In Fama and French 1998 model, refers to years while in this model refers to quarters.
In fact, Compustat does supply a separate item MKVALTQ that represents market value. However, not
all entries are available. Thus, I calculate market value as common shares outstanding times price. I tested
my calculated market value and found that it is identical to MKVALTQ in Compustat when it is supplied.
21
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:
:

Operating Income after Depreciation (item
OIADPQ in Compustat)
Income Taxes (Item TXTQ in Compustat)
Interest expenses in quarter (Item INTQ in Compustat)
Total dividends paid in quarter calculated as22:

:

Shares outstanding (Item CSHOQ in
Compustat)
Dividend per share (Item DVPSPQ in
Compustat)
one quarter current change in X scaled by total assets

:

one quarter past change in X scaled by total assets

:

one quarter future change in X scaled by total assets

All variables are scaled by total book value of assets

in order to avoid potential large-

size firm bias and heteroskedasticity problems (see Fama and French, 1998 for more
explanation on this point). The dependent variable (

) represents spread of market

value over book value. Current, past, and future earnings (

and

) are used to

capture the impact of current, past, and expected growth of profitability on value.
Similarly, past and future changes in assets (

and

) proxy for the net investment

component of value gain. Current, past, and future interest expenses (

and

)

represent level and changes in leverage policy. Current, past, and future dividends
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Compustat does supply a separate item DVTQ that shows total dividends. However, not all entries are
available. Thus, I calculate total dividends as common shares outstanding times dividends per share. I
tested my calculated total dividends and found that it is identical to DVTQ in Compustat when it is
supplied.
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(

and

) represent level and changes in dividend policy 23 . Finally, (

)

captures future changes in value.
In Fama and French (1998) context, the coefficient of interest are

and

because they model the leverage and dividend policy jointly. In this dissertation, the
focus is on leverage-induced value gain hence the focus is on

and

while

dividend variable are kept as control variables. In fact, Fama and French (1998) state that
they are more comfortable with using
with using

as a measure of leverage policy than they are

as a measure of dividends policy. The later notion assures that the selection

of this model for the purpose of this dissertation is justifiable.
Following the spirit of Fama and MacBeth (1973) and the methodology of Fama and
French (1998) I run the regression above for each quarter in the sample period 19902009. In each period, I use data on all REITs available in that quarter to obtain a “period
slope.” Next, average of all 78 periods slopes is calculated, I call this the “average of
periods slopes.” This value is used in making inferences (see Fama and French (1998) for
more details) about the value-adding properties of debt in REITs. I run the model in
several forms: restricted forms with current, past, and future changes of a single variable
and extended form with all variables together. Further, for the purpose of this
dissertation, I run another regression (not done by Fama and French (1998)). I run a
23

In addition to above variables, Fama and French (1998) include three variables for current, past and
future research and development expenses (
and
). In my sample, I found that REITs do not
have R&D expenses (all entries are zeros in Compustat) and, therefore, I eliminated this variable. This does
not change the validity of this regression because Fama and French (1998) include R&D expenses to
capture their specific impact on value (i.e. not as proxy of certain determinant of value). Since R&D
expenditure is zero as shown in Compustat, it is safe to eliminate these items (if Fama and French (1998)
had used these items as proxy of another effect on value, it would have been necessary to replace them with
another proxy to preserve the model specifications).
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pooled regression (time-series and cross sectional) of all data point in my smaller sample
of REITs to obtain a “global slope.” This “global slope” along with the “average of
periods slopes” are used to make general inferences on the value-adding properties of
leverage in REITs. The results are shown in the table below,
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Table 2 – Regression with Restricted and Extended Forms

Panel A – Average of Period Slopes
Average Slope
(t)

Average Slope
(t)

Average Slope
(t)

Average Slope
(t)

Average Slope
(t)

-0.643

14.062

-2.642

5.580

0.093

(-4.175)

(1.686)

(-0.419)

(0.718)

(0.059)

-0.422

0.000

0.315

0.155

(-2.589)

(-0.112)

(0.274)

(0.090)

-0.150

-30.877

0.016

-9.548

0.281

(-0.598)

(-1.905)

(0.000)

(-0.204)

(0.173)

-0.778

35.312

-5.957

12.292

(6.377)

(3.218)

(-.547)

(.603)

-0.045
0.036

-0.71

2.95

-0.15

2.19

0.00

0.21

-11.12

-2.20

-12.71

32.94

-6.35

10.82

0.000

(-3.68)

(0.42)

(-0.02)

(0.35)

(0.11)

(0.25)

(-0.67)

(-0.13)

(-0.35)

(2.49)

(-0.53)

(0.61)

(0.00)

Panel B – Global Slopes
Global Slope
(t)

Global Slope
(t)

Global Slope
(t)

Global Slope
(t)

Global Slope
(t)

-.433

3.230

.008

.355

-.025

(46.77)

(8.887)

(.377)

(4.766)

(-5.856)

-.387

0.000

0.008

-.033

(-50.67)

(-2.030)

(6.481)

(-7.437)

-.401

1.669

.009

.493

-.024

(-40.13)

(2.268)

(.3899)

(4.569)

(-5.961)

-.417

2.882

-.046

2.708

-.035

(-52.45)

(12.69)

(-1.984)

(12.29)

(-10.06)

-0.47

3.68

-0.09

0.99

0.00

0.07

-0.64

0.13

-6.73

3.76

-0.09

3.73

-0.12

(-38.60)

(8.29)

(-1.83)

(5.19)

(-2.03)

(12.24)

(-0.80)

(2.31)

(-9.63)

(14.94)

(-2.93)

(15.39)

(-17.52)
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The dependent variable in the regressions above is

. It is the spread of market value over

book value. The results of the “average of periods slopes” – in panel A of the table above - are
not very impressive in both restricted and extended forms. It reveals that only current dividend
policy has positive effect on REITs value. The slopes on leverage variables are statistically
insignificant in both restricted and extended from which indicates that, in contrast with Fama and
French 1998 findings with broader sample, REITs do not gain or loss value by altering their
capital structure. This finding, by itself, is not surprising; REITs do not enjoy tax deductibility
benefits and should not witness an increase in value attributed to leverage policy. The puzzle,
therefore, is still unresolved. What entices REITs’ managers to issue debt? Nevertheless, I admit
that insignificance of slopes might be an artifact of much smaller sample (REITs only) used in
this dissertation compared to the sample used in Fama and French’s paper (all Compustat
companies). The insignificance of all other slopes used in the restricted and extended regressions
make us suspect that sample size might be the problem here. To overcome this caveat, I run
restricted and extended forms of the regressions with all data point (REIT-quarter) available in
the sample to obtain “global slopes.”
The “global slopes” calculated from the pooled regression of all data points (REIT-Quarter) are
shown in panel B of the table above. Expectedly, current and future (expected) changes in
profitability (

and

) have positive impact on REITs value in the restricted form. Further,

current changes have much stronger impact on value than expected changes does. Past changes
in profitability (see
(look at

and

) has insignificant impact on value. Past and future changes in investment
) have minimal economic impact on value (although it is statistically

significant). Similar to profitability, current and future changes in leverage policy and dividend
policy are positively related to value but past changes are insignificantly different form zero. In
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summary, it looks like the market immediately prices current changes in profitability,
investment, leverage policy, and dividend policy. Expected changes are discounted in present
prices but past changes are not (probably because they are already priced in previous period).
More importantly, the strong relation between these variables and value in the restricted models
ensures that they provide good control for profitability, investment and dividend and therefore,
when used as control variable in the full unrestricted regression, we can isolated the impact of
leverage on value.
The results of the extended model almost support the results of the restricted ones with some
differences. Past changes in investment and dividend policies

and

) now become slightly

more significant (at 10%) but are economically insignificant. More interestingly, however,
current changes in leverage now losses statistical significance. This indicates that current
leverage impact on value found in the restricted model is captured by other control variables in
the extended model. Hence, current leverage, by itself, does not explain variation in value of
REITs.
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V.

The Determinants of REITs Capital Structure Decisions

The second implication of the hypothesis presented in this dissertation states that REITs capital
structure decisions are fueled by non-tax-driven advantages of debt proposed by extant theories
of capital structure. Under the pecking order theory, REITs managers are likely to issue debt to
avoid issuing equity and to lower adverse selection cost of equity. Because REITs pays all
internally-generated funds as dividends (in order to exploit the tax exemption provision), debt is
their next choice of financing under pecking order theory (Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans, 2007).
Howton, Howton, and McWilliams (2003) examine the determinants of the security issue
decision for REITs. Using a sample of 664 REIT security issuances in the 1993–2001 period,
they find that, consistent with pecking order theory, the decision to issue equity is directly related
to the expected cost of issuing debt and inversely related to the costs of issuing equity.
In the context of this dissertation, I am testing whether REITs issuance of debt is explained by
the predictions of the pecking order theory, agency cost models, or signaling theory. I use a
model and discussion borrowed from Fama and French (2002). If pecking order theory
implications derive REITs capital structure, then, we should find that REITs with higher (lower)
existing investment must, after controlling for profitability, be more (less) leveraged. The
intuition here is that existing investment must have been financed with debt; hence the positive
relationship. Similarly, REITs with higher (lower) profitability must, after controlling for
investment, issue less (more) more debt. This is because higher profitability implies existence of
internally generated cash flows that can be used to cover capital expenditure before debt
financing is needed. Therefore, we anticipate a negative relationship between profitability and
debt level. Finally, REITs with higher (lower) expected investment opportunities must,
controlling for existing investment and profitability, be less (more) leveraged. In an attempt to
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avoid issuing equity, REITs with promising future investment opportunities are likely to reserve
their borrowing capacity. In effect, there is negative relationship between expected investment
and current level of leverage.
Under the agency costs models, lenders bear part of the monitoring burden of shareholders. Debt
also mandates regular payments that put restrictions on managers’ access to free cash flow.
Monitoring, then, is thought of as a big benefit to debt financing. As suggested by Feng, Ghosh
and Sirmans (2007), the monitoring benefit of mandatory interest payment on debt is of
particular importance in real estate industry. I have shown in the previous section, that under the
agency costs theory, REITs with higher (lower) profitability, controlling for investments, issue
more (less) debt. This is because shareholders would like to rely on debt as a monitoring tool to
ensure that managers do not expense excess cash flow on bad investments. On the other hand,
REITs with more (less) existing/expected investments must, controlling for profitability, issue
less (more) debt. The intuition here is that shareholders know that monitoring and restriction on
access to cash flow are less needed when managers are busy with existing/expected investment.
Finally, signaling theories implies that managers issue debt to signal a prosperous future of
financially stable firm that can sustain mandatory payments of debt. REITs with higher (lower)
existing and expected investments carry more (less) debt. Similarly, REITs with higher
profitability carries more debt. Managers of companies with high investments and high
profitability issue more debt to signal their companies’ strength24.

24

Ghosh, Giambona, Harding, and Sirmans (2010) use REIT panel data to estimate a system of simultaneous
equations for leverage and maturity. They find that firms with entrenched CEOs use less leverage and shorter
maturity debt. This is consistent with the management self interest story of capital structure choices.
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The following table summarizes the predictions of the three theories (a similar, but more
comprehensive, table is found in Fama and French (2002)).
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Table 3 - The Implications of Capital Structure Theories
Trade-off
Theory

Pecking Order
Theory

Agency Cost
Models

Signaling
Hypothesis

Benefit(s) of Leverage
Taxdeductibility

Reducing adverse
selection cost of
issuing new equity

Restricting access
to cash flow and
monitoring

signaling
prosperous future
and financial
stability

Impacts on Leverage
Existing
Investment

-

+

_

+

Profitability
Expected
investment

+

_

+

+

-

_

_

+
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Linear cross-sectional regression of leverage, as dependent variable, on potential determinants is
common in capital structure literature. Various forms of this approach can be found in Bradley,
Jarrell, and Kim (1984), Long and Malitz (1985), Rajan and Zingales (1995), and Fama and
French (2002). The model I use in this dissertation is borrowed from Fama and French (2002).
Specifically, I use, with some modifications, model 8 in their paper that describes how leverage
varies across firms (REIT in this dissertation) as function of profitability, investment
opportunities, and other control variables. This model fits well the purpose of this dissertation i.e.
identifying the determinants of REITs capital structure25.
The model is,

(E 6)

Where:
:
:
:

:

:

Total long term debt in quarter (Item DLTTQ in Compustat)
Book value of assets in quarter (Item ATQ in Compustat)
Market to book ratio in quarter
Calculated as:
Shares outstanding (Item CSHOQ in Compustat)
Share price (Item PRCCQ in Compustat)
Earning before interest and taxes in quarter
Calculated as:
Net Income (Item NIQ in Compustat)
Interest expenses (Item INTQ in Compustat)
Income Taxes (Item TXTQ in Compustat)
Depreciations in quarter (Item … in Compustat)

25

I did not borrow the entire methodology of Fama and French’s (2002). This is because their paper jointly models
dividend policy and leverage policy to test the pecking order theory vs. trade-off theory. In this dissertation, I focus
on the determinants of leverage policy and I test whether trade-off theory, pecking order theory, agency models, or
signaling hypothesis explain REITs capital structure behavior. This modification is justified by the fact that dividend
payout in REITs is not as discretionary as it is in non-regulated firms. REITs have incentive to pay more than 90%
of income in dividends to benefit from tax exemption.
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All variables are scaled by total assets to account for size impact. Model specifications are
slightly different from Fama and French (2002) specifications. The

,

, and

variables proxies for expected investment opportunities, profitability, and current
investments, respectively. Depreciation (

) captures non-debt tax shield and log of assets

captures volatility of earnings and net cash flow on top of size effect. In Fama and French
(2002), an additional variable of target payout (

) is included. In REITs, most income available

to shareholder is distributed (to benefit from the tax exemption provision) so this variable is
omitted from my regression26.
The focus in this regression is on the signs and significance of coefficients

and

.

Jointly, they determine which theory dominates the capital structure behavior of REITs. Fama
and French (2002) argue that single cross-sectional estimation of the model above (as done by
other authors) suffers from correlation of the residuals. Instead, they suggest using a FamaMacBeth (1973) year-by-year time-series regression. Accordingly, I run the multiple regressions
using data on all REITs available in each quarter in the sample period 1990-2009. The result is
a set of “period slopes.” Next I take average of all period slopes (I call it “average of period
slopes”). I also run a regression on the entire sample (all REITs in all time periods) and obtain
“global slopes.” I use “average of periods slopes” and “global slopes” in making inference on the
determinants of capital structure behavior in REITs. The results are show in the table below,

26

They also use an
variable which is R&D expenses scaled by assets as a second proxy for investment
opportunities. They also include an RDD variable that reports no R&D expenses. I eliminate these two variables for
the same reason I eliminated R&D variables in the previous model. That is, in my sample REITs have zero R&D
expenses. This does not change the validity of this regression because Fama and French (2002) include R&D as a
proxy for investment opportunities along with
. They also use it a proxy for tax shield along with
. Since
both
and
are present in my model and R&D expenses are zero in Compustat, the removal of this variable
is justified.
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Table 4 – Regression with Restricted and Extended Forms

Average Slope
(t)

Global Slope
(t)

0.319

-0.120

1.102

1.742

0.000

0.0299

(1.68)

(-1.57)

(0.471)

(0.105)

(0.125)

(1.083)

0.2474

0.007

-.2269

8.158

-0.000

.0312

(2.005)

(.003)

(-4.331)

(7.292)

(-1.893)

(22.48)
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The economical (sign and magnitude) and statistical significance of coefficients

and

in

conjunction with the contents of table 1 are used to answer the question of what derives capital
structure decisions in REITs. First we note that the results of the average slopes are not
impressive in terms of statistical significance and we believe that this is merely attributed to the
small size of REITs-only sample. The global slopes however are significant and seem to supply
good ground for interpretation. As table 3 above shows, trade-off model, agency model, and
signaling hypothesis predict positive relationship between leverage and profitability while
pecking order theory predicts a negative correlation (see Fama and French, 2002 for more
discussions). The slope on profitability (

) is negative and statistically significant. This

result lends support to pecking order theory which is consistent with the finding of Long and
Malitz (1985), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and Fama and French (2002). Under the pecking order
story of leverage, REITs issue debt to reduce the adverse selection cost of equity. Myers and
Majluf (1984) argue that managers, on the quest to satisfy exiting shareholders, issue equity only
as a last resort and more likely when stocks are overvalued. Consequently, market participants
discount new issues of equity and, thus, issuing equity is never optimal. This also supports the
Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans, 2007 proposition that REITs have the incentive of paying all
internally-generated funds as dividends (to benefit from tax exemption provision) and therefore
debt is their next choice of financing under pecking order theory.
On the other hand, pecking order theory and agency cost model predict negative correlation
between leverage and investment while pecking order theory predicts negative correlation
between leverage and expected investment and positive correlation between leverage and
existing investment (see Fama and French, 2002 for more discussions). In the table above we
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note that the slope on V/A is statistically insignificant and therefore investment does not seem to
be correlated with leverage.
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VI.

Thought Investment Experiment

Description of Thought Experiment
Using a slightly different sample, I conduct a thought investment approach in terms of pursuing
an experimental design to obtain relevant data. The sample used in this section is slightly
different from that used in above sections because of different imposed requirements. I collect
quarterly data on 163 active REIT’s (CIS code 6798) from COMPUSTAT databases over the
period 1990Q1-2009Q4. In each quarter (there are 80 quarters) I obtain REITs total assets, longterm debt, quarter closing price, and market value. I eliminate all missing and irregular entries
(such as negative values for stock price and zeros for total assets). I calculate debt ratio as longterm debt divided by total assets. Since this variable is the main selection filter (as will be shown
later), I eliminated the upper and lower 0.5% outliers. Table 1 below shows the descriptive
statistics of this sample.
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Table 5 Variables Descriptive Statistics
Debt Ratio
Mean
Std Dev
Minimum
Maximum
Median
st
1 Quartile
3rd Quartile
IQ Range

0.47948
0.19644
0.010073
0.95085
0.49115
0.37003
0.60992
0.23989

Price
(USD)
23.61666
23.16358
0.039000
419.64999
19.80500
10.13750
30.80000
20.66250
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Market Capitalization
(million USD)
1178.63828
2109.44201
0.14640
24851.80469
490.12221
140.48590
1297.52463
1157.03873

The final sample includes 7,870 data points of 163 REITS in the period 1990Q1-2009Q4 (80
quarters). Average debt ratio of all REITs in all time points (quarters) is about 48% with a
standard deviation of about 19.6%. The highest and lowest debt ratios in the sample are about
95% and 1%, respectively. About 50% of all data points fall between 37% and 61%. Average
stock price is about $23.61 with a minimum of about $.04 and a maximum of about $420.
Average market capitalization is about $1178.7 million with a minimum and maximum of about
$24,851 million and $0.146 million, respectively.
I split the REITs sample into two portfolios: one is restricted REIT and the other is non-restricted
REIT. I use gross interest-bearing debt as a percentage of total assets as filtering criterion. My
filtering threshold is 33%. I assume that a hypothetical investor is composing debt-restricted
equally-weighted and value–weighted portfolios of available REITs. She selects only REITs that
pass the criteria of having less than 33% of debt ratio. Every quarter, she screens available REITs
for compatibility with this criterion and re-composes her portfolios accordingly. The frequency
of data used in this study is slightly lower than other studies (weekly and monthly as in Hassan
and Tag el-din (2005) and monthly in Hassan (2002)). The rational of using quarterly updating is
that our criteria are derived from balance sheet data available on quarterly basis only. Later in
this paper we will show that increasing the updating frequency from quarterly to monthly do not
change the overall results that we obtain.
For the purpose of comparison, I form two additional none-restricted portfolios (one equallyweighted and one value-weighted) composed of all the REITs that do not pass as compliant in
each quarter. Figure 1 below shows the number of REITs avaialble in each qurarter (quarterlly
sample size), REITs that pass as resitriced, and REITs that do not; across time horizon of this
study. It also shows number of REITs that are non-existent in certain quarter due to missing data.
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Figure 4 – Number of REITs in the Restricted and Non-Restricted Portfolios across Time
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The figure shows how 163 REITs included in this study are distributed over the Compliant and
Non-compliant portfolios over time. We start with a sample of 39 REITs in 1990Q1 where 18
are compliant REITs and 21 are non-compliant. Over time, sample increases as more data
become available every quarter. However, we notice that most of the sample size increase goes
to non-compliant REITs (more than 33% of debt). At the end of the analysis period, fourth
quarter of 2009, we have 24 REITs that pass as compliant and 107 that do not and a total sample
size of 131 REITs.
The four portfolios formed and tracked in this paper are: 1) REW: restricted equlaly-weighted 2)
NEW: non-constrained equally-weighted 3) RVW: restricted value-weighted 4) NVW: nonconstrained value-wieghted. In the equally weighted portfolio REW, we assume that our investor
invest equally in all the RIETs that pass as compliant (and we do the same in the non-compliant
portfolio NEW). In the value-weighted protfolio RVW, we assume that our investor distributes
her investment over compliant REIT in such a way that each REIT receives a fraction of total
investment equals the percentage of that REIT’s marekt value to all compliant REITs’ market
value in each quarter (and we do the same in the non-compliant portfolio NVW).
E. Historical Portfolios Performance
We start with initial investment of $1 in each portfolio in the first quarter of 1990. Then we
update each portfolio quarterly by including REITs that do (do not) comply in the compliant
(non-compliant) and exculding REITs otherwise. We report the over all value of each portfolio,
then we calculate quarterly return and analysis period cumulative return.The following figure
shows the quarterly return of the four portfolios created.
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Figure 5 – Quarterly Returns of the Four Portfolios
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The following table illustrates the four portfolios created and descriptive statistics of their
quarterly returns. The average quarterly return on the REW portfolio is about 3.27% while the
average quarterly return on the NEW portfolio is 3.33%. The difference between the two is only
6 basis points per quarter equivalent to about .32% annually in favor of the non-compliant
portfolio. In the value-weighted portfolios, the difference is much larger. The RVW portfolio
realized an average quarterly return of 1.97% compared to 1.23% in the NVW portfolio. The
difference is about 66 basis point equivalent to about 2.64% annually in favor of the compliant
portfolio. Looking at other descriptive statistics, coefficient of variation in particular, we notice
that the REW portfolio is almost twice as much volatile as the NEW portfolio. However, RVW
portfolio is slightly less volatile than NVW portfolio. We conclude that when equal weighting is
used, restricted portfolio performs worse in both average return and volatility. In value-weighted
portfolios, restricted REITs perform better in both average return and volatility.
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Table 6 - Portfolios Descriptive Statistics
Equally-weighted Portfolio
NonRestricted
restricted
Portfolio
Portfolio
Mean

Value-weighted Portfolio
NonRestricted
restricted
Portfolio
Portfolio

R-EW
0.032710

N-EW
0.033317

R-VW
0.019710

N-VW
0.012266

0.24638

0.13106

0.12241

0.10546

Std Dev
Coefficient
of Variation
Minimum

7.545

3.927

6.211

8.598

-0.55604

-0.39675

-0.31852

-0.36251

Maximum

0.87758

0.42510

0.32581

0.27706

Median

0.011505

0.021467

0.018109

0.013314

st

-0.11211

-0.046678

-0.055625

-0.045324

rd

3 Qrt

0.13005

0.099704

0.089567

0.081976

IQ Range

0.24216

0.14638

0.14519

0.12730

1 Qrt

F. Statistical Measures of Performance
In the following we conduct more sophisticated tests of performance. We start with buy-and-hold
return (BHR) then we use Jensen Alpha measure of performance with various versions of
CAPM.
i.

Buy-and-hold Returns
We start our analysis of the historical performance by calculating the buy-and-hold return BHR
of the four portfolios over the studied period. We calculate BHR as follows:

(1)

Where:
:
:
:

buy-and-hold return for portfolio in period
indicates the first quarter of the study period
return for portfolio in period
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The results are reported in the table below. The BHR analysis confirms our earlier finding that
restricted equally-weighted portfolio underperforms the non-restricted one but restricted valueweighted portfolio outperforms the non-restricted one. If our hypothetical investor had invested
one dollar in the 1990Q1 in each of the four portfolios, she would end up with $1.5 in the REW
portfolio, $7.136 in the NEW portfolio, $2.675 in the RVW portfolio, and $1.667 in the NVW
portfolio. This result, coupled with the earlier results in Table 2 above indicates that portfolio
weight composition is an important determinant of success in investment. The investors can not
earn the excess return generated by compliant REITs, unless their compliant REITs weights are
proportional to their market capitalization values.
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Table 7 Performance of Portfolios Measured by BHR (1990Q1-2009Q4)
Equally-weighted Portfolio
NonRestricted
restricted
Portfolio
Portfolio
R-EW
N-EW
Initial
investment
value
($)
Maximum
Value
($)
Maximum
Value
($)
Portfolio’s
Value at
the End of
the
Analysis
Period
($)

1990Q1

1

1997Q3

2.796

2007Q1

2009Q4

1.500

1

Value-weighted Portfolio
NonRestricted
restricted
Portfolio
Portfolio
R-VW
N-VW
1990Q1

1

2007Q1

2.656

13.520

2008Q2

3.875

7.136

2009Q4

2.675
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1

1.669

Table 3 also shows the maximum value that each portfolio reaches during the studied period. The
REW portfolio reaches a maximum value of 2.796 in 1997Q3. The NEW portfolio reaches a
maximum of 13.520 in 2007 Q1. The RVW portfolio reaches a maximum value of 3.875 in
2008Q2. The NVW portfolio reaches a maximum value of 2.656 in 2007Q1.
Figures 3 and 4 below plot the historical performance of the studied portfolios in terms of
cumulative return. Consistent with earlier findings, in equally-weighted portfolios restricted
portfolio always underperformed the non-restricted one. In value-weighted portfolios, restricted
portfolio always outperformed the non-restricted one.
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Figure 6 – Historical Performance of Equally-weighted Portfolios
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Figure 7 – Historical Performance of Value-weighted Portfolios
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Looking at the figures above, we notice that during the last 8 quarters of analysis, the
performance of the portfolios seems to have different pattern. These are the eight quarters that
cover 2008Q1 to 2009Q4 i.e. the time of the financial crisis. We notice that all four portfolios
witnessed losses as expected. To have a closer look at this period, we run separate analysis. This
time we assume that our investor starts her investment in the beginning of 2008. She puts $1 in
each portfolio and follows the same re-balancing policy described above. The results are
interesting. Restricted portfolio seems to offer better investment in both equally-weighting and
value-weighting schemes. Results are reported in table 4 below.
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Table 8 Performance of Portfolios Measured by Value (2008Q1-2009Q4)

Beginning of 2008
2008Q1
2008Q2
2008Q3
2008Q4
2009Q1
2009Q2
2009Q3
2009Q4

Equally-weighted Portfolio
NonRestricted
restricted
Portfolio
Portfolio
R-EW
N-EW
1
1
1.209495902
0.982744098
1.092824485
0.915163841
1.205816275
0.971639038
0.956656528
0.58613838
0.653777622
0.409896625
0.872248999
0.517120948
1.000526336
0.661610577
1.210755222
0.692053579

Equally-wighted

Value-weighted

1.4

1.4

1.2

1.2

1

1

0.8

0.8

0.6

0.6

0.4

0.4

0.2

0.2

0

0
70

72

74

76

Value-weighted Portfolio
NonRestricted
restricted
Portfolio
Portfolio
R-VW
N-VW
1
1
1.188792467
1.013715982
1.074108243
0.96518108
1.331509588
1.04745945
1.067943051
0.667741277
0.727778192
0.463140732
0.837908437
0.57755785
0.901909793
0.737575495
0.919090747
0.806414578

78

80

70

72

74

76

78

Compliant Portfolio

Compliant Portfolio

Non-compliant Portfolio

Non-compliant Portfolio
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A dollar invested in the beginning of 2008 in REW (NEW) would become $1.211 ($0.692) by
the end of 2009. Obviously the difference is huge and meaningful. The restricted portfolio end
with a gain of about 21% in two years during the crisis period when the non-restricted portfolio
end with a loss of about 31% of its value. On the value weighted portfolios, both restricted and
non-restricted portfolios witnessed a loss. However, the restricted portfolio lost only 9% of its
value while the non-restricted portfolio lost about 19% of its value.
Jensen’s Alpha

ii.

We compute Jensen’s alpha (Jensen 1968) of the compliant portfolios and compare it to Jensen’s
alpha of the non-compliant portfolio. If “alpha” is statistically significant and positive (negative),
then the portfolio is comprised of outperforming (underperforming) REITs. We start with the
simple single-factor CAPM model. We run,

where
:
:
:
:
:

Return of portfolio over period
Risk-Free Return Rate
Excess Return on the Market Portfolio for period
Beta of Portfolio
Jensen’s Alpha of Portfolio

Since this analysis requires use of market portfolio that is mostly available in monthly frequency
(not quarterly frequency), we slightly change our way of tracking portfolios illustrated above.
We still assume that our investor updates her portfolios every quarter (the highest frequency of
data available in Compustat). However, we track each REIT on a monthly basis. Specifically,
after we determine that a certain REIT complies (does not comply) with our selection criterion
and thus is included in the compliant (non-complaint) portfolio, we track its performance on a
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monthly basis until the next quarter. We obtain its monthly market price from CRSP and, thus,
obtain monthly values of our portfolios over the period March 1990 to December 2009. As a
result, we are able to obtain monthly returns of our four portfolios over the period April 1990 to
December 2009. These monthly return are used in calculating Jensen’s Alpha in the rest of this
paper27.
The CAPM is an ex-ante model, the beta coefficient reflects the expected volatility of portfolio
’s return versus the return on the well-diversified risk-free market portfolio. In academia, we
calculate betas using historical data. Next, if projection is the goal of the study, we make the
crucial assumption that historical relative volatility will not change significantly in the future. In
pure statistical terms,

measures the amount by which portfolio ’s return increases for a one

unit increase in the return of a perfectly diversified portfolio (market portfolio returns). In
portfolio theory,

measures the “relative” risk of portfolio compared to the market portfolio.

A higher (lower) beta indicates that investors has been - or should be - asking for higher (lower)
return on portfolio and is generally interpreted as portfolio being more (less) risky.
The intercept

captures the average return on a portfolio over and above that predicted by the

capital asset pricing model (CAPM). In a sense, it is a performance measure that analyzes the
performance of portfolio by estimating the excess average gain (loss) that investors realize by
choosing to invest in portfolio
(negative)

(given its beta and the average market return). A positive

indicates that portfolio offers, on average, higher (lower) risk compensation than

predicted by its own beta and the average return on market portfolio.

27

We repeat the analysis of average period returns and cumulative returns with monthly data. We do not find any
significant difference from the results obtained with quarterly data. In fact, the overall conclusions are identical to
those illustrated before with quarterly data. We chose not to report these results for clarity of presentation.
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We run the model above with monthly returns of all four portfolios REW, NEW, RVW, and
NVW. We use several proxies of monthly returns of market portfolio including the monthly
returns of S&P Composite Index (from CRSP), CRSP all-securities value-weighted market index
(from CRSP), Nasda1 composite index, FTSE NAREIT U.S. Real Estate Index (from the
NAREIT website www.reit.com) and Fama-French’s returns on the market (from CRSP). Risk
free rate is proxied by one month Treasury Bill rate.
Table 5 shows estimated values of slopes, Jensen Alpha, and other regression statistics for the
four portfolios with each proxy of market returns.

61

Table 9 Jensen Alpha of Portfolios under Different Criteria
Equally-weighted Portfolio
Proxy of Perfectly Diversified
Portfolio (Market Portfolio)

S&P market return
CRSP All-securities Valueweighted return
NASDAQ Composite
Index
FTSE NAREIT U.S. Real
Estate Index
Fama-French Market
Return

Value-weighted Portfolio

Restricted Portfolio
REW

Non-restricted Portfolio
NEW

Restricted Portfolio
RVW

Non-restricted Portfolio
NVW

.006076(1.15)
.286637**(2.36)
.023203
.005262(0.99)
.313923***(2.69)
.029902
.006231(1.18)
.164271**(2.19)
.020005
.004445(.85)
.364705***(3.83)
.058800
.006193(1.18)
.323027***(2.77)
.031591

.006478**(2.34)
.270461***(4.26)
.071542
.005939**(2.14)
.267754***(4.38)
.075335
.007071**(2.50)
.107856***(2.69)
.029866
.004585*(1.80)
.382853***(8.25)
.224402
.006752**(2.45)
.271665***(4.44)
.077380

.002602(0.98)
.180891***(2.97)
.036214
.002255(0.85)
.177333***(3.02)
.037394
.003000(1.12)
.071955*(1.89)
.015042
.000665(.27)
.329190***(7.37)
.187739
.002789(1.06)
.180770***(3.079)
.038771

-.000442(-0.20)
.251072***(4.96)
.094887
-.000971 (-.44)
.252126***(5.19)
.102806
.000098(0.04)
.101278***(3.15)
.040530
-.002190(-1.12)
.354389***(9.94)
.295926
-.002061(-.09)
.255936***(5.27)
.105702
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All betas are positive and statistically significant in all four portfolios and with all market
proxies. Understandably, they are higher when NAREIT is used and lower when
NASDAQ is used as proxy of market return. This is simply because NAREIT contain
REIT only while NASDAQ index includes technology stocks that fluctuate, in aggregate,
for causes different from those of the real estate sectors.
Positive beta is loosely interpreted as evidence that the portfolio “follows” the market.
This indicates a positive correlation between our REIT portfolios return and market
return. However, all betas’ magnitudes are relatively smaller than 1. This means that only
smaller portion of the variance of the portfolio cannot be mitigated by the diversification
provided by the market portfolio. Hence, all of our portfolios are generally deemed as
less volatile than the market portfolio. Yet, in equally weighted portfolio, betas of
restricted portfolios are generally higher (in all five proxies of market return except
NAREIT) than the betas of the unrestricted portfolio. The inverse observation is found in
value weighted portfolio (in all five proxies of market return). We conclude that
constrained value-weighted portfolio of REIT are less volatile than the non-constrained
one.
We find that all alphas are statistically insignificant in REW portfolio but positive and
significant when in NEW portfolio. Restricted portfolio is not generating any excess
return while non-restricted portfolio generates excess return of about 65, 59, 70, 46, and
67 basis points per month depending on which proxy is used. This is equivalent to about
7.8%, 7.08%, 8.4%, 5.52%, and 8.04% annual excess return depending on which market
proxy is used. This is also in line with our earlier findings (derived from average period
return and cumulative return) that in equally-weighting portfolios non-constrained REITs
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outperform the constrained ones. We also find that all alphas are statistically insignificant
in RVW and NVW portfolios. This is slightly different from our earlier findings derived
from average period return and cumulative return. There seem to be no difference
between restricted and non-restricted REITs in value weighted portfolios.
iii.

Extended asset Pricing Models

We start with Fama and French (1993 and 1996) three-factor model:

where
:
:

HML

:
:
:

SMB

:
:

Return of portfolio over period
Risk-Free Return Rate (Ibbotson One Month Treasury Bill
Rate)
Excess Return on the Market for period
Beta of Portfolio of factor j
difference in return between a portfolio of high book-tomarket stocks and one of low book-to-market stocks at time
difference in return between a small cap portfolio and a
large cap portfolio at time
Random error term for REIT over period with an
expected value of zero.

Carhart (1997) extends CAPM by including Fama and French (1993 and 1996) factors,
and a momentum factor of Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The resulting model is a 4factor market equilibrium model, where the coefficients provide indication of the style
focus of a portfolio. This model is formally described as follows:
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where
MOM

:

difference in return between a portfolio of past 12 month
winners and a portfolio of past 12 month losers at time t

Results are shown in table 5.
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Table 10 Jenson Alpha of portfolios using the three-factor and four-factor models
I regress portfolio returns on market return, book-to-market factor, size factor using three-factor model
(Panel A):
Then, we regress portfolio returns on market return, book-to-market factor, size factor and momentum
factor using four-factor model (Panel B):

Equally-weighted Portfolio

Value-weighted Portfolio

Restricted
Portfolio

Non-restricted
Portfolio

Restricted Portfolio

Non-restricted
Portfolio

REW

NEW

RVW

NVW

Panel A - Three-factor Model
.003732 (0.72)

.004198 (1.64)

.000800(.32)

-.002247(-1.11)

.350259***(2.91)

.341051***(5.75)

.226651*** (3.86)

.309308***(6.58)

.475572***(2.85)

.536149***(6.35)

.409066***( 5.04)

.426453***(6.56)

.425101***(2.73)

.261958***(3.42)

.239518***( 3.16)

.218574***(3.60)

.078660

.226123

.142418

.252297

Panel B - Four-Factor model
.004300(.81)

.004278(1.64)

.001056(.41)

-.002187(-1.06)

.323713**( 2.51)

.337348***( 5.31)

.214742***( 3.42)

.306505***(6.09)

.452325***( 2.64)

.532906***( 6.30)

.398638***( 4.77)

.423999***( 6.33)

.428883***( 2.75)

.262486*** (3.41)

.241214***( 3.17)

.218973***( 3.60)

-.059930(-.58)

-.008360(-.16)

-.026884( -.54)

-.006327 (-.16)

.080005

.226213

.143479

.252377

*** indicate significance at 1%; ** indicates significance at 5%; * indicates significance at 10%
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The table shows that alphas are statistically insignificant whether we use equallyweighted or value-weighted portfolios. This finding does not change whether we use
three-factor model (Panel A) or four-factor model (Panel B). Consistent with Ibrahim and
Ong (2008), we conclude that when other risk factors are controlled for, there is no
convincing evidence that restricted portfolio’s performance differ from the non-restricted
one. Since betas are all significant (and positive) in all four regressions, we conclude that
market-wide risk-return characteristics are more important than compliance vs. noncompliance characteristics. In other words, although we have shown that compliant
portfolio outperforms non-compliant, the difference become insignificant when we
control for broad economic factors. In practical terms, investors who invest exclusively in
REITs securities make higher return if they choose to invest in debt-conservative REITs.
This is not true for investors with more diversified portfolios.
G. Summary and findings of the thought investment experience
I collect quarterly data on 163 active REIT’s (CIS code 6798) from COMPUSTAT
databases over the period 1990Q1-2009Q4 (there are 80 quarters). I create two debtrestricted REIT portfolios based with equal-weighting and value-weighting. The filtering
threshold is a maximum of 33% debt ratio. For the purpose of comparison, I form two
non-restricted portfolios (one equally-weighted and one value-weighted) composed of all
the REITs that do not pass as compliant.
I that find restricted portfolio performs better in value-weighting (but not in equalweighting) in both average return and volatility. The BHR analysis reveals similar results.
Restricted equally-weighted portfolio always underperformed the non-restricted one
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while restricted value-weighted portfolio always outperformed the non-restricted one.
During the recent crisis period, however, restricted portfolio outperformed the nonrestricted one in both equally-weighting and value-weighting schemes. The restricted
equally weighted portfolio generated a gain of about 21% in two years during the crisis
period when the non-restricted portfolio end with a loss of about 31% of its value. The
restricted value weighted portfolios lost only 9% of its value while the non-restricted
portfolio lost about 19% of its value in two years during the crisis period.
I compute Jensen’s alpha of all four portfolios several proxies of monthly returns of
market portfolio and one month Treasury Bill rate as a proxy for risk-free rate. I find that
constrained value-weighted portfolio of REIT are less volatile than the non-constrained
one. Again I find that in equally-weighting portfolios non-constrained REITs outperform
the constrained ones. However, there seem to be no difference between restricted and
non-restricted REITs in value weighted portfolios. Finally, I use Fama and French (1993
and 1996) three-factor model and Carhart (1997) four-factor market equilibrium model. I
find that when other risk factors are controlled for, there is no convincing evidence that
restricted portfolio’s performance differ from the non-restricted one and that market-wide
risk-return characteristics are more important than compliance vs. non-compliance
characteristics.
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VII.

Conclusion

Classic capital structure theories (Modigilani and Miller, 1958 & 1963 and Miller 1977)
suggest that REITs use of debt should be minimal because REITs do not pay corporate
income tax and thus do not enjoy the classical tax-deductibility benefit of leverage (Howe
and Shilling, 1988). However, anecdotal observation and the findings of previous studies
(Howe and Shilling, 1988; Ghosh, Nag, and Sirmans, 2001; and Feng, Ghosh and
Sirmans, 2007) suggest the opposite. Feng, Ghosh and Sirmans (2007) concur with Ott,
Riddiough, and Yi (2005) that there is no apparent benefit (tax-deductibility savings) and,
therefore, REITs appetite to debt issuance is puzzling. Further, they suggested that
monitoring benefits of debt is the potential motivation for high leverage ratios in REIT.
I investigate REITs leverage in three different approaches. First, I investigate how the
market prices leverage in absence of tax-deductibility benefit. The OLS approach I use
here has been applied extensively in previous studies that investigated leverage.
However, these studies conventionally excluded REITs from their samples because
REITs are regulated entity. The REITs capital structure literature, previous
methodologies applied are limited to event studies. I use a sample of REITs over 19902010 and a regression model similar to that used by Fama and French (1998). Using a
period’s average slope, I found evidence that, in contrast with Fama and French 1998
findings with broader sample, REITs do not gain or loss value by altering their capital
structure. Nevertheless, to overcome a potential smaller sample (REITs only) caveat, I rerun the regressions with all data point (REIT-quarter) in the sample to obtain “global
slopes.” I found that current and future (expected) increases in leverage policy add value
but past increases do not. However, controlling for investment and profitability
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eliminates this value gain. I conclude that leverage, by itself, does not explain variation
on value in REITs.
Second, I investigate other (non-tax-driven) benefits of leverage. Pecking order theory
(Myers and Majluf, 1984) suggests that leverage lowers the adverse selection cost of
equity. Agency theory suggests that mandatory debt payouts lowers perquisite spending
and empire building behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and free cash flow (Jensen,
1986). Signaling hypothesis (Ross 1977, Myers and Majluf, 1984, and Miller and Rock,
1985) suggests that debt issuance signals prosperous future and/or financial stability.
Fama and French (2002) present a comprehensive model that accounts for different
capital structure theories. Following this model, I regress changes on capital structure in
REITs on several proxies of profitability and investment opportunities. I find evidence
that lends support to pecking order theory in particular. This is consistent with previous
findings in broader samples (Long and Malitz (1985), Rajan and Zingales (1995) and
Fama and French (2002). I conclude that REITs managers attempt to maximize wealth of
exiting shareholders by refraining from issuing equity (unless stocks are overvalued) and
rely heavily on debt to finance investments.
Third, I conduct a thought experiment on debt-restricted REITs. I construct a debtrestricted portfolio and a non-restricted portfolio and track their performance over 19902010. I collect quarterly data on 163 active REIT’s (CIS code 6798) from COMPUSTAT
databases over the period 1990Q1-2009Q4 (there are 80 quarters). I create two debtrestricted REIT portfolio based on equal-weighting and value-weighting schemes. The
filtering threshold is a maximum of 33% debt ratio. For the purpose of comparison, I
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form two non-restricted portfolios (one equally-weighted and one value-weighted)
composed of all the REITs that do not pass as compliant.
I find that restricted portfolio performs better in value-weighting (but not in equalweighting) in both average return and volatility. The BHR analysis reveals similar results.
Restricted equally-weighted portfolio always underperformed the non-restricted one
while restricted value-weighted portfolio always outperformed the non-restricted one.
During the recent crisis period, however, restricted portfolio outperformed the nonrestricted one in both equally-weighting and value-weighting schemes. Using Jensen’s
alpha approach, I find that in equally-weighting portfolios non-constrained REITs
outperform the constrained ones and there is no difference between restricted and nonrestricted REITs in value weighted portfolios. Finally, I use Fama and French (1993 and
1996) three-factor model and Carhart (1997) four-factor market equilibrium model. I find
that when other risk factors are controlled for, there is no convincing evidence that
restricted portfolio’s performance differ from the non-restricted one and that market-wide
risk-return characteristics are more important than compliance vs. non-compliance
characteristics.
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Chapter 2: Essay on the Persistence of Corporate Diversification
Discount after Merger and Acquisition Transactions

I.

Introduction

Mergers and acquisitions are business transactions where a parent firm diversifies its
assets by merging with or acquiring business unit(s) of another existing firm. Not all
M&A events lead to “pure” diversification, though. The new unit(s) could belong to the
same, or very similar, industry as the parent (i.e. related or intra-industry diversification)
or to a different industry (i.e. unrelated or inter-industry diversification). The literature on
corporate diversification is very rich and diverse; it covers many interrelated topics from
finance and strategy disciplines. The dominant evidence in finance literature posits that
diversification erodes value (Lang and Stulz, 1994 and Berger and Ofek, 1995 and
Servaes, 1996) and unrelated diversification is more value-eroding than related
diversification (Bettis and Mahajan, 1985 and Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988 and
Berger and Ofeck, 1995)28.
It is puzzling that diversification is such a popular business strategy 29 despite overall
evidence of value erosion. What motivates managers to diversify their companies despite
the documented diversification discount? Some authors suggest that diversification is

28

The collective evidence, however, is inconclusive (Martin and Sayrak, 2003 and Ravichandran, Liu, Han
and Hasan, 2009) and a small, yet important, portion of literature shows evidence of a diversification
premium (Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas, 2001 and Villalonga, 2004a, b).
29
Serveas (1996) shows that in his sample over 1961-1976, number of single-segment firms declined from
54.5% to 28.4% and number of 6-segment firms increased from 0.4% to 4% and the overall trend over the
studied period is an increase of average number of segments from 1.74 to 2.70. Montgomery (1994) notes
that two thirds of the Fortune 500 companies were diversified in 1992. Mukherjee, Kiymaz, & Baker
(2004) reported that the period of 1992-2000 witnessed the largest merger wave in history. Further, the
sample studied in this dissertation shows that some diversifiers involved in repeated diversifying behavior
in the 1998-2008 period.
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motivated by management self-interest pursuit (Jensen (1986) and Jensen and Murphy
(1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1990a,b), Hyland and Diltz (2002) and Aggarwal and
Samwick (2003)). Others suggest that documented discount is an artifact of inappropriate
data (Villalonga, 2004a, b) or a result of diversifiers’ tendency to acquire business units
that are already selling at a discount (Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) and Campa and
Kedia (2002)). Some authors note that diversification strategy carries some advantages
(Rumel (1974) and Bettis and Mahajan (1985) and Berger and Ofek (1995)). No previous
work, however, has attempted to investigate the dynamic relationship between
diversifiers’ value and the evolution of financial and strategic efficiencies of corporate
diversification strategy in a cohesive framework. In this dissertation, I hypothesize that
diversifiers exchange immediate diversification discount with future value gain attributed
to “unanticipated” advantages of diversification. Further, I hypothesize that
diversification advantages are more pronounced in related diversification; hence they
witness a faster value recovery process compared to unrelated diversifiers.
The literature documents several advantages and disadvantages of diversification
strategy. The most celebrated financial advantage is the internal capital market efficiency
(see Weston (1970), Stulz (1990), Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) and Morck and
Yeung (1998)) which also has been reported by other authors as a diversification
disadvantage (see Stulz (1990), Chen and Steiner (2000), Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts
(1992), Lamont (1997), and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000)). Lewellen (1971) lists
several advantages to diversification including improved access to capital market,
increased efficiencies through economies of scale and scope, increased market power,
sharing of extant assets and greater administrative efficiency. A recent survey study by
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Mukherjee, Kiymaz, & Baker (2004) confirms existence of financial and strategic
advantages of diversification. They surveyed CFOs about the primary motives behind
corporate M&A strategies and found that “synergy” (in the form of operating economies
of scope and scale, financial economies, and increased market power) and “diversity”
seem to be top motives.
I argue that immediately after the diversifying event, the value of the diversification
advantages is uncertain to outsiders; thus the initial discount. Over time, financial and
strategic efficiencies materialize and uncertainty diminishes. The market rewards
diversifiers in the form of gradual value gain and initial diversification discount declines
over time. While the diversifying event occur at one point in time, its advantages are
inherently evolving (i.e. they materialize over time) and they do not perfectly qualify as
public information. First, diversification advantages listed above are naturally evolving
i.e. they materialize slowly over time. It is very unlikely that the newly-acquired business
unit(s) come to a complete harmony with existing unit(s) immediately after the
diversification. Further, market power and cost efficiencies usually take time to reach full
level. Second, and more importantly, financial and strategic advantages are, at least
partly, private information 30 at the time of the diversification and, thus, are not
immediately priced.
In a sense, investors initially overestimate the disadvantages and underestimate the
advantages of diversification and it takes some time before they “correct” their estimation
30

Potential financial and strategic advantages do not qualify as “publicly-available” information. Rather,
they are, at least partially, insider’s information. Arguably, insiders know better than outsiders about the
potentials of the subject diversification. This is consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis
which is a cornerstone in major modern theories of finance such as signaling theory of Ross (1977) and
adverse selection of Myers and Majluf (1984) and agency costs of Jensen and Meckling (1976).
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through a learning process. Menon and Subramanian (2007) show that risk-averse agents
face a trade-off between learning and diversification and what matters is not only the
level of risk but also whether or not it can be reduced through learning. In their model, a
risk-averse agent chooses between investing in two similar projects (i.e. to focus) and
investing in two different projects (i.e. to diversify). They show that initially there is
some uncertainty but over time the agent learns and uncertainty is reduced.
Diversification allows the agent to diversify away (at least partially) idiosyncratic risk but
also entitles slower learning relative to being focused. Analogically, I argue that investors
initially discount diversified firms, relative to focused ones, due to uncertainty associated
with the materialization of potential efficiencies but eventually the uncertainty vanishes
away as the units “learn to work together” (Hund, Monk, and Tice, 2010). The learning
process, however, takes longer time with diversified firms relative to focused ones. Thus,
it takes some time for the initial discount to gradually fade away.
One testable implication of this hypothesis is that the initial diversification discount
documented using static methodologies is attenuated in a dynamic investigation. The
second implication is that discount recovery goes hand-in-hand with the materialization
of financial and strategic efficiencies over time. The dynamic approach I use in this
dissertation is tailored to investigate these two implications. Further, Lewellen (1971) and
Rumel (1974) and Bettis and Mahajan (1985), argue that the advantages of diversification
are more significant in related diversifications. Consequently, we anticipate observing
faster value recovery in related diversifiers relative to unrelated diversifiers.
The major contribution of this dissertation is introducing a dynamic evolution framework
to the literature of corporate diversification. The dynamic evolution model I use relates
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value evolution patterns to several unanticipated financial and strategic advantages of
diversification. Specifically, I measure performance (Tobin’s Q) and value (excess value
approach of Berger and Ofek, 1995) of each parent for several years after the
diversification event and observe the trend. Next, I measure several financial and
strategic advantages of diversifiers over several years after the diversification event. I
relay on extant finance and strategy literature to identify potential advantages including
internal capital market, access to capital market, market power and cost efficiencies.
Using several OLS models, I test the joint evolution of diversifiers’ performance and
value with the evolution of diversification advantages. I also condition the test on the
structure of the diversification event i.e. related vs. unrelated.
Some empirical work has been done on the persistence of diversification impact on value
and performance. However, the small number of empirical studies and the
inconclusiveness of results warrant more research in this domain. My hypothesis is
consistent with Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) who show that the market may
adjust slowly to news of mergers. Recently, Hund, Monk, and Tice (2010) used Pástor
and Veronesi’s (2003) rational learning model to examine changes in excess value
conditioned on firm organizational form and how these changes vary across the business
cycle. They show that diversified firms witness larger initial discount relative to focused
firms. However, the diversification discount increases (i.e. worsens) at slower rate in
diversified firms relative to focused ones. They attribute the differential in the worsening
rate to learning and argue that diversified firms are older and, thus, they allow faster
learning as the segments “learn to work together.”
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In contrast to Hund, Monk, and Tice (2010) findings, I show that the initial discount last
for only short post-event period (it actually increases in the first post-event year) before it
starts to decrease (i.e. improve) and eventually turn into a premium. In a sample of 316
diversifying events over 1998-2008, I document that initial diversification discount
worsens (increases) in the first post-diversification year before it starts to improve
(decrease) steadily in subsequent years. In my sample, an average diversifier takes about
3 years to completely neutralize and reverse the initial diversification discount. This
finding indicates that documented diversification discount in other studies might be
attributed to limiting analysis horizon to short period around the diversifying event or
gauging average excess value cross-sectionally without taking into account its dynamic
evolution31. Expectedly, I find evidence that value recovery process is faster with related
diversification which takes about 1 year to reverse the initial diversification discount
while an unrelated diversifier needs 5 years to do so. Further, I show that “learning to
work together” is more adequately defined (and quantitatively measured) in terms of
financial and strategic advantages of corporate diversification.
In particular, I show evidence that annual improvements in performance (higher Tobin’s
Q) are driven by annual improvements in internal capital market activity, market power,
and cost efficiencies. Similarly, annual improvements in value are driven by market
power, internal capital market activity, and cost efficiency. I also show that
improvements in market power contribute to faster improvement in performance (Tobin’s
Q) and faster value recovery process (excess value). Access to capital market, cost

31

The findings of this dissertation does show that, consistent with previous work of Berger and Ofeck
(1995) and many others, that diversification initially destroys value. It also shows, however, that the
discount improves (decreases) systematically overtime.
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efficiencies and share of common assets contribute to faster improvements in Tobin’ Q
but not necessarily translate into improvement in value. Finally, improvements in market
power has stronger impact on speed of recovery (of both Tobin’s Q and excess value) in
related diversifiers relative to unrelated ones.
The rest of this dissertation unfolds as follows. In the next section, I present my
hypothesis and provide a discussion of its implications. In section III, I describe the
sample structure. In section IV, I investigate the evolution of diversifiers’ performance
and value. In section V, I test the joint evolution between value and performance of
diversified firms and the diversification efficiencies. In section VI, I discuss the results
and conclude.
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II.

Hypotheses Development

A. Summary of Extant Literature and the Diversification Puzzle32
The dominant belief in diversification literature is that related diversification is generally
a more advantageous strategy than unrelated diversification (Bettis and Mahajan, 1985
and Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988 and Berger and Ofeck, 1995). However, the value
consequences of corporate diversification strategy are inconclusive (Martin and Sayrak,
2003 and Ravichandran, Liu, Han and Hasan, 2009). While a sizable portion of literature
supports the value-erosion hypothesis of corporate diversification (Lang and Stulz, 1994
and Berger and Ofek 1995 and Servaes, 1996), a smaller, yet important, portion shows
evidence of a diversification premium (Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas (2001) and
Villalonga, 2004a, b). Nevertheless, the dominant evidence and explanations found in the
finance literature support the value-erosion hypothesis of corporate diversification.
The standard methodological approach is to compare the value of multiple-segment firm
to the sum of imputed value of its segments (as in Berger and Ofek, 1995) or to compare
performance (measured by Tobin’s Q) of multiple-segment firms to performance of
single-segment firms (as in Lang and Stulz, 1994; Servaes, 1996; and Steiner, 1996). A
second methodological approach involves investigation of market reaction by regressing
returns on a measure of diversification such as Herfindahl Index (as in Comment and
Jarrell, 1995) or by running an abnormal return analysis around divestiture dates (as in
Desai and Jain (1999), Burch and Nanda (2003) and Ahn and Denis (2004)). The
collective evidence presented in those studies shows that diversification is associated

32

A detailed literature review is available in appendix A.
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with trading at a discount, poorer performance and negative market reaction at
announcement date.
Explanations of the value-erosion hypothesis33 of diversification fall under three major
categories: agency, internal market inefficiencies and information asymmetry. Agencybased explanations (as in Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1997, Chen and Steiner, 2000 and
Rotemberg and Saloner, 1994) advocate exacerbation of free cash flow problem and the
inability to motivate managers. The internal capital market34 hypothesis attributes valueerosion to inefficient resource allocation (as in Lamont, 1997, Rajan, Servaes and
Zingales. 2000 and Shin and Stulz, 1998). Finally, information asymmetry-based
explanations posit that diversification discount stems from over-investment problems (as
in Stulz, 1990, Matsusaka and Nanda, 2002).
The Corporate Diversification Puzzle
Several studies reported increased business appetite toward diversification despite
overwhelming evidence of value-erosion. Serveas (1996) shows that in his sample over
1961-1976, the number of single-segment firms declined from 54.5% to 28.4% and
number of 6-segment firms increased from 0.4% to 4% and the overall trend over the
studied period is an increase of average number of segments from 1.74 to 2.70.
Montgomery (1994) notes that two thirds of the Fortune 500 companies were diversified
in 1992. Mukherjee, Kiymaz, & Baker (2004) reported that the period of 1992-2000
33

There is much less evidence of the value-creation hypothesis of diversification. The fundamental
argument is presented by Villalonga (2004a, b) who documents a diversification premium and shows that
diversification discount is an artifact of data used. See appendix A for more discussions and evidence.
34
The impact of internal capital market on diversified firm value is inconclusive. For instance, internal
capital market allows easier access to capital (advantage) but also exacerbates agency-related free cash flow
problem (disadvantage).
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witnessed the largest merger wave in history. In the sample of this dissertation that
includes 316 diversifying events during 1998-2008, I also notice a repeated diversifying
behavior in the same parent firm. About 7% of the diversifiers studied in this dissertation
underwent a second diversifying event and about 2% underwent a third diversifying event
over the period 1998-2008. Why diversification is such a popular corporate strategy
despite the overwhelming evidence supporting the value-erosion hypothesis of
diversification and documents negative market reactions to focus-decreasing moves? In a
sense, the ultimate goal of corporate management is to maximize shareholders’ wealth
through value-creating investments not to involve in value-eroding strategies. This is the
diversification puzzle.
Possible Explanations of the Corporate Diversification Puzzle
Some authors explain the popularity of diversification strategy in light of management
self-interest

pursuits

(empire-building

behavior

and

increased

benefits

and

compensations). For instance, Jensen (1986) and Jensen and Murphy (1990) note that
managers pursue diversification to increase their compensation, power, and prestige.
Shleifer and Vishny (1990a,b) note that diversification strengthens management
entrenchment by making investments that require their particular skills. Hyland and Diltz
(2002) show evidence that diversifiers enjoy cash availability and lower R&D expenses
and conclude that managers of diversifying firms seem to pursue growth through
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mechanisms other than research and development. Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) also
find similar results35.
In my opinion, management entrenchment concerns cannot be the only motivation behind
diversification because what it really implies is that diversification is a strategy that
transfers wealth from shareholders to managers. This process cannot continue for long
time due to several internal and external control mechanisms. For instance, Board of
Directors intervention would not approve a merger proposition if the sole reason was
management entrenchment. Further, merger transactions are big events that usually
attract a great deal of attention from external investors, analysts, the media, and even the
general public. There is very little room for diversification to be such a common strategy
if management entrenchment is the only motive. Therefore, the management self-interest
pursuit story does not, by itself, resolve the puzzle. I argue that there must be some other
plausible justifications for the popularity of diversification.
B. The Potential Advantages and Disadvantages of Diversification
Logically, there must be a positive side of diversification that lures businesses to
diversify despite initial discount. In the following, I summarize major financial and
strategic advantages of corporate diversification found in literature. I also highlight
potential disadvantages. On the financial side, diversification creates efficiency of
internal capital market and improves access to external capital. However, it is
inconclusive whether internal capital markets create or erode value. On the strategic side,
diversification increases market power and creates cost efficiencies attributed to
35

I would like to highlight that diversification motivations are generally consistent with one explanation of
diversification discount that asserts that diversification intensifies agency problems.
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economies of scale and scope and share of common assets. Finally, I cite evidence that
these advantages are more pronounce in related diversification relative to unrelated
diversification.
i.

Financial Efficiencies of Diversification
Although the dominant belief in diversification literature is tilted toward the valueerosion hypothesis, few authors reported value-creation evidence (Villalonga 2004a, b)

and positive market reaction to diversification announcements (Hadlock, Ryngaert, and
Thomas, 2001). The most celebrated explanation for value-creation is efficient internal
capital market. Weston (1970) argues that internal capital markets are more efficient in
resource allocation than external capital markets. Stulz (1990) shows that diversification
allows firms to set up an internal capital market so that they avoid the need to go to
external capital and, thus, mitigate the under-investment problem suggested by Myers
(1977). Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994) investigate the strengths and weaknesses of
internal capital markets. They find that the ownership aspect of internal financing has two
significant advantages of better monitoring and better asset deployment. Morck and
Yeung (1998) also argue that cross-country diversifications are motivated by efficiency
of internal capital markets.
Nevertheless, there is a considerable doubt whether internal capital market in diversified
firms is efficient and value-creating or inefficient and value-eroding. I have shown in the
literature review section (appendix A) that internal capital market has also been suggested
as an explanation of value-erosion because it exacerbates agency-related free cash flow
problem (Stulz (1990) and Chen and Steiner (2000)) and allows for inefficient allocation
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of resources toward underperforming segments (Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992),
Lamont (1997), and Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000)). In summary, the exact impact
of internal capital market in diversified firms is inconclusive.
Lewellen (1977) lists several other financial efficiencies associated with diversification
including: 1) taking advantage of a temporary undervaluation of the acquired firm; 2)
lowering the variability of earnings through diversification of income sources; and 3)
utilizing the unused debt capacity of the acquired firm. In the same paper, Lewellen
presents an argument based on market efficiency hypothesis of Fama (1965) where
investors can detect undervaluation by themselves and act accordingly. Thus, the
undervaluation explanation of value gain is weakened. Similarly, Lewellen presents an
argument based on well-functioning capital markets envisioned by Sharpe (1964) and
Lintner (1965) where investors can diversify on their own and, thus, there should be little
value gain from diversification in mergers. In fact, Lewellen’s paper is devoted to
investigating diversifiers’ possible utilization of unused debt capacity. Lewellen shows
that this does not only include the possibility of utilizing an unused borrowing capacity of
the acquired firm. He argues that utilization of unused debt capacity also includes the
possible improvement of access to capital market by improved satisfaction of lenders’
service criteria even when the acquired firm had already exploited its own borrowing
capacity.
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ii.

Strategic Efficiencies of Diversification
(Mukherjee, Kiymaz, & Baker, 2004) surveyed CFOs about the primary motives behind
corporate M&A (and divestiture). Their final sample includes 75 CFOs36 from the largest
M&As reported by Mergers and Acquisitions during the period 1990-2001. 28
respondents (37.3%) ranked “synergy” as the top motive behind mergers and acquisitions
and 22 respondents (29%) ranked “diversity” as the top motive. Further, when asked
about the source of synergy, 62 respondents chose operating economies of scope and
scale, 4 chose financial economies, and 3 chose increased market power. Lewellen (1971)
argues that diversification strategy creates net increase in market value after mergers. He
attributed value gain to: 1) Increased efficiencies through economies of scale; 2)
Increased market power through larger market share or the appeal of a more complete
product line; 3) Sharing of extant intangible assets such as research and expertise; and 4)
Greater administrative efficiency through better fit of scarce managerial skills. Chandler
(1977) asserts that diversified firms are inherently more efficient than their divisions
would be separately because diversified firms create administrative efficiency in the form
of management concerned with coordinating the operations of specialized divisions.
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) present evidence that supports the existence of a
diversification efficiency attributed to sharing intangible assets. Gertner, Scharfstein and
Stein (1994) and Stein (1997) noted presence of cost efficiencies in diversified companies
through economies of scale and scope. They posit that unlike tangible assets that
deteriorate faster when shared, intangible assets, such as competencies, grow when
shared. Siegel and Simons (2010) applied human capital theory to M&A events to assess
36

Representing 11.8% of the 636 delivered surveys.
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their impacts on workers, plants, and firms and found that M&A enhances plant
productivity by improving the sorting and matching of plants and workers to more
efficient uses.
Kogut and Zander (1992) present an argument where diversification (in the form of
acquisition or joint venture) is a form of external learning where an organization uses its
“combinative capabilities” to create new market opportunities. Teece, Pisano and Shuen
(1997) develop a dynamic capabilities approach to analyze source of wealth-creation in
firms. They note that diversification could be seen as a strategy emphasizing the
exploitation of market power and conclude that acquisitions may raise rivals' costs or
enable firms to attain exclusive arrangements. Tanriverdi and Lee (2008) show that
diversification across operating system platforms and diversification across software
product-markets complement each other and mutually affect each other’s marginal
returns. Implementing the two strategies in combination improves sales growth and
market share of the entire company.
iii.

Diversification Efficiencies are Stronger in Related Diversification

The predominant evidence in diversification literature is that related diversifications are
more constructive than unrelated ones (Bettis and Mahajan, 1985 and Wernerfelt and
Montgomery, 1988 and Berger and Ofeck, 1995) because the former leverages significant
business synergies while the latter suffers from agency costs and inefficient resource
allocation. Nevertheless, while many authors controlled for relatedness effect and
document superiority of related diversification, we still have very little evidence on the
cause-effect aspects of this phenomenon.
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The literature suggests several arguments for the unequal impact of diversification across
related and unrelated diversifiers. I find that these arguments fall under five major
explanations. The first explanation is based on savings through share of common
resources which is obviously available only to related diversifiers. Rumelt (1974) argues
that related diversification is more constructive (compared to unrelated ones) because
skills and resources can be used in related markets. Rumelt (1982) and Amit and Livnat
(1988) find that related diversifiers exploit synergies across product units by
consolidating business activities in manufacturing, marketing, raw material purchases,
and R&D. Davis and Thomas (1993) assert that the use of common resources in multiple
businesses or multiple product lines within a single business creates value in the form of
economies of scope. The second explanation pertains to internal synergy and harmony in
operations that is available only to related diversifiers. Barney (1997) shows that related
diversifiers benefit from intra-firm product/process technology diffusion. The third
explanation is based on increased market power gained from controlling a bigger slice of
the market. Amit and Livnat (1988) show that related diversifiers witness enhanced
market power. Because an unrelated diversifier operates in different markets by
definition, they realize a minimal market power increase. However, related diversifier
operates in the same, or at least a very close, market. The fourth explanation is related to
the impact of technology advancement. Ravichandran, Liu, Han and Hasan (2009) find
that firm’s information technology advancement (proxied by IT spending) has a positive
impact on performance of related diversifiers but not unrelated diversifiers.
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C. The Hypotheses
Before I formally state my argument, I present an argument that above-cited advantages
of diversification are inherently evolving and do not perfectly qualify as publiclyavailable information; thus, they are not immediately priced. Rather, these advantages
materialize gradually and become publicly available over time.
i.

Diversification Advantages are Evolving and Partially Unanticipated Information
Production-related (economies of scale and scope) and market-related (increased market
power) advantages naturally take time to materialize because of production cycles and
market conditions. Second, internal efficiency-related advantages (internal market
efficiency, share of assets and administrative efficiencies) are part of a unifying process
that kicks in after the merger but takes time to become fully effective. To illustrate, I
argue that after the acquisition, a “unification process” kicks in and management attempts
to bring the newly acquired unit(s) into full harmony and synergy with existing units.
However, this is not likely to be a quick process. This claim is consistent with Agrawal,
Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) who show that the market may adjust slowly to news of
mergers. Therefore, while the diversification move happens at one point in time, the
positive consequences of diversification are inherently evolving i.e. they materialize
gradually over time. In effect, the value gain attributed to diversification advantages may
materialize over time as well.
I also argue that there is an “unanticipated” part of diversification advantages known to
insiders but unknown to the public at the time of diversification, hence the initial discount
reported in literature. More specifically, at the time of diversification, the “full” potential
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of the move is known by insiders only. Outsiders are at informational disadvantage
compared to managers of the diversifying firm when it comes to estimating the exact
potential of the subject move. This claim is consistent with Servaes (1996) who finds
evidence that firms with higher insider ownership are more likely to diversify during
1973-1976 when the diversification discount was declining. This indicates that, consistent
with my claim, insiders may possess information about the prospectus of the
diversification move that outsiders don’t. This proposition is also consistent with the
information asymmetry hypothesis which is a corner stone of major theories of finance
such as signaling theory of Ross (1977) and adverse selection of Myers and Majluf
(1984) and agency costs of Jensen and Meckling (1976). The theory posits that managers
in general possess information that others don’t.
Therefore, potential diversification advantages do not perfectly qualify as “publiclyavailable” information. According to the well-accepted semi-strong form of market
efficiency hypothesis of Fama (1965), only market (historical) information and other
publicly available information (such as financial reports and corporate news) are priced.
Private information (also called insiders’ information) is not priced. In our context,
diversification advantages are not immediately and fully priced because they do not
perfectly qualify as “publicly-available” information.
ii.

Hypotheses: Value Recovery and Diversification Advantages
Above discussions imply that diversification strategy carries some potential advantages
albeit initial discount. These advantages, however, are uncertain at the time of
diversification. Therefore, I hypothesize that diversifiers exchange immediate
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diversification discount with future value gain attributed to “unanticipated” advantages of
diversification. Specifically, I hypothesize that shortly after diversification; its exact
advantages are uncertain to outsiders, thus the initial discount. Over time, positive
consequences materialize, uncertainty diminishes, and the initial discount fades away.
Further, since diversification advantages are more pronounced in related diversifications,
I hypothesize that the value and performance of related diversifier’s improve faster than
unrelated diversifiers. In order to test this hypothesis, I apply a dynamic investigation to
gauge diversifiers’ performance and value over time. Second, I test the joint evolution of
performance and value of diversifiers and diversification advantages. Finally, I condition
the test on diversification nature (related vs. unrelated) to capture any differential in the
speed of value recovery.
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III.

Data, Sample, and Descriptive Statistical

A. Data and Sample Structure
The main methodological contribution of this dissertation is tracking diversifiers’ value
and performance several years (as many as data allows) after the diversification events. I
use data collected from SDC (Securities Data Company) to obtain a list of
merger/acquisition event37. Then, I use CIS (COMPUSTAT Industry Segment) to track
the value and performance of these diversifiers over time. Value is measured by the
standard excess value approach of Berger and Ofek (1995) and performance is measured
by Tobin’s Q used by Lang and Stulz (1994), Servaes (1996) and Steiner (1996). I also
track the evolution of strategic and financial efficiencies of the parent company and
analyze its dynamic impact on value and performance. I track each parent for as many
years as data availability allows for.
I follow sample selection criteria that are common in the diversification literature. In
particular, I follow the specifications and procedures of Berger and Ofek (1995), Denis
Denis and Sarin (1997), Hund, Monk, and Tice (2010), and Subramaniam, Tang, Yue,
and Zhou (2010). I start with SDC database to obtain a list of all completed U.S. mergers
and acquisitions events in the period 1998-200838. I require that deal value is greater than
or equal to $20 million, none of the firms selected have segments in the financial services
industry (SIC 6000-6999) or regulated utilities (SIC 4900–4999), and the acquirer is a
37

The particular argument of this dissertation requires that I use effective date of the merger/acquisition not
the announcement date. This is because diversification advantages commence when the two companies
actually merge not when they announce to do so.
38
I choose 1998 as the beginning year of my sample period because of change in business segment
reporting post 1997. Before 1997, firms were required to report their segments as major lines of businesses.
After 1997, SFAS No 131 requires that segments are defined as the enterprise operating segments. For
more discussion on this issue, see Rajan, Serveas, and Zingales (2000).
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publicly traded company. The inquiry results in 2,961 merger and acquisition events in
the specified time window. Next, I use the CIS database to track these diversifiers39 and
their segments between 1998 and 200840. I was able to match 2,177 events from SDC
with segments data from CIS. Each diversifier is tracked for as many years as the data
allows for within the specified framework of 1998 – 2008. Thus, I have 6,287 firm-year
observations. The year of the M&A transaction is denoted zero for each diversifier. Next
year is denoted 1 and so on. Subsequent M&A events of the same parent are treated as
separate events and tracked separately (I add a dummy variable EVENT in the analysis to
control for this). I require that each diversifier has sufficient data (SIC code and financial
statement items) to construct the variables necessary for this research (see next section) in
at least two consecutive years (years 0 and 1). Further, if the data is missing for all or
some segments in a certain year, I stop tracking that diversifier at that year (because later
I will need to calculate year-to-year differences in value and performance). The result is a
sample of 4,254 firm-year observations.
Following Berger and Ofek (1995), I eliminate extreme values of EV above +1.386 or
below -1.386 (actual value is more than four time imputed value or less than one-fourth
of imputed value). Following Subramaniam, Tang, Yue, and Zhou (2010), I eliminate
firms with total sales less than 99% or more than 101% of the summation of segments
sales. I also eliminate all firms with total assets less than 75% or more than 125% of the

39

Not all M&A transactions leads to pure diversification. Thus, SDC data is also used to obtain SIC code
of parent and acquired unit which will be used later to determine the “relatedness” nature of the transaction
(see the description of
variable below).
40
In line with SEC regulation S-K and Statement of Financial Accounted Standards (SFAS) No. 14, firms
are required report audited information (starting fiscal years ending after December 15 1977) for segments
whose sales, assets, or profits exceeds 10% of consolidated totals (see more discussions in Berger and Ofek
1995, 1996 and Subramaniam, Tang, Yue, and Zhou, 2010).
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summation of segments assets. This further reduces sample size to 1,642 firm-year
observations.
Not all events represent a “pure diversification” event. An event is considered related if
the acquired unit(s) belongs to the same industry and unrelated otherwise. The
variable (explained more in the next section) determines whether the event is considered
a related or unrelated event. The diversification process is identified as “related” if the
acquired and the acquirer belong to the same industry as determined by their SIC code.
From SDC database, I obtain SIC code of both acquired and acquirer firms in each
transaction. Following Berger and Ofek (1995), a merger is considered “related” if the
first two digits of the SIC code of the acquirer match the first two digits of the acquired
firm. I use an indicator variable

that is 1 for related mergers and 0 otherwise.

Thus, the final sample used in this dissertation includes 1,642 firm-year observations
(969 in related events and 673 in unrelated events) from 316 M&A events (185 related
events and 131 unrelated events). The data is collected from 295 firms (some firms
witnessed multiple events) that witnessed diversifying events over the period 1998-2008.
The following table shows number of mergers, related vs. unrelated, in each year in my
sample.
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Table 11 – Mergers Completed in 1998 - 200741
The table shows the structure of the raw sample before I take into account the year-fromevent. I obtain data on 316 merger and acquisition events over the years 1998-2007.
Following Berger and Ofek (1995), a merger is considered “related” if the first two digits
of the SIC code of the acquirer match the first two digits of the acquired firm.
Number of Mergers

Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
All years

All Mergers
2
10
48
50
36
34
40
33
34
29
316

Related Mergers
1
5
26
27
21
23
22
16
24
20
185

Unrelated Mergers
1
5
22
23
15
11
18
17
10
9
131

With exception of 1998, my sample is reasonably balanced overtime and between related
and unrelated mergers. Final sample size is a result of several filtering steps explained
above in addition to the special nature of this research study that requires matching of
three separate databases: SDC, CIS, and Compustat plus continuity of data availability
over several years. Yet, sample size in this dissertation is well compared to those of
similar studies such as, for example, Ravichandran, Liu, Han and Hasan (2009) who use
as a sample of 403 observations over six years and 134 firms and Freund , Trahan , and
Vasudevan (2007) who use 194 US industrial firms that acquire non-US firms over the
period 1985-1998 and Hyland (2003) who uses a sample of 118 diversifying US firms
over 1981-1992.
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I require that each diversifier has at least two years of data (years 0 and 1). Therefore, there are no
mergers in 2008 in the final sample.

98

The following table shows the description of M&A events included in the sample. Panel
A shows the descriptive statistics of the parent (acquirer) and target (acquired). Panel B
shows the descriptive statistics of the deal,
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Table 12 – Descriptive Statistics of Parent and Target Firms and the Merger Deal
The table shows few descriptive statistics of the events in my sample. Panel A shows
different aspects of parent (acquirer) and target (acquired) firms in the sample. Panel B
shows information about the transaction. Data is obtained from SDC database.
Panel A – Parent vs. Target
Parent
Mean
Market Value ($mil)
3,651.10
Median
388.35
Std. Dev.
26,340.06
Mean
5,440.95
Total Assets ($mil)
Median
1,254.22
Std. Dev.
9,047.36
Mean
Net Sales ($mil)
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
EBIT ($mil)
last 12 months pre-merger
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Pre-tax Income ($mil)
last 12 months pre-merger
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Net Income ($mil)
Median
Std. Dev.
-

Target
1,701.68
220.89
6,793.57
3,465.30
288.05
29,588.49
922.08
103.60
3,535.94
64.36
8.29
1,071.07
50.94
6.30
1,145.48
31.90
4.55
905.47

Panel B – Transaction
Value of Transaction ($ mil)

Price Per Share ($)

Ratio of Offer Price to EPS

Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.
Mean
Median
Std. Dev.

B. Measures of Performance and Value of Diversifying Firms

100

1,634.90
220.00
6,384.12
29.48
22.05
42.92
69.63
24.10
498.53

I use Tobin’s Q as a measure of performance (as in Lang and Stulz, 1994, Servaes, 1996
and Steiner, 1996), and excess value (first introduced by Berger and Ofek, 1995 then
become common in diversification literature). Tobin’s Q measures performance as
implied by stock market price. Therefore, it reflects investors’ perspective and, thus, is a
powerful measure of current and expected future performance. Excess value is a measure
of performance peculiar to diversified firms. Like Tobin’s Q, it incorporates market
perception in calculating imputed value (firm’s market value had it not been diversified).
Therefore, it calculates how much value has been added/subtracted exclusively by being
diversified relative to focused firms.
Throughout the rest of this dissertation, I use the following notation:

=1,2,…,N
=1,2,…,M
=1,2,…,K
=1,2,…,Q

: Number of diversifiers (parent company) in the sample of this
dissertation
: Subscript that identifies diversifier in the sample
: Number of segments in the parent (diversifier) company
: Subscript that identifies segment in the parent company
: Number of competitors in the same market (firms with the same four
digit of SIC code as the parent company)
: Subscript that identifies competitor in the market
: Number of matching pure-plays of a segment (firms with the same
last two digits of SIC code as the segment)
: Subscript that identifies matching pure play

Tobin’s Q:

i.

Tobin’s Q (Tobin, 1969) is the ratio of market value of assets to the book value of assets.
Tobin’s Q is a classical measure of performance used in diversification literature. Lang
and Stulz (1994) document lower Q-ratio in diversified firms compared to focused firms
and conclude that the market penalizes the value of the firm assets. Similar use of the
ratio is also found in Servaes (1996) and Steiner (1996). Tobin’s Q measures market
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perception of firm’s value relative to its historical (recorded) value. I calculate Tobin’s Q
as,

(E7)
:
:
:

Market Value of Equity (item MKVALT in Compustat)
Book Value of Liabilities (item LT in Compustat)
Book Value of Equity (item SEQ in Compustat)

If Tobin's Q is greater than parity (

), then the market is rewarding shareholders for

some unrecorded assets. It is an indication of strong future performance because it
implies that the assets are expected to generate sufficient return in the future. Higher
Tobin’s Q implies stronger perceived performance. If efficiencies increase slowly over
time and are impounded in price, I should observe an increase in Tobin’s Q over time.
ii.

Excess Value
I follow Berger and Ofek’s (1995) procedure in estimating the imputed value of each
segment. First I calculate imputed value of each segment in a diversifier as median
ratio of total capital to total assets (or sales42) of matching pure-play firms multiplied by

total assets (or sales) of segment . Matching pure play firms are in the same SIC code of

42

Following Berger and Ofeck (1995), I also calculate EBIT multiplier. However, lack of data resulted in
much smaller sample size. On top of that, the use of EBIT resulted in some negative multipliers and, thus,
negative segment imputed value. Following Berger and Ofeck (1995), I exclude those incidents from
subsequent analysis. Specifically, when a segment (or more) has negative imputed value in any year, the
parent is removed from the sample. Consequently, the sample size became very small usable observation.
As a result, I limit my analysis to excess value calculated based on total assets multipliers and sales
multiplier.
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segment , have at least $20 million in sales, and have sufficient data on Compustat.
Mathematically43,

(E8)

:
:

Imputed value of segment in firm
Total assets of segment in firm (Identifiable total assets
in Compustat segments database)
Total capital of a pure-play firm in the same industry of
segment
Market Value of Equity of a pure-play firm in the same
industry of segment (item MKVALT in Compustat)
Book Value of Liabilities of a pure-play firm in the same
industry of segment (item LT in Compustat)
Total Asset of a pure-play firm in the same industry of
segment (item AT in Compustat)

:
:
:
:

The sum of the imputed values of the
the firm (its value if all of its

segments in firm becomes the imputed value of

segments were operated as stand-alone businesses):

Next, I measure the percentage difference between diversifier ’s total value and the sum
of imputed values for its
capital) of firm is

segments as stand-alone entities. If market value (total

then I calculate percentage difference (excess value) as:

43

I show mathematical notation using total assets (TA) only but I calculate imputed value using sales as
well in an analogous manner (see the results section).
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:
:
:

Total capital of a firm
Market Value of Equity of firm (item MKVALTQ in
Compustat)
Book Value of Liabilities of a firm (item LT in
Compustat)

Positive (negative) excess value indicates that diversification increases (reduces) the
value of segments below that of their stand-alone counterparts and its known in literature
as diversification premium (discount). In line with my hypothesis, I anticipate to observer
increase in excess value over years after the diversification event.
C. Descriptive Statistics44
The table below shows how Tobin’s Q and excess value differ between related (Panel B)
and unrelated events (Panel C). Descriptive statistics are calculated based on all firm-year
observations. A year-by-year analysis is supplied in the next section.

44

This descriptive statistics is derived from all 1642 firm-year observations in the sample. It is not
conditioned on time from merger and, therefore, does not investigate evolution. Time-conditioned analysis
is supplied in the next section.
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Table 13 – Descriptive Statistics
The table shows mean, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and median of Tobin’ Q
and excess value of all diversifiers in the sample. The statistics are calculated from all
data-points in the sample without taking into account year-from-event. Panel A shows
statistics of all events. Panel B shows statistics of related events. Panel C shows statistics
of unrelated events. The statistical significance of the mean Tobin’s Q is gauges using tstat. The statistical significance of the mean of excess value is not shown because the
convention is to measure the statistical significance of the median of excess value using
Wilcoxon test (see next table).
Panel A - All Events – 1642 firm-year observations
Mean
Std Dev
Min
Max
1.829**
0.867
0.586
6.047
Q
-0.0031
0.576
-1.3814
1.3765
EV (based on TA )
0.0161
0.579
-1.3861
1.3759
EV (based on Sales)

Median
1.570
-0.0029
0.0000

Panel B - Related Diversifications – 969 firm-year observations
Mean
Std Dev
Min
Max
1.886**
0.871
0.712
6.047
Q
0.0189
0.588
-1.3814
1.3739
EV (based on TA )
0.0239
0.588
-1.3861
1.3635
EV (based on Sales)

Median
1.646
0.0010
0.0248

Panel C - Unrelated Diversification – 673 firm-year observations
Mean
Std Dev
Min
Max
1.748**
0.855
0.586
5.827
Q
-0.0348
0.556
-1.3814
1.3765
EV (based on TA )
0.0107
0.573
-1.3807
1.3759
EV (based on Sales)

Median
1.458
-0.0311
-0.0123

(***) = significant at 1%, (**) = significant at 5%, (*) = significant at 10%

An average diversifier has a Tobin’s Q of 1.829 (median is 1.570). The mean is
significant at 5%. Expectedly, related diversifiers have higher Tobin’s Q and unrelated
diversifiers have lower Tobin’s Q. Numerically, average firm-year Tobin’s Q is 1.886
(median is 1.646) for related diversifiers and 1.748 (median is 1.458) for unrelated
diversifiers. Both averages are statistically significant at 5%). I conclude that related
diversifiers in general perform better than unrelated diversifiers. This finding is consistent
with prevailing evidence in literature (see in particular the results of Bettis and Mahajan,
1985 and Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988 and Berger and Ofeck, 1995 cited in
literature review section in appendix 1).
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Excess values measures reveal some interesting results significantly different from those
documented in previous studies. The convention in diversification literature is to focus on
the median rather than the mean of EV (see Berger and Ofek, 1995). Statistical
significant of the median of excess values is tested based on the non-parametric
Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The results are shown in the table below:
Table 14 – Wilcoxon Test of EV Median Statistical Significance
The convention is to test the significance of the median of excess values based on the
non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test. P-value of the medians are reported.
Panel A - All Events – 1642 firm-year observations
Median
# of
p-value
observation45
-0.00289
1596
0.000
EV (based on TA )
0.000
1607
0.000
EV (based on Sales)
Panel B - Related Diversifications – 969 firm-year observations
Median
# of
p-value
observation
0.00100
942
0.000
EV (based on TA )
0.0248
946
0.000
EV (based on Sales)
Panel C - Unrelated Diversifications – 673 firm-year observations
Median
# of
p-value
observation
-0.0311
652
0.000
EV (based on TA )
-0.0123
661
0.000
EV (based on Sales)

Excess value using total asset multiple and sales multiple give somehow consistent
results. An average diversifier trades at a discount of about 0.298% using total multiple
and no discount using sales multiple. Related diversifiers seem to trade at an average
premium of 0.1% using total assets multiple and 2.48% using sales multiple; while
unrelated diversifiers trade at a discount of 3.11% using total asset multiple and 1.23%
45

Number of observation in Wilcoxon test are actually number of “ranks” within the original variable
(EV), thus it may be less than the original number of observation.
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using sales multiple. All medians are significant at 1% level of confidence. These
findings are generally not consistent with existing literature in two ways. First, previous
studies have reported a much larger diversification discount (about 13% in the seminal
work of Berger and Ofek, 1995). Second, extant literature reports a smaller discount
associated with related diversifications relative to unrelated ones but not a premium46.
Given that these numbers are calculated from firm-year observations over the year of
event (0) and several years (1-9) after the diversifying event, it lends support to the
general theme of this dissertation i.e. larger initial diversification discount reported in
other studies may be an artifact of limiting analysis to the immediate post-diversification
period. More investigation of this issue is coming in the next section when I track the
year-by-year performance of diversifiers. I will see that large diversification discount is
limited to early years after the event. In subsequent years, the discount magnitude fades
away and in some cases turns into a premium. Thus, the small (or zero) discount I report
in the tables above is in fact an average of initial discount (in early years after event) and
subsequent smaller discounts and premiums.

46

In fact, the reported premium, though very small, is more consistent with the small portion of the
literature that supports value-creation hypothesis of diversification (such as Vilalonga’s work cited above).
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IV.

The Evolution of Diversifiers’ Performance and Value

As mentioned earlier, the main methodological contribution of this dissertation is the
unique sample structure that allows tracking diversifiers’ value and performance several
years after the diversifying event. The year of event for each diversifier is denoted 0.
Subsequent years are numbered 1, 2, 3 … etc. Given the time window of my sample, a
diversifier can be tracked for a maximum of 9 years. The following table shows firm-year
observation in each year-from-event and the overall structure of my sample. Naturally,
there are more observations in early years than in later years. By construction, the
minimum number of tracking years is 2 (year 0 and 1).
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Table 15 –Sample Structure by Year from Event
This table shows the structure of the sample used in all subsequent analysis. Unlike table
1, this table shows number of observation in each year-from-event (not calendar year).
For instance, there are 316 events in the sample. By construction, I have data on these
events in the year of event (0) and one subsequent year (1). There are 274 events that also
have sufficient data on year 2. There are 223 events that have sufficient data on year 3.
The same logic follow for subsequent years. There are only 5 events (out of the original
316) that have data to cover analysis over years 0 through 9. Years 8 and 9 are not
considered in subsequent analysis because the number of observations is very small.
Finally, the events are also categorized into related and unrelated.
Firm-year Observations
Year From
Event
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
All years

All
Diversifying
Events
316
316
274
223
181
140
105
76
6
5
1642

Related
Diversification

Unrelated
Diversification

185
185
159
127
107
83
63
49
6
5
969

131
131
115
96
74
57
42
27
0
0
673

Due to very small number of observations in years 8 and 9, I will drop them from further
analysis. Also, because number of observations in years 6 and 7 are rather limited I will
not put too much emphasis on these years in subsequent analysis. This leaves 5 years of
post-event data to make reliable inference.
A. Evolution of Tobin’s Q
Tobin’s Q (James Tobin, 1969) measures market perception of firm’s value relative to its
historical (recorded) value. It is a classical measure of performance used in
diversification literature (as in Lang and Stulz (1994), Servaes (1996) and Steiner
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(1996)). Higher Tobin’s Q implies stronger perceived performance. In this section I
analyze the evolution of Tobin’s Q over time. More specifically, I investigate how
Tobin’s Q of an average diversifier changes from the year of the event, one year after the
event, two years after the event, and so on. This analysis allows for detecting possible
“trend” in the performance of diversifiers. The results are reported in the table and figure
below.
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Table 16 – Evolution of Tobin’s Q
I track Tobin’s Q of each diversifier from the year of diversification up to 9 years from diversification. In each year-from
diversification, I take the average of all diversifiers’ Tobin’s Q and report the mean and median. Statistical significance of the mean is
measured using t-stat and is reported as:
(***) = significant at 1%, (**) = significant at 5%, (*) = significant at 10%, (-) = insignificant
The last column shows the average and median Tobin’s Q of all data points in the sample for comparison only. The focus of this
dissertation is on the evolution of Tobin’s Q over time. Therefore, the focus is on how average Tobin’s Q evolves over time from
event.
Year From
Div. Event
# of Obs.
All Diversifiers

Average
Median
# of Obs.

Related

Average
Median
# of Obs.

Unrelated

Average
Median

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

All years

316

316

274

223

181

140

105

76

6

5

1642

1.812
(**)
1.537

1.743
(**)
1.492

1.860
(**)
1.626

1.878
(*)
1.526

1.853
(**)
1.585

1.875
(**)
1.654

1.844
(**)
1.599

1.850
(**)
1.721

1.897

1.669

1.916

1.646

1.829
(**)
1.570

185
1.868
(**)
1.653

185
1.800
(**)
1.495

159
1.910
(**)
1.631

127
1.954
(**)
1.677

107
1.866
(**)
1.591

83
1.916
(**)
1.761

63
1.946
(**)
1.762

49
1.957
(***)
1.804

6
1.897
(***)
1.916

5
1.669
(***)
1.646

969
1.886
(**)
1.646

131
1.733
(**)
1.418

131
1.663
(**)
1.472

115
1.790
(**)
1.558

96
1.778
(*)
1.450

74
1.833
(*)
1.516

57
1.815
(*)
1.518

42
1.691
(**)
1.321

27
1.655
(**)
1.269

0

0

673
1.748
(**)
1.458
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Figure 8 - Evolution of Tobin’s Q
Averages
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The table and figure above show that an average diversifier has an average Tobin’s Q of
1.812 (median is 1.537) in the year of diversifying event (year 0). Then, Tobin’s Q
witnesses a remarkable decline in the first year to an average of 1.743 (median is 1.492).
Consistent with the prediction of my hypothesis, Tobin’s Q witnesses a huge increase in
the second year to an average of 1.860 (median is 1.626) and remains at values close to
that level in subsequent years (3, 4, and 5) but never comes back to the low value of year
1 or the initial value of year 0. I conclude that an average diversifier witnesses an initial
decline in performance followed by a sharp boost and eventually achieves higher levels
of performance. Thus, it supports the hypothesis that managers of diversified companies
undertake diversification strategies on the basis of not only immediate consequences,
which could be adverse, but also future positive evolution in performance.
Looking at related vs. unrelated diversifiers, the results are consistent with existing
evidence in literature that related diversifiers are more constructive than unrelated ones.
They are also consistent with the time trend explained in the previous paragraph i.e.
performance measured by Tobin’s Q declines in the first year after the event (year 1) then
improves after that to levels higher than initial levels. However I notice that unrelated
diversifiers’ performance begins to decline significantly in year 6 and 7 while related
diversifier’s performance continues to increase. I note however that number of
observations in these years is limited and generalization of the findings may not be very
meaningful. In summary, I note that average diversifiers performance worsens in the first
year after the diversifying event before it starts to improve in subsequent years. Up to
year 5 after the diversifying event, Tobin’s Q of both related and unrelated diversifiers

113

improves. In years 6 and 7, Tobin’s Q of related diversifiers continue to improve while
Tobin’s Q of unrelated diversifiers declines.
B. Evolution of Excess Value
Berger and Ofek (1995) estimated excess value as the percentage difference between
diversifier’s total value and the sum of imputed values for its segments as stand-alone
entities. Positive (negative) excess value indicates that diversification increases
(decreases) value and is referred to in literature as diversification premium (discount). In
this section, I analyze the evolution of excess value of diversifiers over time. Given the
sample structure explained above, I was able to track diversifier up to 7 years from the
year of diversification. Results from excess value based on total assets multiple are
reported in the tables and figures below:
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Table 17 – Evolution of Excess Value (based on Total Assets Multiple)
I track excess value of each diversifier from the year of diversification up to 9 years from diversification. In each year-from
diversification, I take the average of all diversifiers’ excess value and report the mean and median. Statistical significance of the
median is measured using Wilcoxon test and is reported as:
(***) = significant at 1%, (**) = significant at 5%, (*) = significant at 10%, (-) = insignificant
The last column shows the average and median excess value of all data points in the sample for comparison only. The focus of this
dissertation is on the evolution of excess over time. Therefore, the focus is on how average excess value evolves over time from event.
This table uses excess value calculated based on the total assets multiplier.
Year From Div. Event
# of Obs.
Average
All
Median
Diversifiers
# of Ranks47
P-Value
# of Obs.
Average
Related

Median
# of Ranks
P-Value
# of Obs.
Average

Unrelated

Median
# of Ranks
P-Value

0
316
-0.0234
-0.0362
(***)
310
0.0000

1
316
-0.0472
-0.0552
(***)
304
0.0000

2
274
-0.0265
-0.0474
(***)
266
0.0000

3
223
0.0589
0.0553
(***)
217
0.0000

4
181
0.0168
0.0270
(***)
174
0.0000

5
140
0.0432
0.0864
(***)
138
0.0000

6
105
0.0188
-0.0008
(-)
102
0.4510

7
76
0.0378
0.0196
(-)
74
0.4659

8
6
-0.2757
-0.3887
(-)
6
0.1562

9
5
-0.1819
-0.3327
(-)
5
0.3125

All years
1642
-0.0031
-0.0029
(***)
1596
0.000

185
0.0688
0.0393
(***)
180
0.0000

185
0.0299
-0.0059
(***)
178
0.0000

159
0.0305
0.0000
(***)
154
0.0000

127
0.1637
0.1040
(**)
124
0.0439

107
0.1203
0.1115
(**)
104
0.0238

83
0.1473
0.1770
(**)
83
0.0454

63
0.0738
0.0097
(-)
60
0.2929

49
0.0810
0.0522
(-)
47
0.2556

6
-0.2757
-0.3887
(-)
6
0.1562

5
-0.1819
-0.3327
(-)
5
0.3125

969
0.0189
0.0010
(***)
942
0.000

131
-0.1535
-0.1274
(***)
130
0.0000

131
-0.1559
-0.1408
(***)
126
0.0000

115
-0.1053
-0.1494
(**)
112
0.0154

96
-0.0203
0.0010
(***)
93
0.0019

74
-0.0548
-0.0157
(**)
70
0.0304

57
-0.0283
0.0571
(***)
55
0.0087

42
-0.0635
-0.0532
(-)
42
0.2802

27
-0.0407
-0.0703
(-)
27
0.2277

0

673
-0.0348

47

0
-----

-----

0
---

0
---

Significance of median is calculated by Wilcoxon Singed-rank Test. The test is based on ranking original observations. Thus, number of ranks will always be
less than or equal original number of observations.
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-0.0311
652
0.000

(***) = significant at 1%, (**) = significant at 5%, (*) = significant at 10%, (-) = insignificant
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Figure 9 - Evolution of Excess Value (based on Total Assets Multiple)
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The table and figure above support the general implication of the hypothesis tested in this
dissertation. An average diversifier trades at a discount initially (the year of
diversification and two subsequent years) but at a premium later (years 3, 4, and 5). In
specific, an average diversifier trades at a discount of 3.62% in the year of diversification.
The discount increases (i.e. worsens) to 5.52% in the next year before it improves slightly
to 4.74% in the second year. In the third year, the discount turns into a premium of 5.53%
and remains as a premium in the fourth and fifth years. All figures are statistically
significant. In the sixth and seventh year, the premium is almost lost but figures are
statistically significant. This is second evidence that supports the tested hypothesis.
Diversification discount persists for only a short period surrounding the diversification
event (year of event and two subsequent years). In farther years, the value loss is restored
and the discount turns into a premium. This explains why diversification is still a very
popular business strategy as evidenced in the hypothesis development section above.
Managers of diversifying firms seem to be inclined to accept initial discount knowing
that eventually it will turn into a premium. How can they be sure about this turnover? The
second part of the hypothesis (tested in the next section) states that they are at better
situation than the market to evaluate the true financial and strategic advantages of the
transaction.
Excess value of related and unrelated diversifiers move in unison and also show a trend
of improvement in later years. Nevertheless, diversification discount persists longer in
unrelated diversification. Related diversifiers trade at a premium of 3.93% in the year of
event. They lose value and trade at a small discount of 0.59% in the next year. Excess
value becomes nil in year 2, then dramatically jumps to a huge premium of 10.4% in year
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3. The trend continues and the premium increases to 11.15% in year 4 and a remarkable
level of 17.7% in year 5. The figures are statistically significant throughout years 0, 1, 2,
3, 4, 5 but statistically insignificant in years 6 and 7 (where we see a sharp decline to
trivial premium of 0.97% in year 6 and 5.22% in year 7). Unrelated diversifiers show the
same overall trend but at a different level. They trade at a huge discount of 12.74% in the
year of the event; the discount worsens to 14.08% in the year 1, and worsens even further
to 14.94% in year 2. However, a huge jump in value occurs in year 3 when the huge
discount disappears and turns into a very small premium of 0.1%. In years 4, a small
setback brings discount back to 1.57% before it surges again to a premium of 5.71%. In
years 6 and 7 the value gain is lost again but figures are statistically insignificant.
I conclude that the overall theme of the hypothesis tested in this dissertation is valid with
related and unrelated diversification. An average diversifier trades at an initial discount
but achieves reasonable value recovery in subsequent years. However, I find that the
value recovery process does not kick off immediately and the discount persists for few
years before it turns into a premium. I also note a differential in speed of recovery
between related and unrelated diversifiers. For an average diversifier, it takes three years
for the discount to become a premium. For an unrelated diversifier, it takes almost 4
years before the diversification discount turns into a premium. Related diversifiers never
trade at a huge discount and they witness sustains increase in value starting year 1.
I repeat the analysis above with excess value calculated based on sales multiple. The
following table and figure show the results.
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Table 18 – Evolution of Excess Value (based on Sales Multiple)
I track excess value of each diversifier from the year of diversification up to 9 years from diversification. In each year-from
diversification, I take the average of all diversifiers’ excess value and report the mean and median. Statistical significance of the
median is measured using Wilcoxon test and is reported as:
(***) = significant at 1%, (**) = significant at 5%, (*) = significant at 10%, (-) = insignificant
The last column shows the average and median excess value of all data points in the sample for comparison only. The focus of this
dissertation is on the evolution of excess over time. Therefore, the focus is on how average excess value evolves over time from event.
This table uses excess value calculated based on the sales multiplier.
Year From Div. Event
# of Obs.
Average
All
Median
Diversifiers
# of Ranks48
P-Value
# of Obs.
Average
Related

Median
# of Ranks
P-Value
# of Obs.
Average

Unrelated

Median
# of Ranks
P-Value

0
316
-0.0412
-0.0752
(***)
306
0.0000

1
316
-0.0386
-0.0352
(***)
312
0.0000

2
274
0.0610
0.0369
(***)
272
0.0000

3
223
0.0977
0.0656
(***)
216
0.0000

4
181
0.0906
0.0544
(***)
175
0.0000

5
140
0.1383
0.1449
(***)
135
0.0000

6
105
-0.1112
-0.0904
(***)
103
0.0199

7
76
-0.1025
-0.1340
(***)
76
0.0465

8
6
-0.3094
-0.4763
(-)
6
0.1094

9
5
-0.2454
-0.4779
(-)
5
0.2188

All years
1642
0.0161
0.0000
(***)
1607
0.0000

185
-0.0301
-0.0550
(***)
178
0.0000

185
-0.0887
-0.0623
(***)
181
0.0000

159
0.0812
0.2011
(***)
157
0.0000

127
0.1081
0.0653
(**)
123
0.0446

107
0.1163
0.1537
(*)
103
0.0915

83
0.1756
0.2354
(**)
81
0.0367

63
-0.0792
-0.0660
(**)
62
0.0423

49
-0.1234
-0.1213
(-)
49
0.1155

6
-0.3094
-0.4763
(-)
6
0.1094

5
-0.2454
-0.4779
(-)
5
0.2188

969
0.0239
0.0248
(***)
946
0.0000

131
-0.0490
-0.0882
(***)
128
0.0000

131
-0.0032
0.0000
(***)
131
0.0000

115
0.0465
-0.0066
(*)
115
0.0703

96
0.0898
0.0676
(**)
93
0.0352

74
0.0729
0.0182
(**)
72
0.0360

57
0.1126
0.0508
(***)
54
0.0059

42
-0.1326
-0.0994
(-)
41
0.1206

27
-0.0909
-0.1467
(-)
27
0.1242

0

673
0.0107
-0.0123
(***)
661
0.0000

48

0
---

---

--0
---

--0
---

Significance of median is calculated by Wilcoxon Singed-rank Test. The test is based on ranking original observations. Thus, number of ranks will always be
less than or equal original number of observations.
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Figure 10 - Evolution of Excess Value (based on Sales Multiple)
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The results from excess value based on sales multiple are similar in general to those from
excess value based on total assets. However, I notice that the recovery process is faster
and there is much more fluctuation in value over time despite the overall improvement
trend up to year 5. An average diversifier trades at a discount of 7.52% in the year of
event. The discount improves steadily in subsequent years. It improves to a smaller
discount of 3.52% in year 1 before it turns into a premium of 3.69% in year 2, 6.56% in
year 3, 5.44% in year 4, and a remarkable 14.49% in year 5. However, this momentum is
lost in years 6 and 7 where the premium turns into a discount again. In fact it goes back to
a huge discount of 13.40% in year 7. All figures are statistically significant over the 7
years. Again, in contrast with existing evidence found in literature and consistent with the
value recovery hypothesis presented here, we may conclude that the celebrated
diversification discount is a result of limited time horizon, or lack of subjects time
synchronizations, in analysis in previous studies. There is a potential value gain of
diversification strategy and this gain materializes over time.
Related and related diversifiers show somehow similar trend but with much more
fluctuation. A related diversifier trades at a discount of 5.5% in the year of event. The
discount worsens a little to 6.23% in the next year before it jumps dramatically to a huge
premium of 20.11% in year 2. After that, a huge fluctuation in value occurs when
premium drops to 6.53% in year 3 and rise again to 15.37% in year 4 and a reaches a
remarkable level of 23.54% in year 5. In year 6, the value gain is lost and the premium
drops down to a discount of 6.6% (excess value of year 7 is statistically insignificant).
Unrelated diversifiers trade at a discount of 8.82% during the event year. The discount
disappears in the next year, comes back to trivial discount of 0.66% in year 2 and jumps
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to a premium of 6.67% in year 3. After that, it fluctuates as well before it turns back to
become a discount in years 6 and 7 but without statistical significance.
In summary, I find that, consistent with the value recovery hypothesis presented in this
dissertation, diversification discount is limited to short periods around the diversification
event. In subsequent years, the discount decreases (i.e. improves) gradually over time and
at some point in time it turns into a premium. In my sample, the discount is likely to
persist for about 2 years post-event in an average diversifier. There is also a strong
evidence of differential in speed of value recovery between related and unrelated
diversifiers. Unrelated diversifiers trade a discount for longer periods than related ones.
Collectively, these evidences pave the road for the second half of the hypothesis which
states that diversification has potential financial and strategic advantages that materialize
over time. I also hypothesize that these advantages are stronger in related diversifier
relative to unrelated ones. Both of these claims are investigated thoroughly in the next
section.
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V.

Value Recovery and Diversification Advantages

I argue that value recovery documented in previous section is attributed to
“unanticipated” financial and strategic advantages of diversification that are known only
to insiders at time of diversification (thus, not priced immediately) and materialize slowly
over time. When managers make the diversification decision, they attempt to exploit
future potential boost in efficiency. When the merger is complete, the advantages of the
diversification move are still “potential” and are not fully disclosed to the public, hence
the initial discount. Over time, the advantages materialize and become publicly available;
thus the market responds with increased value.
A. Financial Efficiencies of Diversification
i.

Efficient Internal Capital Market
I have shown above that the most documented source of value creation in corporate
diversification strategies is efficient internal capital market. In fact, several authors have
shown that internal capital market efficiency is a major motivation for diversification (see
Berger and Ofek (1995), Lamont (1997), Shin and Stulz (1998), and Khanna and Tice
(2001)). Several measures are found in literature of internal capital market size and
efficiency. Billet and Mauer (2003) argue that a subsidy is efficient (inefficient) if the
segment receiving the subsidy has a larger (smaller) ROA than the asset-weighted
average of the firm's other segments, and a transfer is efficient (inefficient) if the segment
making the transfer has a smaller (larger) ROA than the asset-weighted average of the
firm's other segments. Accordingly, they constructed a measure of internal capital market
efficiency (

). Subramaniam, Tang, Yue, and Zhou (2010) developed a measure of
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internal capital market activity that includes cash holdings. They take the difference
between the summation of segments excess cash flow and the firm-level excess cash flow
and argue that this difference is a good measure of internally-exchanged cash flow.
Both measures are used in this dissertation with slight modifications (one at a time).
I construct a proxy of internal capital market efficiency in manner very similar to Billet
and Mauer’s (2003). I first construct two variables to distinguish subsidies from transfers,
(a)
(b)
(c)
(E9)
(d)
(e)
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Subsidy segment
Potential transfer of segment
Transfer of segment
Capital expenditure of segment (form Compustat segment
database)
Net cash flow of segment
Net Income of segment (form Compustat segment
database)
Depreciation of segment (form Compustat segment
database)
Asset weight of segment
Total assets of segment (Identifiable total assets in
Compustat segments database)
Total Assets of the parent company (item AT in
Compustat)
Total dividend parent company (item DVT in Compustat)

When capital expenditure of a segment is greater than its own net cash inflow, then this
segment must be receiving cash from other segments to cover its excess expenses and,
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thus, is a subsidy. When net cash inflow of segment is greater than its own capital
expenditure (plus its asset-weighted contribution to dividends of the parent company),
then this segment must be subsidizing other segments (or at least not being subsidized by
any other segment) and, thus, is a transfer. To assess efficiency of the ICM, we need also
to know if the subsidizing activities within the firm are efficient. To do that, I compare
each segment’s ROA to the asset-weighted average ROA of all other segments in the
firm. For each segment, I calculate the following indicator,

(E10)

:
:
:
:

Return on asset of segment
Total assets of segment (Identifiable total assets in
Compustat segments database)
Net Income of segment (form Compustat segment
database)
Asset-weighted average ROA of the firm's remaining
segments

A cash flow between two segments is considered efficient if it flows from a segment with
relatively low ROA to a segment with relatively high ROA. Accordingly, a subsidy is
efficient if it has a relatively high ROA (

) and inefficient otherwise.

Similarly, a transfer is efficient if it has a relatively low ROA (

) and in

efficient otherwise. Now I can construct a measure of internal capital market efficiency as
summation of the values of all efficient subsidies and transfers minus the summation of
the values of all inefficient subsidies and transfers. Mathematically,
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(E11)

:
:
:
:
:
:

ii.

Proxy of internal Capital market efficiency
Value of all efficient subsidies
Value of all inefficient subsidies
Value of all efficient transfers
Value of all inefficient transfers
Total Assets of the parent company (item AT in
Compustat)

Internal Capital Market Activity
I construct a proxy of internal capital market activity following the methodology of
Subramaniam, Tang, Yue, and Zhou (2010). I calculate the excess capital expenditure of

each segment as the positive difference between capital expenditure and net cash flow:
(a)
(b)
:
:
:
:
:

(E12)

Excess capital expenditure of segment
Capital expenditure of segment (form Compustat segment
database)
Net cash flow of segment
Net Income of segment (form Compustat segment
database)
Depreciation of segment (form Compustat segment
database)
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represents the amount of cash that segment needs (on top of its own) to
finance its capital expenditure. Segments are not always financed through internal capital
market activity. External financing as well as previous year cash flow contributes to the
financing of segments as well. To control for this, Subramaniam, Tang, Yue, and Zhou
(2010) take the difference between summation of all segments excess capital expenditure
and the firm-level excess capital expenditure

(which is calculated in the

same way I calculate segment-level excess capital expenditure

). This

difference represents the total size of cash flow exchanged internally49,
(E13)

iii.

Access to capital markets

Lewellen (1971) pointed out that diversification strategy could be motivated by the desire
of enhancing access to capital market. He shows that this includes the possibility of
utilizing an unused borrowing capacity of the acquired firm as well as the possible
improvement of the borrowing capacity derived from improved satisfaction of lenders’
service criteria even when the acquired firm had already exploited its own borrowing
capacity. In effect, our performance measure might be upward biased because it reflects
improvement in borrowing capacity. In the diversification literature, Lang and Stulz
(1994) include a dummy variable to capture access to capital markets. In a sense, a firm
that has limited access to funds forgoes some positive NPV projects and therefore has a

49

Subramaniam, Tang, Yue, and Zhou (2010) then calculate the mean of Transfer variable, MINTER, as a
measure of average internal cash flow across divisions in diversified firms. For the purpose, of this
dissertation, I keep the analysis at the firm level and I track Transfer variable over time.

128

higher Q because only highest NPV projects are taken. To control for this, they use a
dichotomous variable that takes value one if the firm pays dividend. The idea is that a
firm that pays dividend is not likely to be capital-constrained. This approach was
originally used by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Peterson (1988) and also adopted by Serveas
(1996). I use a dichotomous explanatory variable (i.e. a dummy) indicating whether the
firm have access to funds (1) or not (0).
when
when
:

(E14)

dividend paid (item DVT in Compustat)

B. Strategic Efficiencies of Diversification
i.

Cost efficiencies
Several authors (see Lewellen (1971), Gertner, Scharfstein and Stein (1994), Stein
(1997), Mukherjee, Kiymaz, & Baker (2004) and Tanriverdi and Lee (2008)) noted that
diversifiers benefit from economies of scale and scope. In microeconomics, economies of
scale are defined as the cost advantages of expansion. More specifically, they are factors
that cause a producer’s average cost per unit to fall as a result of spreading fixed costs
over larger units of output. Economies of scope are conceptually similar to economies of
scale. Whereas economies of scale primarily refer to efficiencies associated with a single
segment/product type, economies of scope refer to efficiencies associated with different
segments/product types. Formally, economies of scale and scope translate in lower
relative costs, hence I anticipate that firms with higher economies of scale and scope have
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higher ratio of total asset and revenues to expenses. Thus, I calculate ratio of total assets
to total expenses as a proxy of economies of scale and scope.

(E15)
:
:
:

Proxy for economies of scale and scope
Total assets (item AT in Compustat)
Total expenses (item XOPR in Compustat50)

(E16)
:
:
:

Proxy for economies of scale and scope
Total Revenues (item REVT in Compustat)
Total expenses (item XOPR in Compustat51)

Lewellen (1971), Prahalad and Hamel (1990), Kogut and Zander (1992), and Teece,
Pisano and Shuen (1997) show that diversifiers realize strategic advantages by sharing
common resources. More specifically, different units may be able to share the same
resource (like R&D, HR, licenses, … etc) and reduce overall costs for the parent
company. Intuitively, the more similar the units are, the more they are likely to share
common resources. Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) show that when divisions are
homogenous (heterogeneous), funds flow toward divisions with more (less) investment
opportunities manifested in high (low) Tobin’s Q. Thus, less dispersion in weighted
opportunity (diversity, as they call it) leads to a more (less) valuable firm.
In order to account of this type of strategic efficiency, I take the % of assets in common
SIC code to total asset of parent firm:
50

This item is titled “Total Operating Expenses” in Compustat. I tried the obtain “Total Expenses” figure
(item XT in Compustat) but the inquire did not return usable data (I obtained missing data points only)
51
This item is titled “Total Operating Expenses” in Compustat. I tried the obtain “Total Expenses” figure
(item XT in Compustat) but the inquire did not return usable data (I obtained missing data points only)
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(E17)
:

Proxy of the efficiency of sharing common assets of parent

:

Number of segments with the same SIC code in the parent
company
Total assets of all segments that shares the same SIC code
Total Assets of parent company (item AT in Compustat)

:
:
ii.

Market Power
Lewellen (1971), Kogut and Zander (1992), and Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997), show
that diversification may create market opportunities in the form of enhanced brand
recognition and consumer loyalty. Mukherjee, Kiymaz, & Baker (2004) documented that
mergers and acquisitions may be motivated by management’s desire to gain increased
market power. I follow Shenoy’s (2008) approach who calculates market power as the
ratio of sales of the diversifier to the sales of all firms on Compustat with the same fourdigit primary SIC code during the same year. Hence,

(E18)
:
:
:
:

Proxy for market power
Total revenues (sales) of the diversifier (item REVT in
Compustat)
Number of competitors in the same market
Total revenues (sales) of the competitor in the market

I eliminate all cases where market power variable is greater than 0.99 and consider that a
data error. Higher (lower) values of MP indicate that the firm is enjoying larger (smaller)
market share and implies stronger (weaker) performance.
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C. Some Control Variables
i.

Size
Lang and Stulz (1994) find evidence that size is a significant determinant of valuation
differences (differences in Tobin’s Q between diversified and pure-play firms).
Specifically, they find that valuation differences are reduced (but not explained away)
when taking into account differences in size. I control for log of total assets:
(E19)
:

ii.

Total Assets (item AT in Compustat)

Relatedness
I use two measure of relatedness, dichotomous measure and a continuous measure.
Following Berger and Ofek (1995), a merger is considered “related” if the first two digits

of the SIC code of the acquirer match the first two digits of the acquired firm. I use an
indicator variable

that is 1 for related mergers and 0 otherwise.

The second measure of relatedness is based on Palepu’s (1985) entropy measure of
diversification. Within each diversifier , segments (denoted
SIC industry groups (denoted

) at the two-digit level (

assume that there are Z segments (denoted

) are placed in
). Let’s

) in a certain industry group y.

Palepu (1985) showed that we can compute related diversification of industry group
as:
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:
Entropy measure of related diversification of
industry group .
:
Total assets of the segment z in industry group y.
:
Total assets52 of the industry group y.
Accordingly, related diversification of diversifier is calculated as weighted average of
its industry groups related diversification:

:
Entropy measure of related diversification of
diversifier .
:
Total assets of the diversifier .
I measure

for each diversifier as the difference in

in the year of completion of

merger from the year before (for the acquirer):

:
Change in entropy measure of related
diversification of diversifier .
If

is positive, then the new unit has increased the “relatedness” of the parent and

the merger is related. If

is negative, then the new unit decreased the “relatedness”

of the parent and the merger is unrelated. In both cases, we have an efficient continuous
measure that incorporates the magnitude of relatedness.
iii.

Profitability and investment

52

The original entropy measure of Palepu (1985) uses sales; I use assets. In this dissertation, I focus on the
relative importance of each segment in terms of assets rather than sales. Assets are generally more stable
than sales and less susceptible to the possibility that the acquired and/or the acquirer witness a sudden
surge/decline in sales shortly before the merger.
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Profitability (EBIT over sales) and investment (capital expenditures over sales) are
common control variables in diversification literature (see for example Campa and Kedia
(2002) and Mansi and Reeb (2002) and Hund, Monk, and Tice (2007)). Firms with higher
profitability and/or investment may have higher performance measures regardless of
diversification. To neutralize the effect of profitability and investment on firm
performance, I include in my model two proxies,

(E20)
:
:

Income after interest and taxes of parent company (item
EBIT in Compustat)
Total Revenues (item REVT in Compustat)

(E21)
:
:

Capital Expenditure of parent company (item IVNCF in
Compustat)
Total Revenues (item REVT in Compustat)

D. Descriptive Statistics of Financial and Strategic Efficiencies of Diversification
The table below shows the descriptive statistics of variables used in this dissertation and
how they differ between related (Panel B) and unrelated events (Panel C). Descriptive
statistics are calculated based on all firm-year observations. A year-by-year analysis is
supplied in the methodology and results sections below.
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Table 19 – Descriptive Statistics – Measures of Diversification Advantages
Panel A - All Events – 1642 firm-year observations
Mean
Std Dev
Min
Max
0.118
0.341
2.987
0.000
1692.590 4467.485
51516.000
0.000
2.168
2.288
19.524
0.103
1.237
0.508
5.603
0.0537
0.200
0.245
0.986
6.181D-06
0.190
0.0617
0.884
0.112
3.348
0.836
5.440
0.356
0.465
0.499
1.000
0.000
-0.136
1.495
0.574
-19.712
-0.146
1.142
21.888
-20.881
0.401
0.142
0.650
0.150
0.422
0.169
0.870
0.111
0.0211
0.0726
0.221
-0.186
Panel B - Related Diversifications – 969 firm-year observations
Mean
Std Dev
Min
Max
0.156
0.419
0.000
2.987
2101.760
4862.963
0.000
51516.000
1.956
2.005
0.191
19.524
1.225
0.436
0.0676
4.804
0.265
0.276
0.000
0.986
0.195
0.0727
0.112
0.884
3.461
0.850
0.830
5.440
0.520
0.500
0.000
1.000
-0.0698
1.207
-15.877
0.547
-0.132
0.887
-20.881
9.170
0.406
0.142
0.151
0.650
0.468
0.172
0.145
0.870
0.0620
0.0549
-0.0306
0.221

Median
0.00370
292.469
1.444
1.150
0.0903
0.180
3.350
0.000
0.0877
-0.0600
0.406
0.414
0.0186

Median
0.0207
355.190
1.333
1.151
0.133
0.182
3.404
1.000
0.0878
-0.0548
0.411
0.467
0.0537

Panel C - Unrelated Diversification – 673 firm-year observations
Mean
0.0630
1103.458
2.472
1.255
0.106
0.183
3.185
0.385
-0.232
-0.165
0.394
0.356
-0.0378

Std Dev
0.164
3752.836
2.613
0.596
0.150
0.0398
0.786
0.487
1.828
1.433
0.143
0.141
0.0512

Min
0.000
0.000
0.103
0.0537
0.000
0.112
0.356
0.000
-19.712
-15.571
0.150
0.111
-0.186

Max
1.308
46174.000
18.051
5.603
0.795
0.402
5.207
1.000
0.574
21.888
0.650
0.680
0.0618

(***) = significant at 1%, (**) = significant at 5%, (*) = significant at 10%
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Median
0.000
225.066
1.631
1.150
0.0455
0.178
3.230
0.000
0.0873
-0.0700
0.394
0.349
-0.0338

Related diversifiers witness better sharing of common assets compared to unrelated ones.
Understandably, segments that belong to similar industries are more likely to have
common assets to share. I also note that related diversifiers tend to be larger than
unrelated ones. This might be loosely explained as follows: when acquiring an unrelated
business unit from a different industry, managers prefer to acquire smaller ones. It might
also be explained as larger firms are more inclined to expand within their industries. The
answer of this question goes beyond the goal of this research and may be undertaken in
separate analysis.
Related diversifying results in lower economies of scale and scope efficiency compared
to unrelated ones. This is true when we look at the second proxy

which is

statistically significant. However, very little inference can be made using the first proxy
which is statistically insignificant in both related and unrelated diversifiers.
compares revenues to total expenses while

compares total assets to total expenses.

It seems that unrelated diversifiers are able to derive more revenues from dollars spent on
expenses. This does generally does not support my hypothesis. Further analysis is
supplied below when I make a year-by-year analysis.
Table 9 below analyzes the correlation between used variables. Most of variables used in
this dissertation are not highly correlated with few exceptions. The two proxies of
economies of scale and scope (

and

) are understandably highly correlated

(+0.75) and are used in further analysis as alternatives (on at a time). Size is moderately
correlated (+0.51) with market power (
activity of internal capital market (

) and moderately correlated (+0.51) with

) and moderately correlated (+0.44) with access
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to capital market (

). This is not surprising because it indicates that larger firms

capture larger share of their product market and allow for larger internal capital market
and have better access to capital markets.
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Table 20 – Correlation Analysis

Q
EV(based on TA)
EV(based on
Sales)
ICME
TRAN
ESP1
ESP2
MP
SHCA
Log(TA)
ATC
Rel
Proft
Invst

Q
1.00
0.18
-0.18
-0.07
0.08
-0.05
-0.01
0.06
-0.01
-0.07
-0.05
0.08
-0.17
0.01

EV(based
on TA)

EV(based
on Sales) ICME

TRAN

ESP1

ESP2

MP

SHCA

Log(TA)

1.00
0.75
-0.21
-0.04
0.09
-0.09
-0.11
0.05
-0.21

1.00
-0.03
0.01
0.25
0.06
-0.03
0.38
-0.11

1.00
0.15
0.51
0.25
0.32
0.13
0.03

1.00
0.17
0.09
0.10
0.03
0.02

1.00
0.44
0.16
0.28
-0.02

ATC

Rel

Proft

Invst

1.00
0.13 1.00
0.07 0.05
0.04 0.01

1.00
-0.05

1.00

1.00
0.17
0.06
0.09
-0.03
-0.02
0.10
0.02
0.10
0.03
0.05
-0.01
-0.02

1.00
0.06
-0.03
-0.05
0.05
-0.01
0.04
-0.04
0.00
-0.01
0.11
-0.06

1.00
0.15
-0.20
-0.09
0.23
0.39
0.26
0.22
0.13
0.05
0.03

1.00
0.08
0.13
0.20
0.12
0.51
0.21
0.11
0.08
-0.04
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E. Value Recovery and the Dynamic Evolution of Diversification Advantages
The second half of my hypothesis states that value gain and performance boost comes as
a result of financial and strategic advantages of diversification. In this dissertation I focus
on: 1) Internal capital market efficiency (
capital market (

) and activity (

). 2) Access to

). 3) Economies of scope and scale calculated as the spread of total

assets over expenditure (

) and spread of revenues over expenditure (

). 4)

Market power measured as firms revenues divided by revenues of all other firms in the
same industry (

). 5) Share of common assets (

). I use three different forms of

OLS regression analyses to test the prediction of joint evolution of these efficiencies with
value and performance. First, I run OLS regressions on level values of both dependent
(performance and value) and dependent (diversification advantage) variables. Second, I
run OLS regressions on annual changes. I regress simple annual changes in dependent
variables on annual percentage changes in independent variables. In the third OLS model
I regress annual changes in dependent variables on the annual percentage changes in
dependent variables interacted with
i.

variable and

variable.

Level OLS regression
The level models are,

(A)
(E22)
(B)
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(C)

:
:
:

Tobin’s Q of firm at time
Excess value (based on assets multiple) of firm at time
Excess value (based on sales multiple) of firm at time

:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:
:

Internal capital market efficiency of firm at time
Internal capital market activity of firm at time
Economies of scale and scope of firm at time 53
Market power of firm at time
Sharing of common assets advantage of firm at time
Size (log of total assets) of firm at time
Dummy for access to capital of firm at time
Profitability of firm at time
Investment of firm at time
Dummy for another event of firm at time 54
Dummy for another relatedness of the diversifying event
Change in entropy measure of related diversification of
diversifier .

The models above test the null hypothesis that year-to-year variation in performance
(Tobin’s Q) and value (Excess Value) of diversified firms are explained by variation in
financial and strategic advantages (

). Specifically,

the first model tests whether diversifiers with better performance or higher value in
certain post-event year also benefit from higher financial and strategic advantages in that
year. I run the model with

variable as well as

variable or

variable.

Further, I control for size, profitability and investment.
53

I have two proxies of economies of scale and scope. See variable construction section
EVENT is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the parent witnessed another event in that year, and 0
otherwise
54
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In the context of our model,

and

diversifiers’ performance (Tobin’s Q) and value (

capture the association between
) in certain post-event year and the

level of financial and strategic advantages that the diversifier has achieved in the same
year. An economically meaningful and statistically significant coefficient implies that the
corresponding advantage co-varies with performance or value. It also implies that annual
changes in value and performance are explained by annual changes in the corresponding
diversification advantage. Insignificant coefficient implies that changes in value and
performance are not attributed to changes in the corresponding advantage.
indicates whether the parent witnessed a previous diversifying event in the time frame of
my sample. Thus,

captures the incremental gain (loss) that a diversifier gets from

being diversified before.
parent and

is dummy that indicates whether acquired unit is related to

is an entropy measure of relatedness. Therefore,

incremental gain/loss from related diversifications.

and

and

capture

are slopes on control

variables.
I run the models in their full format as well as some variations. For instance, I run the
models once without
with

and once with

and once without

variable. I also run the models once

only. The results are reported in the table below.
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Table 21 – OLS Model on Level Values – Tobin’s Q
The table shows the results of the following regression:

The models above test the null hypothesis that year-to-year variation in Tobin’s Q of diversified firms are explained by variation in
. I run the model with
variable as well as
variable or
variable and I control for size,
profitability and investment.
and capture the association between diversifiers’ performance and the level of
financial and strategic advantages.
captures the incremental gain (loss) that a diversifier gets from being diversified before.
and
capture incremental gain/loss from related diversifications. I run the models in their full format as well as some variations.
(***) = significant at 1%, (**) = significant at 5%, (*) = significant at 10%
Diversification Advantages

Control Variables

55

1.766
(***)
1.812
(***)
1.899
(***)
1.784
(***)
2.260
(***)
2.112
(***)

-.2386
(***)
-.2297
(***)
-.2256
(***)
-.1781
(***)

.2893
(***)
.2883
(***)

56

-.0986
(**)
-.0959
(**)
-.0641

-.0976
(***)
-.0988
(***)
-.0113

-.0556
.2924
(***)
.2881
(***)

-.0742
-.0659

.5060
(***)
.5080
(***)
.1583
(***)

-.0059
.1701
(***)

.3822
(***)
.4029
(***)
.3748
(***)
.4644
(***)
.4200
(***)
.5032
(***)

.2091
.2248
.2718
.2127
-.2279
-.1984

-.1597
(***)
-.1609
(***)
-.0628
(*)
-.1001
(***)
-.1656
(***)
-.1971
(***)

55

-.1466
(***)
-.1460
(***)
-.0970
(***)
-.1147
(***)
-.0899
(***)
-.1091
(***)

-.0170
-.0176
-.0069
.0026
-.0032
.0050

.4682
(***)
.4761
(***)
.5158
(***)
.5094
(***)
.4299
(**)
.4324
(**)

.1057
(**)

.1021
.6333
(**)

.1226
(***)
.1272
(***)
.1041
(**)
.1094
(**)

0.1015
.0588
.0647
.0692
.0768

Transfer variable is scaled down by 10,000 to make it more comparable in magnitude with internal capital market efficiency (ICME).
I found that replacing
with
does not change the sign or the statistical significance of any coefficient. It does, however, change the magnitude of
coefficients but the change is very minimal. Therefore, I report the results of including
in the full regression only. I also ran the model with both
and
and find that both of them lose significance when put together in any model (results are not reported)
56
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The table shows that performance (Tobin’s Q) of diversifiers is positively related to
market power (

) and revenues-based cost efficiencies (when calculated as revenues

divided by expenses -

) and internal capital market activity (

coefficients on these variables,

,

, and

). The

are positive and economically and

statistically significant which implies that year-to-year variation in Tobin’s Q, i.e.
performance, of diversifiers is explained by year-to-year variation in these variables.
More specifically, annual increases in Tobin’s Q (reported in the previous section) are
driven by annual increases in market share, annual decreases in expenditure relative to
revenues, and annual increases in the activity of internal capital market. Also consistent
with evolution trend of Tobin’s Q over time depicted in previous section, I find that
related diversifiers enjoy higher Tobin’s Q. This is evidence by positive and statistically
significant

and

.

Surprisingly, however, diversifiers performance is negatively related to internal capital
market efficiency (

) and asset-based cost efficiencies (calculated as total assets

divided by expenses these variables

,

,

) and access to capital market (ACT). The coefficients on
are negative and statistically significant. Nevertheless,

magnitudes are small.

and

magnitude is economically meaningful. It implies that

depicted annual increase in Tobin’s Q, it associated with decreasing internal capital
market efficiency.
On the other hand, it seems that diversifiers’ performance is not related to share of
common assets and investment. Subsequent diversifying events have strong positive
impact on diversifiers’ performance. This might explain why some firms involve in
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repeated diversifying strategy. These findings are robust to several variation of the model
as shown in the table. I run the model once without

and once without

because these two variables represent the efficiency and activity of internal capital
market, respectively. This variation in the model does not change the sign of the
coefficients and it causes very minimal changes in the magnitude. I also run the model
without

and

. This variation also does not change sign of coefficients and

causes very minimal change in magnitude. However, I note that when
from the model,

is excluded

loses significance.

To sum up the findings of Tobin’s Q level OLS regression, and keeping in mind that it is
a market-driven measure of future performance, the result of regression indicates market
tendency to reward internal capital market activity, market power, and cost efficiencies.
This finding is in line with the general implication of my hypothesis that future
improvements in diversifiers’ performance are derived from future materialization of
financial and strategic advantages. Further, related diversifiers have higher Tobin’s Q and
previous diversifying events contribute to even higher Tobin’s Q.
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Table 22 – OLS Model on Level Values – Excess Value
Panel A – Excess Value based on Assets Multiplier
The table shows the results of the following regression:

The models above test the null hypothesis that year-to-year variation in excess value of diversified firms are explained by variation in
. I run the model with
variable as well as
variable or
variable and I control for size,
profitability and investment.
and capture the association between diversifiers’ value and the level of financial
and strategic advantages.
captures the incremental gain (loss) that a diversifier gets from being diversified before.
and
capture incremental gain/loss from related diversifications. I run the models in their full format as well as some variations.
(***) = significant at 1%, (**) = significant at 5%, (*) = significant at 10%
Diversification Advantages
-.1559
(*)
-.1528
(*)
-.2153
(***)
-.1916
(**)
-.1781
(**)
-.1521
(*)

.0448

-.0379

-.0075

-.0040

-.0388

-.0077

-.0036

.0458

-.0394

-.0080

.0501

-.0355

.0474

.0633
(*)
.0599
(*)

.0638
(*)
.0639
(*)

-.0352
-.0303

-.0300
-.0094
-.0356

Control Variables
.1202
(*)
.1059
(*)
.1082
(*)
.1190
(*)
.1216
(*)
.1345
(*)

-.1637
-.1709
-.1501
-.1546
-.0791
-.0747
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.0505
(**)
.0516
(**)
.0697
(***)
.0676
(***)
.0529
(**)
.0506
(**)

-.0136

-.0146

.0468

.0152

-.0135

-.0148

.0451

-.0155

-.0153

.0562

.0180

-.0122

-.0135

.0561

.0187

-.0142

-.0149

.0549

.0161

-.0102

-.0128

.0557

.0170

.0201
.3463
(*)

.0218
.0184
.0181
.0196
.0190

Panel B - Excess Value based on Sales Multiplier
The table shows the results of the following regression:

The models above test the null hypothesis that year-to-year variation in excess value of diversified firms are explained by variation in
. I run the model with
variable as well as
variable or
variable and I control for size,
profitability and investment.
and capture the association between diversifiers’ value and the level of financial
and strategic advantages.
captures the incremental gain (loss) that a diversifier gets from being diversified before.
and
capture incremental gain/loss from related diversifications. I run the models in their full format as well as some variations. (***) =
significant at 1%, (**) = significant at 5%, (*) = significant at 10%
Diversification Advantages
.0371
.0243
.2140
(***)
.1872
(**)
.1611
(*)
.1305

.0999
(**)
.0989
(**)
.1030
(**)
.1273
(***)

-.0122

-.0006

-.0144

-.0009
.0177

-.0487
(***)
-.0484
(***)
-.0123
(*)

.0245
-.0088

.0244

-.0104

.0347

.2153
(***)
.2149
(***)
.0393
(*)

-.0150
(**)
.0278
(**)

Control Variables
-.0335

.2375

-.0509

.2303

-.0119

.2352

.0362

.2058

-.0097

.4257
(*)
.4513
(*)

.0442
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-.0653
(**)
-.0641
(**)
-.0654
(***)
-.0832
(***)
-.0566
(**)
-.0736
(***)

.0284
(**)
.0283
(**)
.0525
(***)
.0481
(***)
.0521
(***)
.0488
(***)

-.0392
(***)
-.0391
(***)
-.0336
(***)
-.0279
(**)
-.0342
(***)
-.0278
(**)

.0390

-.0235

.0351

.0410
.0481
(*)

.0390

.0225

.0362

-.0200

.0593

-.0198

.0615

-.0163

0.0407
.0301
.0291
.0274
.0248

OLS regressions with excess value based on total assets and sales multiple reveal
somehow consistent, but generally weaker, results as the Tobin’s Q regression. Annual
improvements in excess value based on total assets (Table 12) is positively related to
annual improvements in market power (
The coefficients on these variables

) and internal capital market activity (

and

).

are positive and statistically significant (at

10%). Annual improvements in excess value based on sales (Table 13) are positively
related to annual improvements in internal capital market efficiency (
revenues-based cost efficiencies (

). The coefficients on these variables

) and
and

are positive and statistically significant (at 10%). In both regressions, I obtain positive
and significant coefficient on relatedness measure

(but not

) which implies that

relatedness of diversification adds value.
Access to capital market (ATC) and share of common assets do not add value. Neither
does previous diversifying event (

). Similar to Tobin’s Q regression,

is

negative and statistically significant in the third regression. Thus, assets-based cost
efficiencies (

) has negative impact on performance and value. Unlike excess value

based on assets, excess value based on sales is positively related to profitability and
negatively related to investment.
To put things in perspective, I summarize the findings above in the table below. The table
summarizes the results of level regressions and some concluding remarks follow,
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Table 23 – The Association between Diversification Advantages and Performance
and Value
The table shows the sign of the relevant coefficients from the three regressions above.
The table, therefore, summarized the findings from the level regression analysis. A
positive sign indicates that the variable has a constructive impact on Tobin’s Q or excess
value.
Diversification Advantages

Relatedness

Tobin’s Q

-

+

-

-

+

+

0

+

+

Excess Value
based on
Total Assets

0

+

0

0

0

+

0

0

+

Excess Value
based on Sales

+

0

0

-

+

0

0

0

+

The table shows that, generally speaking, future improvements in performance and value
are attributed to annual improvements in internal capital market activity (
revenues-based cost efficiencies (
efficiencies (
market efficiency (

), and market power (

),

). Assets-based cost

) have negative impact on performance and value Internal capital
) has negative impact on performance and positive impact on

value. Share of common assets (

) do not contribute to performance or value.

Related diversifiers are better in terms of performance and value.
ii.

Annual Differences OLS Regression
The models in the previous section test the cross-sectional year-to-year variation between
performance and value and other financial and strategic advantages. In this section, I
move to a more specific question. Does the documented improvements in performance
and value stems from synchronous evolution of diversification advantages? To answer
this question, I run an annual differences model. For each dependent variable (Tobin’s Q
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and excess value), I calculate annual changes at time as the level difference between
time and time
(E23)
For each independent variable (diversification advantages and control variables 57 ), I
calculate annual percentage at time t as the level difference between time
divided by level value at time

and time

58

(E24)

Given this change in variables, the structure of the sample changes as well. The changes
are shown in the table below,
Table 24 – Description of Sample Structure After Taking Annual Differences
I lost one year of data by taking the annual differences. This table shows how total
number of observations is affected by this. Expectedly, the numbers of observations in
each year are identical to those in table 5 with a shift of one year.

0
1
1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
5
6
6
7
7
8
8
9
All years

Firm-year Observations
All Diversifying
Related
Unrelated
Events
Diversification
Diversification
316
185
131
274
159
115
223
127
96
181
107
74
140
83
57
105
63
42
76
49
27
6
6
0
5
5
0
1326
784
542

57

Except
,
,
,
and
. These are indicators and their annual difference is
meaningless.
58
Tobin’s Q is already a ratio and EV is already a discount relative to imputed value, hence no need for
further normalizing. Diversification advantages and profitability and investment variables, however, are not
normalized, hence I take the difference divided by previous period value.
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The annual differences models are,

(A)
+

(B)

(E25)

(C)

The independent variable represents annual change in performance (Tobin’s Q) and value
in every time point. The right-hand variables represent unanticipated annual improvement
(deterioration) in financial and strategic efficiencies. This regression captures
synchronous evolution between performance and value and the materialization of
diversification advantages. This model tests the null hypothesis that there is a
synchronous improvement (deterioration) between performance and value and
diversification advantages. I run the regressions for all firm-year data and observe the

s

which indicate whether a certain movement in diversification advantages derives
synchronous movements in performance and value. In other words, unlike the level
regression model that focuses on changes, this model focuses on speed of changes.
Statistically significant and positively signed slope implies that performance and value
evolution is expedited by synchronous evolution of the corresponding diversification
efficiency. The slope on

and

in this regression tests if relatedness makes
150

improvement in performance and value any faster. The slope on

tests if repeated

diversifying events make improvements in performance and value any faster.
I run the models in their full versions as well as some variations similar to those adopted
in the previous section. The results are reported in the table below,
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Table 25 – OLS Model on Annual Percentage Differences – Tobin’s Q
I run the following model:
+
I take annual percentage changes of the independent variables and annual changes in the dependent variable. Not all independence
variables are differenced. Size captures the firm size effect and its annual changes are not relevant in this context. Same argument
applies to EVENT and relatedness variables.
Diversification Advantages

Control Variables
59

-.0461

.0000

-.0000

.0644
(*)

-.0033
(***)

.0010
(**)

.0068
(*)

.0220
(***)

-.0569
(***)

-.0000

-.0000

.0216

-.0452

.0000

-.0000

.0631
(*)

-.0033
(***)

.0010
(**)

.0069
(*)

.0219
(***)

-.0585
(***)

-.0000

-.0000

.0179

-.0399

.0000

.0646
(**)

-.0028
(***)

.0068
(*)

.0228
(***)

-.0600
(***)

-.0000

-.0000

.0254

-.0031

-.0310

.0000

.0668
(*)

.0065
(*)

.0241
(***)

-.0655
(***)

-.0000

-.0000

.0363

-.0038

.0068
(*)

.0229
(***)

-.0611
(***)

-.0000

-.0000

.0253

-.0020

.0065
(*)

.0242
(***)

-.0672
(***)

-.0000

-.0000

.0361

-.0028

-.0357

-.0000

.0642
(*)

-.0249

-.0000

.0643
(*)

.0012
(**)
-.0028
(***)
.0012
(**)

-.0028

.0484
.1703
(*)

.0489

.0461
.0184
.0466
.0193

(***) = significant at 1%, (**) = significant at 5%, (*) = significant at 10%

59

I run all models with
only then with
only. Replacing Rel with DR did not change the sign or statistical significance of any of the coefficients. Some
minimal changes in coefficients magnitude is observed but the change is negligible. I show the results on including
in the full regression only for clarity and
conciseness of presentation.

152

The table shows that the developments of performance (Tobin’s Q) of diversifiers is
driven by synchronous improvements in access to capital market (
(

), market power

), revenues-based cost efficiencies (when calculated as revenues divided by expenses

-

) and share of common assets (
and

). The coefficients on these variables

,

,

are positive and economically and statistically significant. I conclude that the

speed of recovery process is driven by speed of materialization of these efficiencies.
More specifically, a diversifier that witness faster improvements in access to capital
market, market power, cost efficiencies, and share of common assets is likely to witness
faster improvements in Tobin’s Q. Further, I find that related diversifiers enjoy higher
Tobin’s Q. This is evidence by positive and statistically significant

and

.

Diversifiers performance evolution speed is not related to internal capital market
efficiency (

) or previous diversifying events (

). Finally, coefficient on

annual improvements in asset-based cost efficiencies (calculated as total assets divided
by expenses -

) is negative and statistically significant. It implies that speed of

improvement in Tobin’s Q is reduced with this cost efficiency. Several variations in the
model do not change the sign of the coefficients and it causes very minimal changes in
the magnitude.
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Table 26 – OLS Model on Annual Percentage Differences – Excess Value
Panel A – Excess Value based on Assets Multiplier
I run the following model:
+
I take annual percentage changes of the independent variables and annual changes in the dependent variable. Not all independence
variables are differenced. Size captures the firm size effect and its annual changes are not relevant in this context. Same argument
applies to EVENT and relatedness variables.
Diversification Advantages

Control Variables

.1424

-.0000

.0000
(*)

-.0177

.0003

-.0014
(**)

.0021
(**)

.0011

-.0309

-.0000

-.0000

.1254

.1236

-.0000

.0001
(*)

-.0225

.0004

-.0015
(**)

.0019
(**)

.0015

-.0356

-.0000

-.0000

.1115

.1379

-.0000

-.0181

-.0003

.0021
(**)

-.0016

-.0277

-.0000

-.0000

.1200

-.0534

.1506

-.0000

-.0183

.0022
(**)

.0009

-.0326

-.0000

-.0000

.1329

-.0537

.0021
(**)

-.0002

-.0248

-.0000

-.0000

.1198

-.0559

.0022
(**)

.0008

-.0298

-.0000

-.0000

.1239

-.0559

.1274

.0000
(*)

-.0177

.1402

.0000
(*)

-.0178

-.0012
(**)
-.0003
-.0012
(**)

(***) = significant at 1%, (**) = significant at 5%, (*) = significant at 10%
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-.0550

.0137
.0858
(*)

.0119

.0074
.0106
.0102
.0133

Panel B – Excess Value based on Sales Multiplier
I run the following model:
+
I take annual percentage changes of the independent variables and annual changes in the dependent variable. Not all independence
variables are differenced. Size captures the firm size effect and its annual changes are not relevant in this context. Same argument
applies to EVENT and relatedness variables.
Diversification Advantages

Control Variables

-.1241

.0000

-.0000

.0079

-.0010

-.0001

.0060
(*)

.0175

.0038

.0000

-.0000

.0396

-.1199

.0000

-.0000

.0081

-.0010

-.0001

.0059
(*)

.0174

.0038

.0000

-.0000

.0401

-.1286

.0000

.0181

-.0010

.0060
(**)

.0175

.0049

.0000

-.0000

.0395

.0083

-.1228

.0000

.0087

.0061
(*)

.0182

.0020

.0000

-.0000

.0440

.0106

.0060
(**)

.0178

.0039

.0000

-.0000

.0376

.0105

.0061
(*)

.0185

.0007

.0000

-.0000

.0421

.0129

-.1247

-.0000

.0061

-.1181

-.0000

.0068

-.0007
-.0010
-.0007

(***) = significant at 1%, (**) = significant at 5%, (*) = significant at 10%
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.0093

.076
.0854

.0137

.0074
.0059
.0054
.0044

OLS annual difference regressions with excess value do not comply much with the
results of OLS annual difference regression with Tobin’s Q. Only market power seems to
have similar impact on speed of value recovery as it has on Tobin’s Q i.e. faster
improvements in market value contributes to faster improvement in value. Internal capital
market activity does have positive impact on the speed of value recovery but its impact is
very minimal (

is very small) and limited to excess value based on assets multiplier.

Similar to earlier finding with Tobin’s Q regression, repeated diversifying events do not
make the value recovery process any faster. Relatedness speeds up the value recovery
process but the impact is limited to excess value based on assets multiplier and to the
variable (but not

). Internal capital market efficiency, access to capital market,

cost efficiencies, and share of common assets do not contribute to the speed of value
recovery.
iii.

Annual Percentage Differences OLS Regression with interaction variables:

Inclusion of
only i.e.

and
and

variables in the models above allows for intercept differences
capture the full impact of relatedness on the evolution process (in

level regression) and speed of the recovery process (in the annual change regressions). In
this section I am interested in different inquiry. I look at the relatedness “incremental”
impact on performance and value through financial and strategic advantages
Econometrically, this is done by interacting each advantage variable with the
variable and test the significance of interaction variable.

60

This is equivalent to testing if diversification advantages have differential impact in performance and
value between related and unrelated diversifiers.
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60

.

and

The null hypothesis here is that the dependent variable (performance or value evolution)
follows the same model for related and unrelated diversifiers conditioned on the studied
variable V and is tested by the significance of the corresponding coefficient. Positive and
statistically significant coefficient implies that the studied variable V have larger impact
on related diversifiers’ performance and value. In the context of our model, since the
independent variables are annual percentage differences and dependent variables are
annual changes, larger impact is safely interpreted as faster improvement. The model also
tests if all diversification advantages contribute jointly to faster (slower) improvement in
related diversifiers performance and value. This is done by testing the joint significance
(Wald test) of all coefficients including the coefficient on
The results are reported in the table below,
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and

Table 27 – OLS Model on Annual Differences with Interaction Variables61

Excess Value
based on
Assets
Excess Value
based on
Total Sales

-.1047

.0000

-.0000

.0415

.0000

-.0000

-.0000
(*)
-.0000

.0000
(*)
.0000

Rel.ATC

Tobin’s Q

ATC

Panel A - Interaction with

.0554

.0116

.0068

-.0202

-.0021
(***)
.0005

-.0027
(**)
.0001

.0001

.0018

-.0028

.0018

.0069
(*)
.0021

.0085
(*)
.0014

(**)
-.1599

-.0000

.0000

.0000

.0001

.0230

-.0171

-.0028

-.0023

.0311
(**)
.0165

-.0137

.0759

-.0246

.1151

.0211

-.0045

.0408

(*)

-.0013

.0026

.0061

.0067

.0020
(**)
-.0014

.0042

.0006
(***)
.0008

.0132
(***)
.0169

(***)

(***)

.0005

.0121

(*)

(*)

(**)

ATC

Panel B - Interaction with

Tobin’s Q
Excess
Value based
on Assets
Excess
Value based
on Total
Sales
61

-.0636

.0001

-.0004

-.0000

.0863

.0000

-.0000

.0001

.0000

.0554

.1217

-.0258

-.0927

-.0033
(***)
.0002

-.0057
(**)
.0027

.0012

(*)
-.1324

-.0000

.0003

-.0000

.0003

-.0163

.8409

-.0008

-.0143

-.0005

.0135

Only diversification and interaction variables coefficients are shown. Control variables are suppressed for clarity of presentation.
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.0311
(**)
.0075
.0200

-.0137

.4840

.2793

1.891

(*)

(**)

-.0698

.0026

The table shows that market power have a positive differential impact on related
diversifiers. When market power is interacted with

variable, we see that market

power has stronger impact on related diversifiers Tobin’s Q and excess value (based on
assets multiplier). When market power is interacted with

variable, we notice that

market power has stronger impact on related diversifiers Tobin’s Q and excess value
(based on both assets and sales multipliers). This is not surprising. Market power variable
reflects mainly market share. It is quite expected that diversifier who seek merger or
acquisitions of units in related industry are more capable to capitalize on increased
market share than diversifier who acquire business units from completely different
industry. We also note that share of common assets has stronger impact on related
diversifiers value (but not Tobin’s Q) when it is interacted with
Rel).
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variable (but not

VI.

Conclusion

The main contribution of this dissertation is tracking diversified companies’ performance
over several post-event years. The dominant belief in diversification literature is that
diversification destroys value (Lang and Stulz, 1994 and Berger and Ofek 1995 and
Servaes, 1996) and related diversification is more value constructive than unrelated
diversification (Bettis and Mahajan, 1985 and Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988 and
Berger and Ofeck, 1995). Yet, a small portion of the literature shows evidence of a
diversification premium (Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas (2001) and Villalonga, 2004a,
b) and the literature, as it currently stands, is not completely conclusive about the impact
of diversification strategy on value (Martin and Sayrak, 2003 and Ravichandran, Liu,
Han and Hasan, 2009). Anecdotally, diversification has been a popular business strategy
over the last 4 decades (Serveas, (1996), Montgomery (1994), and Mukherjee, Kiymaz,
& Baker (2004)). Why diversification is such a popular corporate strategy despite the
overwhelming evidence supporting the value-erosion hypothesis of diversification and
documents negative market reactions to focus-decreasing moves? Possible explanations
of the found in literature focus on management self-interest pursuits (Jensen (1986) and
Jensen and Murphy (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1990a,b), Hyland and Diltz (2002) and
Aggarwal and Samwick (2003)). Alternatively, I argue that documented discount
associated with diversification strategy is an artifact of limited subject-specific time
horizon of previous studies. Specifically, I argue that the discount is limited to short
period around the diversification event. The literature presents several evidences that
diversification strategy carries some financial advantages (internal capital market and
access to capital market) and strategic advantages (market power and cost efficiencies).
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These advantages are, at least partially, private information at the time of the diversifying
event and thus they are not fully priced. Further, these advantages are inherently evolving
and are uncertain at the time of diversification, thus the initial discount. Over time,
positive consequences materialize, uncertainty diminishes, and the initial discount fades
away. Formally, I present and test a hypothesis that diversifiers exchange immediate
diversification discount with future value gain attributed to unanticipated financial and
strategic advantages of diversification. Two implications of this hypothesis are tested.
First, the initial diversification discount found in static methodologies should be
attenuated in a dynamic analysis. Second, diversifier’s value evolves jointly with the
materialization of certain financial and strategic efficiencies.
I construct a unique sample composed of a list of merger/acquisition event collected from
SDC (Securities Data Company) in 1998-2008. Then, I use CIS (COMPUSTAT Industry
Segment) to track the value and performance of these diversifiers over time. Value is
measured by the standard excess value approach of Berger and Ofek (1995) and
performance is measured by Tobin’s Q used by Lang and Stulz (1994), Servaes (1996)
and Steiner (1996). I also track the evolution of strategic and financial efficiencies of the
parent company and analyze its dynamic impact on value and performance. Thus, the
final sample used in this dissertation includes 1,642 firm-year observations (969 in
related events and 673 in unrelated events) from 316 M&A events (185 related events
and 131 unrelated events).
I track each diversifier for up to 9 years after diversification. Years 8 and 9 are ignored
due to very small number of observations. Depicted trends show that the value recovery
momentum continues for up to 5 years form diversifying event. Tobin’s Q of unrelated
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diversifiers declines sharply in years 6 and 7. Excess value based on total assets
multiplier and sales multiplier in years 6 and 7 are not significantly different form zero.
Nevertheless, due to smaller number of observations in years 6 and 7, I refrain from
making a solid generalization of this observation62.
Consistent with my hypothesis, I find evidence of value recovery (reduction in excess
value) in subsequent years after the diversification event and it is accompanied with
parallel improvement in performance (increase in Tobin’s Q). Diversification discount
declines constantly over the first 3 years from event before it turns into a premium in year
4 and continues to improve thereafter. When the test is conditioned on relatedness, I find
a noticeable differential in recovery speed between related and unrelated diversifiers. The
diversification discount persists for at least one year in related diversifiers and may
persist for up to 4 years in unrelated diversifiers. In both cases, however, the initial
discount does improve (i.e. decline) steadily over time and eventually it turns into a
premium.
Surprisingly, and somehow inconsistent with my hypothesis, value recovery process does
not start immediately after the diversifying event. There seem to be an initial decline in
value and performance of diversifiers in the year that follows the year of diversification
before the recovery process kicks off in year 2. Specifically, Tobin’s Q worsens in the in
year 1 i.e. one year after the diversification event before it, consistent with my
62

It is particularly surprising that all three measures of performance and value start to decline at exactly the
same time distance from event (i.e. at 6 years). In fact, the curves depicted suggest that diversification
impact on value and performance follow a curve that increases initially up to a maximum before it starts to
decline again. This suggests that some negative consequences of diversification consummate at some
distant point in time and rises sharply thereafter. This possibility is beyond the scope of this dissertation but
further investigation might be a fertile research field For researchers interested in investigating this point, it
might be fruitful to think of market-related explanations such as product cycle or legal explanations such as
taxes
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hypothesis, improves gradually starting in year 2. Similarly, there seem to be a “dip” in
excess value in first year after the diversifying event. This might be explained as a result
of “disturbance” that the diversifying event creates but further research is needed to
address this particular observation63.
I run three different forms of OLS regressions to test the prediction of joint evolution of
diversification efficiencies with value and performance: 1) regression with level values 2)
regression with annual changes and 3) regression with annual changes interacted with
variable and

variable.

The result of the level OLS regression with Tobin’s Q indicates that annual
improvements in performance (higher Tobin’s Q) are driven by annual improvements in
internal capital market activity, market power, and cost efficiencies. When dependent
variable in the level OLS regression is excess value, I document positive impact of future
improvements in market power and internal capital market activity on excess value based
on asset multiplier and positive impact of annual improvements in cost efficiency and
internal capital market activity on excess value based on sales multiplier. These findings
lend support to the general implication of my hypothesis that future improvements in
diversifiers’ performance and value are derived by future materialization of financial and
strategic advantages.
63

For interested researchers, a plausible explanation of this trend could be that diversifier’s performance
declines initially for some administrative and operational reasons. First, management time is spent on
closing the deal and attempting to bring the new unit(s) into full harmony with existing ones. Second, the
new unit(s) and existing units may be using existing common resources inefficiently before they “learn to
work together” as described by Hund, Monk, and Tice (2010). Finally, the diversifying event is a huge
transaction that could by itself create disturbance and distraction in operations. Subsequent boost of
performance comes after the legal and administrative procedures of the deal are completed and the new
unit(s) has come into complete harmony with existing ones and become an inherent part of the new
organizational structure.
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The results of the annual changes OLS regression reveals that improvements in market
power contribute to faster improvement in performance measure (Tobin’s Q) and faster
value recovery process (excess value). I also find that access to capital market, cost
efficiencies and share of common assets contribute to faster improvements in Tobin’ Q
(but not value). Finally, the regression with annual changes interacted with
and

variable

variable indicates that improvements in market power has stronger impact on

speed of recovery (of both Tobin’s Q and excess value) in related diversifiers relative to
unrelated ones.
Several other findings about diversification are reported. 1) Regression analysis confirms
earlier findings in this dissertation and in literature that related diversifiers outperforms
unrelated ones in and trade at higher value. However, I find that related diversifiers also
enjoy faster value recovery process relative to unrelated ones. 2) The structure of my
sample allows for controlling for repeated diversifying behavior. I find that subsequent
diversifying events contribute to higher Tobin’s Q (but not higher value) of diversifier.
Further, repeated diversifying behavior does not make the recovery process any faster. 3)
I find mixed results on internal capital market efficiency impact. It has negative impact
on Tobin’s Q an positive impact on value. This is not surprising given mixed evidence in
the literature on the impact of internal capital market efficiency. I do find, however, that
internal capital market efficiency do not contribute to the speed of value recovery.
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VIII.

Appendix A: Literature Review

In the following, I focus on major findings under major topics of corporate
diversification. Four distinct topics are presented separately for the purpose of clarity: the
value-erosion hypothesis, the value-creation hypothesis, the impact of related vs.
unrelated diversification and persistence.
A. Value-erosion Hypothesis of Corporate Diversification
Advocates of the value-erosion hypothesis posit that diversifiers sell at a discount
compared to matching pure-plays. The standard methodological approach is to compare
the value of multiple-segment firm to the sum of imputed value of its segments (as in
Berger and Ofek, 1995) or to compare performance (measured by Tobin’s Q) of multiplesegment firms to performance of single-segment firms (as in Lang and Stulz, 1994;
Servaes, 1996; and Steiner, 1996). A second methodological approach involves
investigation of market reaction by regressing returns on a measure of diversification
such as Herfindahl Index (as in Comment and Jarrell, 1995) or by running an abnormal
return analysis around divestiture dates (as in Desai and Jain, 1999). The collective
evidence presented in those studies shows that diversification is associated with trading at
a discount, poorer performance and negative market reaction at announcement date.
Explanations of the value-erosion fall under three major categories: agency, internal
market inefficiencies and information asymmetry. Agency-based explanations (as in
Denis, Denis and Sarin, 1997, Chen and Steiner, 2000 and Rotemberg and Saloner 1994)
advocate exacerbation of free cash flow problem and the inability to motivate managers.
The internal capital market hypothesis attributes value-erosion to inefficient resource
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allocation (as in Lamont, 1997, Rajan, Servaes and Zingales. 2000 and Shin and Stulz,
1998). Finally, information asymmetry-based explanations posit that diversification
discount stems from over-investment problems (as in Stulz, 1990, Matsusaka and Nanda,
2002).64
In the following two subsections, I explain in detail the above cited evidence and
explanations of the value-erosion hypothesis of corporate diversification strategy.
iv.

The Evidence of Value-erosion Hypothesis of Corporate Diversification
Lang and Stulz (1994) find a strong evidence of diversification discount and poor

performance of diversifying firms. They show that diversified firms have a lower Tobin’s
Q than comparable portfolios of pure-play firms. They also show that diversification
level is negatively related to performance measured by Tobin’s Q throughout the 1980s.
They conclude that diversified firms are consistently valued less than specialized firms.
They note, however, that poor performance of diversifiers may not be attributed mainly
to being diversified because diversifiers are likely to perform poorly even before they
diversify. They suggest that diversification might be a strategy of seeking external growth
after all opportunities of internal growth have been exploited i.e. diversification move is a
symptom of overinvestment problem65. A seminal paper in the domain of diversification
discount is that of Berger and Ofek (1995). They estimate diversification's effect on

64

Nevertheless, some authors argue that diversification discount arises endogenously because acquired
firms are usually discounted before they are purchased (Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) and Campa
and Kedia (2002)). The literature also presents management’s self-interest motivations of diversifications
grounded in the agency theory such as managements’ love for power, entrenchment, prestige and perks
(Shleifer and Vishny (1990a,b), Hyland and Diltz (2002) and Aggarwal and Samwick (2003)). These are
explained in more details below.
65
The reasoning supplied here is that mangers diversify because they have excess cash and little investment
opportunity inside there firms.
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firm’s value by imputing stand-alone values for segments of a diversified firm.
Comparing the firm’s imputed value (sum of stand-alone values of its segments) to the
firm's actual value implies a 13% to 15% average value loss from diversification during
1986-1991. They also show that profitability of pure-play firms is higher than
profitability of comparable segment of a diversified firm. They also find evidence that
supports Lang and Stulz’s (1994) suggestion of overinvestment problem. Specifically,
they document higher propensity to overinvest in segments of a diversified firm
compared to a pure-plays. Servaes (1996) examines samples of firms in three year
intervals over the 1961-1976 period when the diversification merger wave started. He
compares Tobin’s Q of multiple-segment firms with that of single-segment firms to
measure capital markets reaction to diversification. He documents a large diversification
discount during the 1960s (during the diversification wave) that declined to zero during
the 1970s. Specifically, he finds that the difference between Tobin’s Q of multi-segment
firms and Tobin’s Q of single-segment firms is negative and statistically significant in
every year of the studied period and declines from -0.4 in 1961 to -0.04 in 1976. He also
finds

results

that

contradict

with

Lang

and

Stulz’s (1994)

suggestion

of

underperformance before diversifying. Specifically, he finds that firms have low
valuation because they are diversified not because poorly performing firms decide to
diversify. Steiner (1996) incorporates ownership structure and diversification into the
same model of Tobin’s Q. Using data from 1992, he finds that Tobin’s Q is negatively
related to the level of diversification which is consistent with the value-erosion
hypothesis of diversification66.

66

It has been shown also that diversification discount is not a US-specific phenomenon but might be a
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Market reaction analysis studies also support value-erosion hypothesis of diversification
because the market seems to react favorably to increases in corporate focus. Comment
and Jarrell (1995) find that shareholder returns increase with focus. Using the revenuebased Herfindahl Index, they find that an increase in focus of 0.1 is associated with an
additional stock return of 4.3%. Similarly, using the asset-based Herfindahl Index, they
find that an increase in focus of 0.1 is associated with an additional stock return of 3.5%.
Desai and Jain (1999) use a sample of 155 spinoffs between the years 1975 and 1991 and
find that the announcement period as well the long-run abnormal returns for the focusincreasing spinoffs are significantly larger than the corresponding abnormal returns for
the non-focus-increasing spinoffs.
v.

Possible Explanations of Value-erosion Hypothesis of Corporate Diversification

Probably the simplest and most intuitive explanation of the diversification discount is that
corporate diversification runs against one of the most-celebrated concepts in economics
that specialization is more productive (Matsusaka, 2001). Three other possible
explanations for the cross-sectional diversification discount are found in literature. The
first explanation is grounded in the agency problems arguments set forth by Jensen and
Meckling (1976) and Jensen (1986). Stulz (1990) shows that diversification allows firms
to set up an internal capital market where cash flows are pooled and re-allocated among
divisions. This, however, might trigger a free cash flow problem (i.e. over-investment
problem suggested by Jensen, 1986) or exacerbate an existing one. Rotemberg and
developed-markets-specific phenomenon. Lin and Servaes (1999) examine a large sample of firms in
Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. They find significant diversification discount of 10% in Japan
and 15% in UK but no significant diversification discount in Germany. Lin and Servaes (2002) use a
sample of over 1,000 firms form seven emerging markets in 1995 and find that diversified firms trade at a
7% discount. Fauver, Houston and Naranjo (2004) examine across 35 countries and find that diversification
discount is more likely to occur in high income and common law economies.
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Saloner (1994) show that diversified firms are less powerful in combating agency-related
symptoms because diversification precludes offering incentives to motivate managers.
Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) also provide evidence consistent with agency cost
explanation of corporate diversification discount. They find that focus-increasing
strategies are triggered by external corporate control threats, financial distress, and
management turnover and conclude that agency problems are responsible for firms
maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies. Chen and Steiner (2000) advocate
that diversification exacerbates agency problems such as excess discretionary cash flow.
They find that the level of excess discretionary funds in the firm is a significant and
positive determinant of the level of diversification.
The second explanation of the diversification discount advocates inefficient allocation of
resources by the internal capital market. Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992) asserts that
internally-generated funds are likely to be used in the cross-subsidization of failing
business segments. They argue that a stand-alone unit can reach a minimum value of zero
while a cross-subsidized unit can have a negative value because it is negative value is
absorbed by other units in the conglomerate. Lamont (1997) focuses on the oil
companies’ non-oil segments during the 1986 oil shock (oil prices fell by 50%). He finds
correlation between oil cash flow and non-oil investments and suggested that this is
because large diversified companies overinvest in and subsidize underperforming
segments. Rajan, Servaes and Zingales (2000) also find evidence of inefficient allocation
of resources. They model the internal power struggles for resources in diversified firms
(in a sense, this is also an agency-based problem). The model predicts that increased
diversification causes resources to flow toward the most inefficient division. They test the
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model with US data from 1980 to 1993 and find evidence consistent with model
predictions of inefficient allocation of resources in diversified firms.

Similarly,

Scharfstien and Stein (2000) show how rent-seeking behavior of divisions managers
could lessen the efficiency of internal capital market. Shin and Stulz (1998) use segment
information from Compustat and find evidence consistent with the inefficient internal
capital market hypothesis. They find no evidence that the internal capital market protects
the investment budgets of good segments in cases of adverse cash flow shocks. At the
same time, however, a segment’s investment is affected by the cash flow shortfall of the
firm regardless of the value of its investment opportunities. They conclude that
investment by a segment is more sensitive to its own cash flow than it is to firm cash
flow. In effect, resources eventually flow toward inefficient divisions67.
The third explanation of diversification discount is based on internal and external
information asymmetry. Myerson (1982) and Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv (1982) suggest
that conglomerates are more likely to incur costs of information asymmetry between
central management and divisional management. CEOs of major companies such as
Robert Allen of AT&T and Dennis Pickard of Raytheon expressed their belief that the
market better understand strategies of stand-alone units and, thus, gives them higher
valuation (see quotations in Krishnaswami and Subramanian, 1999). Stulz (1990) shows
that in presence of information asymmetry internal capital market exacerbates free cash
flow problem and this reduces the value of diversifiers. Matsusaka and Nanda (2002)
show that increased information asymmetry between managers and owners results in
over-investment and misallocation of resources. Information asymmetry problem is also
67

Siddiqi and Warganegara (2003) also report evidence that spin-offs reduce capital mis-allocations.
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acute in the related literature of corporate spin-offs, carve-outs, and targeted stock
offerings. Nanda and Narayanan (1999) find that transparency improves following a
breakup of a conglomerate into several focused units. Krishnaswami and Subramanian
(1999) demonstrate that spin-offs enhance value because they mitigates information
asymmetry in diversified firms.
Some authors find evidence that diversification discount arises endogenously i.e.
diversification discount exists not because diversification is a bad strategy per se, rather,
because acquirers tend to purchase already discounted business units. For instance,
Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) find evidence that acquired firms sell at a discount
before they are purchased. Campa and Kedia (2002) also find evidence in support of the
endogenous diversification discount effect. This explanation fits well with the hypothesis
addressed in this dissertation. Managers may acquire undervalued business units, and
accept the initial negative market reaction, hoping that harmony and synergy between the
new unit(s) and the existing one(s) would reverse the discount in the future.
B. Value-creation Hypothesis of Corporate Diversification
There is much less evidence of the value-creation hypothesis of diversification. The
fundamental argument presented is by Villalonga (2004a, b) who documents a
diversification premium and shows that diversification discount is an artifact of data
used. Similarly, evidence of positive market reaction to diversification announcements
(as in Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas, 2001) is limited compared to evidence of negative
reaction. The most prominent explanation for value-creation is efficient internal capital
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market.68 The following section list major evidences of the value-creation hypothesis of
corporate diversification.
The evidence on diversification premium is very limited compared to that on
diversification discount. The most prominent work in this domain is that of Villalonga
(2004a, b). She shows that that diversification discount is an artifact of data used. She
uses unit-level rather than segment-level data and documents a diversification premium.
Villalonga (2004a) uses causal inference techniques to examine diversification impact on
value. First, she uses the matching estimators of Dehejia and Wahba (1999, 2001) and
Abadie and Imbens (2002) to match diversifiers and pure-play firms on their
diversification propensity score (the predicted values from a probit model of the
propensity to diversify). Second, she uses Heckman’s (1979) two-stage estimator to
compare value across diversifiers to pure-plays. Both methodologies render insignificant
OLS effect i.e. no difference in value between diversifiers and pure-plays. She concludes
that corporate diversification does not destroy value. Villalonga (2004b), goes on to show
that the diversification discount found in earlier work might be an artifact of the data
used. She uses a sample from Business Information Tracking Series (BITS) which is a
census database that covers the whole U.S. economy at the establishment level. She
argues that this data allows for better comparison across firms because business units are
more consistently and objectively defined than segments. Using this data on a sample that

68

Note that some advantages and disadvantages of diversification share the same theoretical ground. For
instance, internal capital market allows easier access to capital (advantage) but also exacerbates agencyrelated free cash flow problem (disadvantage).
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yields a diversification discount according to segment data, she finds evidence of large
and statistically significant diversification premium.69
C. Related vs. Unrelated Diversifications
Not all acquisitions lead to diversification. Acquisitions lead to extreme diversification
when occurring across different industries. Acquisitions lead to minimal diversification
when firms acquire a close competitor from the same industry. Broadly speaking, related
diversification refers to the case where acquired unit belong to the same, or very similar,
industry as the acquirer (i.e. related or intra-industry diversification) or to a completely
different industry (i.e. unrelated or inter-industry diversification). The predominant belief
is that related diversifications are more constructive than unrelated ones (Bettis and
Mahajan, 1985 and Wernerfelt and Montgomery, 1988 and Berger and Ofeck, 1995)
because the former leverages significant business synergies while the latter suffers from
agency costs and inefficient resource allocation. Nevertheless, while many authors
controlled for relatedness effect and document superiority of related diversification, we
still have very little evidence on the cause-effect aspects of this phenomenon.
Lewellen (1971) noted that strategic advantages of a merger are more likely to
materialize in intra-industry mergers (i.e. related diversifications). Rumelt’s (1974) work
is considered to be pioneering in this area. It is the first research effort that empirically
distinguished between related and unrelated diversification. He establishes nine
categories of diversification based on the level of relatedness and finds that related

69

Hadlock, Ryngaert, and Thomas (2001) examine the effect of corporate diversification on the equity
issue process. Using a sample of 641equity issues in the 1983-94 period, they show that the market views
equity issues by diversified firms less negatively than equity issues by focused firms.
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diversifiers generally tend to outperform unrelated diversifiers. Further, he shows that
narrowly focused (related-constrained) diversification are more profitable than the
broadly focused (related-linked) diversification. Bettis and Mahajan (1985) investigate
the risk-return tradeoff in profits for 80 related and unrelated diversifiers and find that
related diversifiers outperform unrelated diversifiers on average. Wernerfelt and
Montgomery (1988) use Tobin’s Q as a measure of performance and find that narrowly
diversified firms do better than widely diversified ones. Berger and Ofeck (1995)
compare the sum of imputed stand-alone values to the firm's actual value and find that
value loss is smaller when the segments of the diversified firm are in the same two-digit
SIC code.
D. Evolution of the Impact of Diversification
Evolution of the impact of diversification is an important sub-topic of corporate
diversification that has received very little attention. Therefore, the results presented on
this topic are very limited and inconclusive. Hyland (2003) finds evidence of a drop in
Tobin’s Q in the first year after diversification compared to three years prior to
diversification. Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker (1992) use a large sample of mergers
between NYSE acquirers and NYSE/AMEX targets. They find a statistically significant
two-year post-merger CAAR of -0.0494 and five-year post-merger CAAR of -0.1026 that
persists even after controlling for size, book-to-market ratio, and beta. They conclude that
shareholders of acquiring firms suffer a value loss of about 5% during the two-year postmerger period and 10% during the five-year post-merger period. More importantly, they
suggest that the market may adjust slowly to news of mergers. This finding supports my
hypothesis that “strategic” advantages of diversification are not immediately priced but
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rather materialize gradually over time. Recently, Hund, Monk, and Tice (2010) use Pástor
and Veronesi’s (2003) rational learning model to show that the initial adverse effect of
diversification is mitigated over time as the conglomerate segments “learn” to work
together.
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